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iABSTRACT
Access to water and sanitation is indeed a human right; however quality water and
sanitation service provision should not be assumed a ‘free service’ as a result. Hence it
is crucial to understand the costs involved of monopoly water service provision to
enable informed decision-making on tariff determination. Namibia, is not only
characterised with extreme conditions of water scarcity and skewed income distribution,
with a history of free water services, but it also is prone to information asymmetry and
lack of transparency (especially financial) challenges in the price-setting process.
Hence, the research aim was to adapt a framework for determining price-setting
processes and to investigate the potential role of an economic regulator to inform the
process and policy accordingly in Namibia. In this regard, the research explores the
price-setting processes of independent economic regulators in England and Wales and
Zambia (as a guide to understand the dynamics and intricacies of setting and enforcing
prices for utilities based on the need for sustainable cost recovery and efficient service
provision) to further investigate possible improvements to the Namibian price-setting
process. The research objectives were explored through descriptive and exploratory case
study approaches, mainly comprising of semi-structured interviews and focus group
discussions.
The research found that the most appropriate regulatory framework for Namibia is an
intermediate framework- a hybrid regulatory body (consisting of a combination between
government and independent expert panels). The research also identifies crucial
operating principles, regulatory tools (with emphasis on accounting separation within
financial models) and consumer involvement as major components for the Namibian
price-setting process. In essence, accountability through transparency (effective
information sharing and stakeholder involvement) is identified by the study to address
the principal-agent challenges faced within Namibia, especially given the extreme
conditions.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and objectives
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Chapter 1: Introduction and objectives
Namibia has a particular challenge, in terms of its urban water services provision and
price-setting processes, with an emphasis on affordability for basic services to the urban
poor, given extreme water scarcity and highly skewed income distribution challenges.
This chapter provides the context and concepts that outline the research problem and the
related research objectives, followed by a brief outline of the thesis structure.
1.1 Providing water services in urban areas
Providing water services to an increasing urban population is a challenge for all
governments throughout the world. It is a challenge, especially in developing countries,
because physical water scarcity does not always allow for new sources of water to be
exploited to provide the necessary services (Vairavamoorthy and Mansoor, 2006: 188).
Urban migration is causing huge concern and exacerbating the water scarcity problem
faced in urban areas of developing countries. As a result, poverty increases due to
limited access to water and sanitation services to inhabitants, leading to various health
implications. For example, cities such as Bombay, Lagos, Jakarta and Karachi are faced
with rapidly increasing populations in a short period of time and thus cannot cope with
the demand for essential services. The necessary infrastructure and capacities to manage
water supply and sewerage services is a major limitation and thus exacerbate
inequalities in service provision and living standards between the rich and poor (Sohail,
2004: 11).
The increase in development of informal and squatter settlements in developing
countries, often declared to be ‘illegal’,, adds further strain on service providers to
expand services to these areas. It is estimated that approximately 30-60 percent of total
urban populations are made up of these settlements (Uitto et al., 2000: 9). These
settlements normally have very little space for in-house water and sanitation facilities,
and hence make use of communal outlets for these services. In this regard, it is noted
that governments often neglect these areas, and service is mostly directed to the rich
part of the population. This is because it is believed that “adequate cost recovery for the
provision of services to these settlements is not possible” (Uitto et al., 2000: 10; Sansom
et al., 2004: 57). This contributes to rapid decrease of already poor services, causing a
heavy impact on the health and environment in these areas. In addition, due to the focus
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placed on improving access to clean drinking water, the sanitation sector has been
severely neglected, with figures of lack of access to sanitation facilities in urban areas
increasing steeply (Mara, 2005: 57).
Politically there is unwillingness to charge for water and sanitation services, which have
adverse effects for any service provider/utilities’ financial sustainability (Franceys,
2005: 210) and in turn leads to inequitable service distribution. Hence financial
implications (increasing capital, operating and maintenance costs) of catering for the
growing water and sanitation requirements are unmanageable for many water utilities
and governments. Winpenny (1994: 5) attributes this failure primarily to improper
pricing and cost-recovery. Other factors include high proportion of leaks and wastage,
weak billing and collection systems, illegal connections and theft and erratic payments
by large consumers (Vairavamoorthy and Mansoor, 2006: 198). As a consequence water
utilities are unable to maintain, repair and expand their systems; resulting in poor
quality of water and sanitation services.
In this regard, major shortcomings in most urban utilities are summarised by Uitto et al.,
2000: 15-16; Winpenny, 1994: 5; Dutta and Tiwari, 2006: 141,143; Sohail, 2004: 11)
as:
 Improper or no metering systems in place, resulting in little monitoring and
replacements of faulty meters,
 Improper water tariffs, causing under-billing leading to waste of water and no
proper conservation measures in place to manage it,
 Improper financial management of utilities, in many cases results in long delays
in bill collections (for example in Dhaka and Shangai cities, it takes 11 months
for bill collections),
 Improper account for operation and management expenses (these include
replacement of pipes, valves water meters, service vehicles and reduction of
unaccounted for water), this leads to investments made on improper maintained
system, which ends up doubling costs and system inefficiencies and causes poor
service to the customers, and
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 Poor capacities and institutional arrangements of utility companies. It is
recorded that in many developing countries that utilities are most over-staffed
and under-trained leading to “low financial returns” and inefficiencies.
Inefficiency of water utilities can thus be attributed to poor management, in a nutshell.
In this regard, financial and political autonomy, as well as clear and transparent tariff
policy (“that is acceptable to the people and politicians”) are key ingredients to a
successful water utility operation (Uitto et al., 2000: 17-18). Another indicator of poor
management is extensive use of communal taps in urban cities. These normally indicate
“lower levels of service and high wastage”. Utilities cannot recover all their revenue
from such taps and it normally calls for subsidisation, mainly from taxes (Sohail, 2004:
11). In this regard to be able to meet the goal of provision for basic services to all users,
cross-subsidisation from the rich to the poor is an issue that needs to be explored. The
Bonn Charter for safe drinking water (2004), supports the notion of cross-subsidies for
the “economic disadvantaged” groups and thus urges governments or regulatory
authorities to set the price of water “so that it does not prevent consumers from
obtaining water of sufficient quantity and quality to meet fundamental domestic needs”
(IWA, 2004: 9).
1.2 Price-setting processes for urban water and sanitation services
During the 1980s, water reforms became increasingly popular, largely due to the
increasing demands of population growth and urbanisation coupled by lack of
governmental financial support (including non payment (limited) for services) and poor
management (GTZ, 2008: 7). Decentralised structures and corporatized companies
formed the basis of water sector reforms. However, limited knowledge and skills lead to
the failure of many such reforms (Swatuk, 2005: 877) – a key challenge being the
continuing unwillingness to establish viable water tariffs. In many cases, local
government is responsible for water services, and therefore sets the prices through an
internal process (self-regulation), however due to large budget allocation systems (for
mixed services) the process is often not transparent (Rouse, 2007: 25; Bartle and Vass,
2005). The challenges of self-regulation include improper legal and regulatory
framework and lack of definition of clear roles and responsibilities as a result of limited
expertise. There is a high level of information asymmetries in developing countries as a
result of these constraints which, in many cases, can be described as the result of
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regulatory weaknesses (Parker et al., 2002: 11) but in reality it is more the absence of
any understanding of the requirement for a regulatory process. Information
asymmetries in this context refers to one party having more information over another
(Nickson and Franceys, 2003: 5). Hence, customers often do not understand the charges
(Rouse, 2007: 25), which affects payment for services. In order to minimise political
pressures, services are under-priced with the resulting lack of revenue affecting the
sustainability and quality of services rendered. In this regard, regulatory frameworks
and structures are required to set, monitor and enforce prices for water and sanitation
services. These structures vary widely across countries depending largely on the
ownership (public or private) and composition of water service providers as well as the
understanding of economic, price-setting, regulation.
The incentives of having regulators in place are to ensure efficient service delivery,
while protecting consumers against unfair charges for services. Overall, implementation
of these ‘incentives’ requires change in policy/regulatory frameworks as well as
adequate stakeholder involvement (including politicians and consumers) (Franceys and
Gerlach, 2008: 16). This process is highly dependent on accurate information for
informed decision making processes, and hence it’s the duty of such regulators to create
the necessary incentives to receive such information (Parker et al., 2002: 3-5),
especially financial and operational statistics. Transparency is thus very important and
stakeholder involvement, especially with regard to issues such as cost recovery and
tariff structures, is required in relation to improved water and sanitation service
provision (Jamison et al., 2004: 13). Hence the advocacy of having “some form of
independent regulation” is now deemed as “essential for sustainable water services”
(Rouse, 2007: 20). Economic regulation, particularly of public service providers is a
relatively new development and there is a lot of scepticism regarding the extent of
‘independence’ regulators can exercise. This is necessarily highly dependent on the
political situation of a country and therefore it is up to the country to identify the
appropriate level of regulation (Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 9). In terms of water services,
independent regulators refer to those that have the autonomy “to set tariffs, take
enforcement action and impose sanctions” (Rouse, 2007: 29).
Performances of regulatory processes in lower-income countries are ‘under-researched’
and hence the appropriate level of economic regulation in the right socio-economic and
political context of poorer countries, still needs to be defined (Parker et al., 2002: 2).
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While it is necessary to learn from regulatory processes in high-income countries, it
should also be noted that conditions are different and thus lessons are not directly
‘replicable’ (GTZ, 2008: 12). Amongst these challenges facing regulators, the pro-poor
agenda is surfacing more and more and hence regulators are forced to act on these
particular demands. In this respect, as one example, with the involvement of the
economic regulator Zambia has established a ‘Devolution Trust Fund’ (DTF) with a
specific mandate to facilitate extension of services to urban poor (peri-urban) areas
(Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 93-94; Tremolet, 2006: 7).
Economic regulation involves not only setting prices, usually higher than previously to
overcome revenue shortfalls, but also giving incentives to service providers to perform
more efficiently, ie. at lower cost, to reduce or limit and tariff increases. Comparative
competition approaches in the water sector are very common in high-income countries
as one means of incentivising efficiency. This approach strives towards achieving
efficient service levels at lower costs and also to identify companies that are poorly
performing as an incentive to improve. This takes into consideration various parameters
such as consumer bills; leakage control; operational costs; quality compliance and
financial performance (OFWAT, 2007a: 8). The latter is of high importance during the
regulatory process, especially in England and Wales, where the financeability of
companies is declared by government to be a primary statutory duty of the regulator, to
be able to ensure that necessary investment is obtained to deliver high, and ever
improving, quality services (OFWAT, 2007a: 11).
Appropriate water pricing is not only required to ensure viable service provision but
also provides information to users regarding the economic, social and physical value of
the water resource, thus “sending the right signal to users” to encourage better water
allocation and water use efficiency (Sansom et al., 2004: 2; Rosegrant and Cline, 2002:
7). Water pricing trends are gradually changing over time, using a mixture of tariff
structures, to attempt to deliver this combination of incentive based water services, both
for suppliers (based on performance standards to “reduce costs of water supply”) and
consumers (“to use water more efficiently”) (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997:11). Hence
there is an increasing necessity to have an appropriate regulatory framework as part of
the institutional set-up to ensure that there is an appropriate level of transparency and
information access to facilitate the decision-making process of involved stakeholders
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and to enable societal understanding and commitment to sustainable water supply and
use.
1.3 Namibian water resource availability
The need for new water management paradigm, incorporating some form of economic
regulation, is especially pressing in Namibia. Namibia is the most arid country south of
the Sahara and is in a precarious and extraordinary position of having no perennial
rivers within its borders (with only two forming its borders) (Figure 1-1) with its water
resources being very unevenly distributed over the country. In the regional (Southern
Africa Development Countries-SADC) context, Namibia along with South Africa,
Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Zimbabwe are classified as dry countries in
comparison with their population and renewable fresh water resources. In Namibia’s
case, most of its renewable freshwater resources are inaccessible (Allan, 2002).
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Figure 1-1 Map of the World, indicating Namibia as part of the southern African development
community (SADC) countries, with the location of the capital (Windhoek) indicated. The map also
highlights the water sources (light green) and major rivers Source: (Hirji et al., 2002)
Consequently, regional water shortages may emerge long before any national shortage
is apparent at national level. A good example is the Central Area of Namibia (where
Windhoek is located), where local demand is higher than the available local resources
(Figure 1-2), a situation that will eventually require expensive supply augmentation
schemes with even desalination predicted as one solution (DWA, 2006).
Chapter 1: Introduction and objectives
8
Figure 1-2 water production from different sources and population demand for Windhoek. Source:
(CoW, 2005)
The city of Windhoek (see Appendix A for a general overview of water and sanitation
status of Windhoek) presently relies on three surface reservoirs to provide 70% of its
water for approximately 250,000 residents, while the remainder is provided from
groundwater reserves. The dams are built on ephemeral rivers within a 70 to 160 km
distance from the city. Evaporation amounts to 3,400 mm per annum; thus Nature is
referred to as the biggest “consumer” of water, accounting at times for twice the volume
attributable to human consumers. In this sense access to adequate water resources for
water supply to central areas of Namibia is one of the biggest challenges for the
government and its water services providers (Du Pisani, 2006: 80). Most unusually in
the world, though it can now be seen as the fore-runner of a rapidly growing trend, the
city’s potable water from the reservoirs is augmented with reclaimed waste water from
domestic and business sectors so as to cope with the 5% increase in population per
annum. The reclamation plant in Windhoek provides approximately 35% of the daily
requirements of the city (Du Pisani, 2006: 81-82). Even this approach is not sufficient
and the City is now planning to artificially recharge the Windhoek aquifer using excess
reclaimed water, while upholding strong quality standards, as an alternative future
supply option (Du Pisani, 2006: 88). Other demand management strategies include
replacing potable water for industrial and agricultural purposes with reclaimed water
(Du Pisani, 2006: 88). According to the National Accounts Report on Water; domestic
use, followed by all other uses and losses, and unaccounted-for-water constituted 39%,
36% and 25% respectively of urban water supply by municipalities, in 2001/02 (DWA,
2006).
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1.4 Institutional arrangement for urban water and sanitation
services
Water sector reforms started as early as the 1980s in the Southern African region,
primarily as a result of high population growth in highly water scarce (Swatuk,
2005:874; Gumbo, 2004: 1225; Rothert, 2000:118) and extremely unequal conditions,
this latter point reflecting on colonial history trends (Robinson, 2002 as cited by
Swatuk, 2005: 874). The reforms have tended to address these challenges through the
creation of new legislative frameworks and institutions designed to achieve “equitable,
efficient and sustainable use of the resource” (Swatuk, 2005:874). However, as will be
explored further in this thesis, the trend of developing new laws, strategies and
institutions has not always succeeded in improving water and sanitation services
provision due to the lack of commitment and lack of resources commitment from
politicians and policy-makers. The lack of clarity in information, particularly financial
information, available to politicians and policy-makers, is seen as a key explanatory
variable in this process.
The review process for the water sector in Namibia (Figure 1-3) was launched in 1998,
with the Namibia Water Resources Management Review team selected to assess the
current status of water management and resources in line with associated legislation and
available human resources and to make recommendations to promote long term social
and economic development. As part of this process, complementing the Water Supply
and Sanitation Sector Policy (WASSP) of 1993, in 2000 a Water Policy (white paper)
was drafted to promote the concept of the economics of water, while recognizing water
as a public good that must be available to those who cannot afford to pay for water
services. The policy also incorporates full cost recovery principles (MAWRD, 2000;
Heyns, 2004; DWA, 2007). Prior to the review, the Water Act, 1956 (Act No. 54 of
1956) was the basic legal document that guided the Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry, stipulating its overall responsibilities to include control, allocation,
management and conservation of water sources, including the provision of bulk water
supply.
The White paper of 2000 was the guiding document for drafting of the current Water
Resources Management Act (WRM), 2004 (Act 24 of 2004). The Act calls for the
establishment of a Water Regulatory Board, with the aim of controlling water and
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effluent pricing and providing “independent assessment of water pricing proposals by
water utilities and suppliers”. This Act is not yet in effect and is currently under review;
hence certain provisions have not yet been implemented. Regulations following this Act
are also still in the drafting phase. Furthermore, based on all the legislation, the water
sector vision was reviewed in 2006, as part of the strategic sector plan for 2007-2011, in
line with the National Vision 2030 and National Development Plans. The sector vision
approved aimed “to achieve equitable access to sufficient, appropriate, safe, sustainable
and affordable water for all Namibian users for improved quality of life” (MAWF,
2007: 3). A ‘balanced score card’ system was developed to implement the specific
objective to meet the sector vision. To reflect the vision of the sector, in 2008, the
WASSP was reviewed and replaced with the Water Supply and Sanitation Policy
(WSASP), which is based on principles of stakeholder participation and cost recovery
(MAWF, 2008: 1-7). A further law was introduced to make provision for the efficient
governance of State-owned enterprises and the monitoring of their performances in the
form the State-owned Enterprises Governance (SOEG) Act, 2006 (Act, 2 of 2006).
Both the section on Regulatory boards and SOEG Acts are not implemented yet,
reportedly due to lack of resources (human and financially mainly).
Figure 1-3 Transition of legal framework for water supply sector in Namibia. Source: Author’s
synthesis from grey literature
To address these policy provisions, the Namibian Government opted to commercialize
bulk water services and as a result established NamWater (a government owned water
supplier whose operations are required to be run on commercial lines) through the
establishment of the Namibia Water Corporation Act in 1997. This defined an effective
and sustainable bulk water supplier to customers (in terms of costs; quality and
quantity) as well as entailing the determination of levies and tariffs structures based on
full cost recovery principles, in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and
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Forestry. However, as will be investigated and described in more detail following,
cabinet decisions have been known to influence and change many of the strategies for
implementing the legislation, especially with regard to NamWater tariff determination.
The powers, duties and functions of local government, i.e. the Local Authority councils
(including municipalities, towns and villages) are laid out in the Local Authorities Act,
1992 (Act, 23 of 1992). The responsibilities of local authorities include providing
services to residents such as distributing NamWater’s water and maintaining a system
of sewerage to local consumers. For the purposes of the study, only the services and
price-setting process of the City of Windhoek (municipality) as a local authority will be
considered, as explained and justified in Chapter 3.
In this sense, Namibia’s water sector faces similar, though perhaps more extreme,
challenges to other low-income countries when it comes to determining cost-reflective
tariffs while ensuring that all consumers, especially the urban poor are provided with
quality basic services. As a result of political interference in tariff determination,
Namibia’s bulk water supplier, since inception, has recorded an overall poor financial
performance (Ndokosho et al, 2007: 1302). Furthermore, there are no measures in place
for performance or accountability assessment for the public utility (Ndokosho et al,
2007:1308) which reflects on the credibility of the process. Nevertheless, statistics
indicate that Namibia’s water and sanitation service delivery is advanced compared to
other countries in the region; with 99.3% and 84% coverage of the urban population
having piped water as their drinking water source and sanitation respectively (CBS,
2006).
Because of the extremes of water availability and income skewness, further institutional
improvements (such as sustainable tariff determination) are believed to be required to
ensure equitable water and sanitation service delivery (Matros-Goreses et al, 2008:296),
given the history of high government subsidies as a consequence of non-payment for
water services until early 1990s (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997). Despite all the efforts
of awareness raising and education of public, leak detection programmes, proper
management of water meters; the true cost of water is still not reflected through the
charged price (Hirji et al., 2002). However, it is known that water supply services are
very costly in Namibia due to its sparsely distributed population (long service distances)
and limited rainfall (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997: 78). Furthermore, tariffs (especially
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concessionary tariffs for high income users) are deemed unclear (no proper justification)
(Dinar and Subramanian, 1997: 29).
1.5 Affordability of urban water and sanitation services
Namibia is classified as a middle-income country, however it has a very skewed income
distribution, with a Gini-coefficient of 74.3 (UNDP, 2006). The Bureau of Statistics
notes that 34 % of Namibia’s population accounts for only 7% of the income, while less
than 1% of the population have the highest adjusted per capita income of 16% (CBS,
2006). Households’ expenditure on water services should not exceed 5% of their
income, according to Namibian standards, in which case such households are classified
as urban poor (DWA, 2007). There are various types of water and sanitation services
that are available depending on the various income levels of residents, as outlined in
the Development and Upgrading Strategy of the City of Windhoek (Table 1-1)(CoW,
2006a).
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Table 1-1 Indicates the types of water and sanitation services available according to development
levels based on income of residents
Development level Monthly
Income level
(2008, PPP$-
5.18)
Water service levels/options Sanitation service
levels/options
Welfare level 0-18 - rudimentary services -none
Level 0: Ultra-low
income- rudimentary
services
19-32 - communal water points
within 200 m walking
distance
-none
Level 1:
Ultra-low income-
block communal
services
33-128 - water points at each toilet
block
- walking distances not to
exceed 200m
- water meters at each water
point
- ventilated improved pit
latrines at access points to
each block
- 2 latrines (1x ladies,
1xgents)/80 people
-100m walking distances
Level 2:
Ultra-low income-
block communal
services
129-232 - water points at each toilet
block
- walking distances not to
exceed 200m
- water meters at each water
point
- pre-paid taps being piloted
-communal flush latrines in
road reserves
- 2 latrines (1x ladies,
1xgents)/80 people
-30m walking distances
Level 3:
Ultra-low income-
block communal
services
233-422 -full water reticulation
designed and installed
-water points with meters at
each toilet block
- pre-paid taps being piloted
-standards same as for level 2
-entire sewer reticulation
system designed and
installed
Level 4:
Low income-
Individual
connections
423-663 -full water reticulation
designed and installed
-full sewer reticulation
-individual sewer
connections
Level 5:
Low Income-
individual
connections
664-870 full water reticulation
designed and installed
-individual connections for
flush toilets (full waterborne
sewer)
Level 6:
Medium Income-
fully serviced
+871 -full water reticulation
designed and installed
- individual connections for
flush toilets (full waterborne
sewer)
Source: (Modified from (Matros-Goreses et al., 2008: 297) and (CoW, 2006a)
The strategy attempts to cater for all residents, including these ‘ultra-poor’, in providing
land for settlement as well as developing uniform standards for all of the services
mentioned above, based on appropriate technology and reasonable health standards.
Community development services are mostly targeted for level 0 and 1 groups, where
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the city facilitates the emergence of self-help initiatives, through which a community
can access support from the city. There is also a strong emphasis on capacity-building
undertaken to instil a sense of empowerment amongst low-income groups, in the hope
of improving their living conditions. In this regard Social Compact Agreements are
signed with the low-income groups to decide on the services that they need and can
afford (CoW, 2006a). Numerous informal area residents have been relocated since
2000 to “improved” areas as part of this strategy. This relocation process includes
feasibility studies (to determine the financial, social and environmental impacts),
registration of properties (land), signing of lease agreements, and community
participation.
Photograph 1: Facilities (water and sewerage) build before relocation to takes place. This area is
earmarked for development level 3 inhabitants. Source: R. Franceys, Windhoek, 2007.
One of the ongoing challenges is preventing illegal settlers from coming into upgraded
areas (Photograph 1), so as to avoid disruption of services and ensure proper control and
monitoring by the City of Windhoek (CoW, 2006b). Incoming residents are required to
settle in the ‘receiving’ areas (Level 0), from which they will eventually be moved to
upgraded or “improved” areas.
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According to official reports, (CoW, 2006b) the majority (32%) of households fall
within development level 1, which can barely afford services (neither qualify for land
with individual connections) and thus can only be accommodated in communal service
areas. Furthermore 22% of families (both welfare and development level 0 groups) are
unable to afford basic services. There are approximately 32 informal ‘squatter’
settlements or “shantytowns” within Windhoek, of which 9 are indicated to have no
toilet facilities at all. Appendix B shows the status of water and sanitation services in
selected informal areas in Windhoek.
A separate study conducted in Windhoek, indicated that “low-income water users were
willing to pay N$58 (PPP US$14) in addition to their monthly consumption to get
individual water connections” (Kavezeri-Karuaihe, 2005). According to Kavezeri-
Karuaihe (2005), “the prices are cryptic”, because water users do not know the true
price for water services, since that is imbedded into the municipal bill, and hence their
response to prices are inconsistent.
1.6 Price-setting process in Namibia
Currently the process of developing NamWater tariffs is undertaken behind closed
doors by Government Board members. These tariffs are subjected to annual increases,
without proper justification and have been known to be manipulated by Board members,
which reduces the chances of effective cost recovery (MAWRD, 2000). Similarly, the
tariffs for Local Authorities are increased, based on changes in the bulk water tariffs,
without enquiry or investigation. Hence the entire price-setting processes (two separate
levels for bulk water and distribute, retail water prices) in Namibia are undertaken on
the premise of a lack of transparency and access to information - so that consumers and
civil society are unable to understand how prices for basic services are set. Given the
Namibian challenges of water scarcity and skewed income distribution, the need for
proper pricing mechanisms and institutions is even more pressing, to ensure universal
provision of sustainable urban water and sanitation services.
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1.7 Scope and objectives
The overall goal of this research is to contribute to sustainable water and sanitation
services to all urban users1 in a water scarce developing country, Namibia, with highly
skewed distribution of income.
The research explores the price-setting processes from other countries (particularly
England and Wales and Zambia) as a guide to further understand the dynamics and
intricacies of what the process entails. It then further reflects on lessons from the
experiences in these countries in order to investigate the challenges of the price-setting
process in Namibia.
1.7.1 Research Proposition
The underlying proposition of the research is that access to information, linked with an
appropriate level of stakeholder involvement, is required for effective and sustainable
urban water and sanitation price-setting process, especially in a water scarce, skewed-
income distribution country.
1.7.2 Research Aim and Objectives
The specific research aim is to adapt a framework for determining price-setting
processes and to investigate the potential role of an economic regulator to inform the
process and policy accordingly. In order to achieve the aim, the following specific
research objectives need to be fulfilled:
 Identify specific lessons/experiences from price-setting processes in selected
counties, particularly England and Zambia, to investigate possible improvements
to the Namibian price-setting process;
 Understand the current price review process in Namibia, within the legal
framework, in terms of its capacity to deliver water and sanitation services to
urban consumers (particularly poor households);
1 All urban water users include domestic water consumers (all income levels); industries and institutions
(government, universities, and schools). The main focus of the study will be on the domestic water sector.
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 Determine the affordability levels of water and sanitation services for the urban
poor in Namibia and the potential role of cross-subsidisation amongst domestic
water users;
 Identify the perceived level of transparency and stakeholder involvement
required for the price-setting process in Namibia;
 Identify the appropriate regulatory framework needed to improve current price-
setting process in Namibia, balancing the needs of all stakeholders but with a
bias towards the needs of the urban poor, to inform relevant policy accordingly
The research aims and objectives were translated into a conceptual framework (Figure
1-4), which guided the research, setting the boundaries and hence facilitated the
understanding of the concepts and related relationships being investigated. The
framework reflects on the contextual issues that are considered to influence the
Namibian price-setting process and hence are identified as input factors for the
institutional process. In this regard, the institutional processes, namely legislation, water
and sanitation services and price-setting (including England and Zambia price-setting
processes) with its relevant issues and main stakeholders, further highlights the major
focus areas of the research. As a result the proposed regulatory framework is an output
of the research to address the contextual and institutional challenges; hence the feedback
loop which illustrates that it is an iterative process.
The foundations of the study are embedded around principal-agent theory, where the
principal (in this case government) delegates service provision (in this case water and
sanitation services) to an agent (in this case service providers). However the challenge
exists when the principal and agent have different interests/interpretation and as such
one party has an information advantage over the other, leading to huge information
asymmetry and uncertainty problems (Jamison, et al, 2004:29-30). In conjunction to the
Principal-Agent theory, the research also builds upon the stakeholder theory (‘interest-
group’ theory), in recognition of much wider stakeholder base than just the government
and service providers, but also including consumers, investors and other interested
parties. The stakeholder theory also addresses the implications of compatible/non
compatible interests of stakeholders and the consequent regulatory mechanisms required
to balance these interests for the best possible outcome (Prosser, 1999:206). In the
context of water and sanitation provision, the research suggests implementation of the
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proposed regulatory board, as provided for in the Water Resource Management Act,
2004 of Namibia, to address the information asymmetries and stakeholder interests,
given the unique characteristics of Namibia; water scarcity and skewed income
distribution.
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Figure 1-4 Concept flow diagram to be investigated during this study
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1.8 Structure and overview of the thesis
The thesis is organised around the ideas highlighted in the conceptual framework and
follows on to validate the objectives with empirical data collected from the fieldwork.
It follows the logical progression of the research objectives.
This chapter has outlined the introduction and background to the research, indicating
the research problem as primarily being lack of transparency and involvement within
the current price-setting process, acknowledging the complexity of providing water
and sanitation services to all domestic consumers, including the urban poor. This
chapter thus sets the scene for the research, which is further explored in Chapter 2,
which present the literature review on previous research in this field, reflecting on
appropriate institutional frameworks within the water sector, provision of urban water
service and sanitation services, various price-setting processes across the world, with
a strong emphasis on regulatory frameworks and the role of economic regulators in
the price-setting process. Chapter 3 outlines the research agenda and the research
methods adopted throughout the study, primarily following case-study approaches,
guided by semi-structured interviews and focus-group discussions using purposive
snowballing methods in England, Zambia and Namibia accordingly. Chapter 4
reflects on results from the fieldwork experiences in England and Zambia. It
elaborates on the price-setting processes in these countries and interprets the
perceptions of targeted stakeholders on service provision and regulatory processes,
with a strong emphasis on affordability of services in regulated environments.
Chapter 5, forms the basis of the Namibian fieldwork results, indicating responsible
institutions, the intricacies of service provision, with focus on the costs of such
services and financial situation of the providers which reflects on the prices
consumers pay. It furthers explains the price-setting process and the potential role of a
regulator in the system. The institutional positioning of such a regulator is also
identified as well as the appropriate regulatory framework, given the extreme
conditions of the country. Chapter 6 forms the cross-case analysis chapter, discussing
the results in the context of the objectives, also reflecting on the application of the
principal-agent theory and the benefits of having an economic regulator in Namibia to
guide the price-setting processes based on lessons learnt from England and Zambia in
particular. Finally, Chapter 7 states the main conclusions and implications of the
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research findings in line with the objectives, a consideration of this research’s
contribution to knowledge, as well as future research areas.
Knowledge is a treasure, but practice is the key to it
Thomas Fuller
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter provides insight into the current debates on urban water and sanitation
service delivery, with emphasis on the costs involved and the pricing processes. More
specifically, the chapter highlights the challenges of service provision, especially
towards the urban poor, and the subsequent institutional and procedural governance
arrangements to address these challenges. In this context, literature on economic
regulation, the elements required and relevant structures are discussed in both the
lower-income (‘developing’) and high-income (‘developed’) country context.
Furthermore, regulation theory is explored as an explanatory tool for information
asymmetry challenges prevalent in principal-agent relationships. Access to basic
services are important, however access to basic, relevant and accurate information is
key to ensure that services are provided in line with sector objectives. Therefore
appropriate regulatory frameworks are necessary to facilitate (balance) conflicting
stakeholder interests through implementation of good governance principles such as
transparency and stakeholder involvement throughout the price-setting process.
A systematic literature review process was followed to ensure a fair representation of
the literature in this field and to ensure that the majority of relevant information was
included. Various search engines (such as Scopus, Aqualine, Science Direct and
Google Scholar) were used, making use of the following search words (either in
combination or separately); water utility regulators, urban water and sanitation
services (for urban poor), price-setting processes, alternative pricing processes,
economic regulators, regulation theory and institutional governance. There is quite a
significant amount of literature on these topics, though most were found to be ‘older’,
in many cases older than 10 years, especially on the general literature. Another
limitation was that there were not many journal articles (peer reviewed) about
regulatory frameworks or price-setting processes in developing countries, and these
were more found in books or donor reports (for example World Bank, GTZ, DFID
research outputs).
2.1 Defining major concepts
It is predicted that improved water and related services will greatly contribute towards
economic growth and poverty reduction. There is a strong link between water and
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economy and these cannot be treated separately (Commission on Sustainable
Development (CSD), 2004-2005). In agreement, Dinar and Subramanian (1997)
draws “close linkages among financial status, physical health, and service quality in
the water sector” and states that these are the basis for “water pricing reforms and cost
recovery policies in most countries”. The costs of not improving these basic services
(for example health sector costs increasing) are much higher and benefits of
improving it outweigh unwillingness to improve these services (Whittington et al.,
2008: 34).
Price and costs are confused and in some instances used interchangeably, however
the definition of price is “the amount set by political and social system to ensure cost
recovery, equity and sustainability. Prices of water are not determined solely by costs,
and may or may not include subsidies” (Rogers et al., 2002: 3). The “cost” of
providing water and sanitation services has been defined by (Spencer, 1983 as cited
by (van Ryneveld, 1995: 1) as a “sacrifice that must be made in order to do or acquire
something. The nature of the sacrifice may be tangible, objective or subjective and
may take one or many forms such as money goods, leisure time, income, security,
prestige, power or pleasure”. In this research, various types of costs will be addressed
where appropriate. These may include financial (for example operation and minor
maintenance expenditure (OPEX), capital expenditure (CAPEX), the cost of capital
and other supporting costs (Franceys et al., 2006: ix) as well as environmental and
convenience costs.
The “extent that user fees and any other direct contributions are adequate to meet
service costs” is refereed to as cost recovery. Similarly “financial sustainability
describes the extent to which society as a whole (including international society)
contributes in a committed, long-term manner to support services, either through full
cost recovery through user fees or through a combination of user fess and societal
contributions” (Franceys et al., 2006: ix).
The term tariff refers to payments made by consumers for access to services based on
various tariff structures developed by service providers depending on their local
situations. In this study it specifically refers to “payment for access to provision of
water and sewerage services to consumers” (Sohail, 2004: 1). Other concepts such as
“user fees, service charges, customer charges and prices” (Franceys et al., 2006: ix)
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will also be used in the same context throughout this study. “A water tariff is a
powerful and versatile management tool” with the main aim of cost recovery and
economic efficiency for the water supplier, while being equitable to the customers.
Tariffs can also be set to redistribute charges between customers (cross-subsidisation
purposes) as well as serving a conservation purpose (Boland and Whittington, 1998).
The Urban poor can be defined in various ways, however in this study they are
classified according to their “expenditure on water and sanitation services” (Sohail,
2004: 1-2), which is significant for a substantial majority of households, especially in
lower-income countries. It is globally advocated that expenditure on water and
sanitation services should be between 3-5% of the household income (Merrett, 2005:
116; Almagro, 2005: 200-201).
Institutional arrangements refer to the “rules of the game” (Kemper, 2001: 112).
More specifically it focuses on the laws, norms and regulations that influence water
use and allocation that are applied by the different actors in the water sector (North,
1992 as cited by Kemper, 2001: 111) There are various actors within the water sector,
for example government, providers, users, civil society and other agencies. The
combination and interaction between the arrangements and actors within the sector
results in an institutional framework (Kemper, 2001: 112).
2.2 Providing urban water supply and sanitation services
The provision of water and sanitation services follows a simple cycle of activities
which includes “bulk water supply, water treatment, local water distribution, sewage
collection and sewage treatment” (Schouten and van Dijk, 2007: 11-12; Abbott and
Cohen, 2009: 2), however the delivery process in terms of roles and responsibilities is
more complex and dynamic than what meets the eye (Figure 2-1). It is less common
to find a single service provider that undertakes all water supply and sanitation
activities, though it is the norm in the United Kingdom and has been introduced in the
Netherlands as an “integrated water service organisation” (Schouten and van Dijk,
2007: 11-12). In many other countries the norm is a split of services between bulk and
local water distribution, of which the latter is done at municipal level. This is known
as vertical separation, while horizontal separation/combination of functions applies to
separation of water supply from sewerage and wastewater disposal (Abbott and
Cohen, 2009: 4).
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Figure 2-1 Water and waste water supply chain of activities. Source: Gonzalez-Gomes and
Garcia-Rubio (2008:41)
The range of activities of service providers varies from country to country and from
the nature of the service providers in principle. Various factors, such as the water
source, geography, and consumer base further influences the technology and
regulation of such services. Due to large transportation and distribution network
requirements and costs involved, the water industry is normally a natural monopoly,
with limited competition (Abbott and Cohen, 2009: 2). Municipal costs of providing a
household with water and sanitation services, subjected to economies of scale, include
charging for “collection of wastewater from household; distribution of treated water
within urban area to household; treatment of waste water; treatment of raw water to
drinking water standards; storage and transmission of untreated water to the urban
area; opportunity costs of diverting raw water from alternative uses to household and
negative externalities incurred” (in descending order in terms of costs) (Whittington et
al., 2008: 15-16).
Water scarcity is one of the biggest challenges facing developing countries. However
it is often not treated as such, considering the limited signal to conserve sent by the
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low prices charged for the resource, especially in the irrigation sector (highly water
intensive) compared to the industrial and domestic sectors (Rosegrant and Cline,
2002: 6; UNEP FI, 2004: 8).
Intermittent supply of water services is often cited as one of the most common results
of water scarcity in lower-income countries. This approach is often explained (though
usually without adequate justification) as due to necessity and not by design. This
adds more pressure to deal with the service consequences such as low pressure;
inequitable distribution and short duration of supply and ultimately water quality
deterioration. For example, in South Asia and India where people receive services
only for limited hours daily and in some areas of Kenya where services are limited to
2.9 hours per day (Hardoy et al., 2001 as cited by (Vairavamoorthy and Mansoor,
2006: 188). However in many instances, twenty-four service is not possible and
hence managers should strive to be proactive in the design of the intermittent system
to meet service standards where possible. The consumers’ costs, coping with these
types of services also needs to be incorporated, which results in low-income consumer
groups paying more in terms of time and inconvenience of collecting water from
public taps (Dutta and Tiwari, 2006: 141,143)
Universal coverage (including services to the urban poor) and water service
improvement are objectives usually shared by both governments and service
providers. However the challenge is to ensure financial sustainability for further
extension of service coverage, hence the suggested option to differentiate service
options (for example “in-house connections, yard connections or water kiosks”) and
prices as appropriate (Sansom et al., 2004: 3) in order to facilitate universal service.
Water losses are inevitable in a distribution network; however the challenge is to
manage them as effectively as possible (Mugabi et al., 2007: 2). Losses are comprised
of ‘real’ losses (for example physical leakage) and ‘apparent’ losses (illegal
connections, improper metering schemes and improper billing aspects). Illegal
connections are primarily caused by water scarcity, poor management and lack of
awareness and result in loss of water and a decrease in service levels of the supply
system. Consumers resort to illegal connections if refused household connections; due
to inappropriate tariffs and this is mostly found amongst the middle and low-income
groups. In lower-income economies illegal connections are sometimes fuelled by
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“politicians who try and win public support at the expense of sustainability”, thus
making the job of utility operators more difficult (Vairavamoorthy and Mansoor,
2006: 198).
Meter reading and billing discrepancies are quite common in developing countries
due to various reasons ranging from failure to access properties; failure to read
meters; bribing from consumers; flaws in billing system (Nickson and Franceys,
2003: 1-6). These reflect on the capacity and credibility of the service provider;
however it also results in the consumer having to pay for the inefficiencies of water
service utilities.
Many water utilities in southern Africa do not produce public domain performance
indicators therefore cannot be compared with peer utilities. Such indicators include
“setting fair tariffs; detecting undue consumption early, maintaining infrastructure in
time, reducing unaccounted for water, reuse and recycling of wastewater, planning
new developments rationally and having a informed prioritising system in time of
shortages and droughts”(Gumbo, 2004: 1230). This is a significant hindrance to any
transparent price-setting.
2.2.1 Cost of providing water and sanitation services
Ideally, costing of water and sanitation services should be based on full-cost recovery
principle implementation. This is also referred to as sustainable cost recovery (Rouse,
2007: 39). There are direct and indirect costs involved in the supply of water services.
Hence, to appreciate the value of water as a resource and a service, it is necessary to
understand the full costs of service provision (Figure 2-2), which comprises of full
supply, economic and full costs (Rogers et al., 1998: 5-7). In this regard, the basic
cost elements that make up the price of water and sanitation services comprise of
operational, capital and replacement costs (Speers, 2007: 2), which are referred to as
full supply costs (Rogers et al., 1998: 6). The operational costs refer to day-to-day
input costs such as human resources, chemicals and energy and fixed assets, while
replacement costs relate to replacement or maintenance of assets and infrastructure.
Capital costs include capital investments (Speers, 2007: 1) and the costs of capital or
financing. Reflecting other “less quantifiable” costs in the price is a more complex
process; however, ideally, these costs need to be recognised as part of setting the basic
price-setting framework. In essence these costs deal with alternative investment
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opportunities and consequences of environmental or resource depletion and associated
risks, respectively (Dutta and Tiwari, 2006: 136; Speers, 2007: 2). These costs are
opportunity, economic and environmental externalities, and related risks, which
together with full supply costs make up the full economic costs and finally the full
costs respectively (Rogers et al., 1998: 7-10; Winpenny, 1994: 10-14). Arguably, it is
noted that externality costs (especially due to inefficiency of providers) should not be
included in public pricing policies, however full supply costs should be catered for by
consumers (Dutta and Tiwari, 2006: 141,143).
Figure 2-2 Costs Components of water service provision. Source: (Rogers et al., 1998: 7)
Sustainable cost recovery is encouraged, in the sense that the provider should be able
to generate “sufficient revenue” to cover operating, financing and maintenance costs
(Winpenny, 2003: 18-19). However, in practice, only a proportion of operation and
maintenance costs are recovered gradually, with capital costs only recovered slightly
(Dinar and Subramanian, 1997: 8). It should be noted that in many cases the average
supply costs of the domestic water sector are met by the non-domestic sector
(commerce, industry, public sector institutions) through cross-subsidies (Sohail, 2004:
11).
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The full costs of service provision hence, sets the context against which prices are
determined (Rogers et al., 1998: 31; Tsagarakis, 2005: 10). In this sense, the Bonn
Charter emphasises the need for transparency and stakeholder involvement in the
price-setting decision making process to fully understand the complexities involved
(Speers, 2007: 2; IWA, 2004: 9). The Bonn charter principle further highlights the
complexity of these contrasting elements by indicating that “the price of water should
be set so that the price does not prevent consumers from obtaining water of sufficient
quantity and quality to meet fundamental domestic needs” (IWA, 2004: 9).
2.2.2 Charging for water services
User fees are not only considered as the basis of financial sustainability, but are also
incremental in “meeting social, economic and environmental policy objectives”,
which includes ensuring sufficient revenue to deliver long term quality services;
extending service coverage and ensuring that consumers understand the cost to the
economy of the scarce water resources, hence enhancing conservation of the natural
environment (Franceys et al., 2006: 2). The African Development Bank in their
Integrated Water Resources Management Policy (2000), advocated that economic cost
pricing should be the basis for water allocation decisions. The price of water is known
to influence water use efficiency and hence is used as a tool to facilitate water
allocation and conservation behaviour amongst water users (Dinar and Subramanian,
1998: 239-240).
There are various forms in which users can pay for water services. Four main ones are
discussed by Merrett (2005: 6-7) as being the price paid to the supplier per unit
quantity (mostly in case of metered supply); payments linked directly to volume
received and the cost incurred by user (mostly in case where users supply their own
water, eg. pumping water using electric motors); payments indirectly linked to
volume used (payments are based on fixed tariffs, multiplied by number of people
registered to live in house) and payment based on value of the property of the user
(cost-use relation to fixed charge, invariant of volume; mostly, no metering system in
place). Charging for water services per unit basis paid (volumetric use), is a powerful
method to encourage demand management. The flat-rate tariff payment system which
does not take into account volumetric use has no incentive for conservation
(Arlosoroff, 1999 as cited by (Vairavamoorthy and Mansoor, 2006: 198) and thus is
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not advisable for countries with scarce water resources. Dinar and Subramanian
(1997:1) highlighted that out of the different pricing measures used across the world,
“about 37% of utilities charge uniform prices regardless of the quantity consumed,
22% used rising block rates and 38% used declining block rates, with the remaining
3% using a mixture of schemes” (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997: 1; Dinar and
Subramanian, 1998: 240). Countries which operate on rising block tariffs usually
justify this approach through the principle of ‘making water more affordable or even
free (“basic lifeline”) for the low income users, while promoting water conservation
amongst the high income users’ (Sohail, 2004: 11; Dinar and Subramanian, 1997: 27;
Herrington, 2007: 14). The “lifeline” block, providing basic water required to sustain
life, can vary from 5m3 to 20 m3 per month – though it might be wondered to what
extent the latter figure can ever represent a ‘lifeline’. For example in South Africa the
lifeline block is fixed at a more reasonable 6m3 but with no charge (DWAF, 2008).
This has implications for revenue adequacy depending upon the proportion of
domestic consumers accessing these limited amounts of water.
Tariff schemes are evolving towards two part charges; fixed and variable. The fixed
part is seen to give the utility guaranteed revenue to cover overhead charges, while the
variable part encourages efficient use of water by consumers (Dinar and Subramanian,
1997: 4; Tsagarakis, 2005: 4). The most appropriate tariff is one that can balance the
various goals of society (Rogers et al., 2002: 5). Very often these goals are
conflicting, such that consumers require “high quality water at affordable and stable
prices” while suppliers strive for a “stable revenue base, by covering all their costs” of
providing services (Rogers et al., 2002: 5). Either way, it is important that the public
understand the process and that the tariff systems are relatively easily implemented
without conflicting with government policies.
The future of water supplies is moving towards introducing metering and
consumption based tariffs to promote efficiency, equity (fairness) and environmental
sustainability (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997: 141; Weeden, 2003: 148; Walker, 2009:
11). However currently this is being phased in gradually over time in some countries
in order to reduce the payment “burden” on consumers. Metering is a contentious
issue, for example in England and Wales, where it is seen by some as unethical
towards water as a right, especially for low income users, while others associate it
with increase in prices by water companies. As a consequence the fixed annual fee
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tariff system is still being implemented by many companies (Herrington, 2007: 11).
This may reflect well the ‘fixed cost’ nature of water supply (>85%, Franceys,
2008:50) however it “provides little incentive to conserve” and does not send the
signal for effective water use strongly enough (Rogers et al., 2002: 5-6). In this
regard, water metering is deemed essential in demand management, since it is the
basis of determining the price based on the consumption rate (Nickson and Franceys,
2003: 6). However in developing countries, metering is mostly used in the context of
intermittent supply which results in many problems such as malfunctioning of meters
due to improper use or technological failures. Nevertheless, pre-paid water meters are
increasingly being installed in lower-income countries, with South Africa being an
example of successful implementation history for pre-paid meters for shared
connections (though not without ongoing legal challenges from some in civil society).
Pre-paid metering is being promoted to be very effective in conserving water and
recovery of costs. In general the literature suggests that metering should be
considered for all levels of users, from bulk metering to individual metering, requiring
careful monitoring and frequent maintenance (Vairavamoorthy and Mansoor, 2006).
Franceys (2008:50) points out the resulting cost of metering in England and Wales.
The most popular tariff system in developing countries is the increasing block tariff
(IBT) system (Liu et al., 2003: 212), where the poor consumers are subsidised by
high-volume consumers. The first block is normally charged at a low rate to include
the basic water needs of consumers and subsequent blocks are charged higher as an
incentive for consumers to use only the necessary water. Industrial and commercial
water users are charged significantly more to contribute to the subsidisation system
for low volume users (Vairavamoorthy and Mansoor, 2006). Nevertheless, IBT
systems have been criticised as being disadvantageous to the poor, especially those
who share water connections. In the sense that most of them pay more than the
average cost for each unit than the lowest block as compared to those not sharing
household connections (Sohail, 2004: 10-14; Rosegrant and Cline, 2002: 7; Liu et al.,
2003: 212-213) because of the number of people in each household using the single
connection. They argue that the main reason to use an IBT system is because it is
perceived to be politically acceptable and fair. Lack of transparency, flexibility and
simplicity in implementation are the major issues of IBT’s that need to be sorted out
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to ensure cost recovery (Sohail, 2004: 10-14; Herrington, 2007: 40; Liu et al., 2003:
213; Boland and Whittington, 1998: 8)
Sewerage tariffs are not as notorious as water tariffs and are normally subjected to
lower coverage (especially in low income areas) as well as lower charges levied as
local property tax. It is important that costs of sewerage network are considered inline
with willingness to pay for the services, since it is very costly service, especially
waterborne sewerage networks (Sohail, 2004: 35).
In addition to tariff structures, consumers pay standing basic charges, which
comprises of direct and indirect charges. Direct charges includes connection, physical
infrastructure, such as pipe size, meter (Walker, 2009: 69), while indirect charges are
mostly attributed to administration related costs (Sohail, 2004: 26). There are
numerous debates around the issue of connection charges. High charges is seen as a
barrier to access services and usually results in illegal connections due to inability to
afford charges, especially by the urban poor (Franceys, 2005: 211). Hence, charging
structures of water companies should be based on “fairness principles” according to
Walker (2009:51). These principles include cost-reflective charges related to volumes
consumed, affordable charges to those that cannot afford and charges should be
simple to administer and transparent for consumers to understand what they are
paying for and why.
2.2.3 Providing water and sanitation services to urban poor
Cities in lower-income countries mainly expand on the periphery of the city which
makes it difficult to ensure adequate and cost effective services, especially in terms of
cost determination of water utilities which may delay expansion of services to those
areas (Sansom et al., 2004: 57; van Ryneveld, 1995: 2). Therefore the urban poor
often need to resort to informal vendors (at a much higher price than those having
household connections) as an alternative source of water to unprotected water sources,
such as wells and rivers (Table 2-1) (Sansom et al., 2004: 2; Rosegrant and Cline,
2002: 7). It gets even more expensive to provide full sanitation services to such areas,
because the implication is that additional sewer capacity along the whole length of the
sewer pipe to the treatment works is needed which makes marginal cost of bulk
reticulation more expensive than average current replacement costs (van Ryneveld,
1995: 2).
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Table 2-1 Existing water sources and options for urban poor.
Typical existing water sources Potential Improved service options
- Unregulated water kiosks
- Handcart vendors (expensive)
- Unauthorised connections
- Public stand posts from which little or no
revenue is collected
- Contaminated pools or rivers
- Distant springs or boreholes
- Seasonal dug wells
- Utility-supported private water kiosks
- Regulated small-scale providers or
vendors
- Community-managed local water
distribution pipes
- Shared water connections with on-selling
to neighbours
- Individual connections
- Pre-paid metered kiosks
- Water kiosk with storage tanks
Source: (Sansom et al., 2004: 28)
Service options are related to variable prices and therefore the income base (and
“willingness-to-pay”) of the target groups has to be considered (Sansom et al., 2004:
35). The current international debates centre around the issue of provision of water to
the urban poor and subsidies, in the sense that due to high (extravagant) connecting
fees, it seems more plausible to subsidise water connections rather than the norm of
water services (Speers, 2007: 3; Winpenny, 2003: 19). The challenges of connecting
to water supply and sewerage services are often neglected and hence poorly
understood, especially with regard to limiting access to urban poor which are unable
to afford the excessive charges (on average US$500 in Uganda in 2004) (Kayaga and
Franceys, 2007: 171-172, 174). The connection costs (including additional informal
costs) incurred by low-income consumers are much higher compared to other income
groups, due to lack of clear policies, information and knowledge (of consumers on
official procedures) (Kayaga and Franceys, 2007: 175).
Cost for providing high level services (house connection and full water-borne
sanitation) are four times more than the cost of providing low level service (for
example stand pipe and ventilated improved pit latrines (VIP). The main reason is
attributed to the cost of bulk services (van Ryneveld, 1995: 4). Sanitation technology
types are limited to “conventional sewerage, on-site systems (ventilated improved pit
(VIP) latrines, pour-flush and ecological sanitation (Eco-san)) and low-cost sewerage
(settled sewerage and simplified)” (Mara, 2005: 57). Simplified sewerage is
advocated to be most appropriate for peri-urban areas, since it is cheap and does not
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require much space to install (Mara, 2005: 58). This technology started in Brazil in
the late 1980s and has since been tried in Pakistan, India, Sri-Lanka, Bolivia and
South Africa (Mara, 2005: 60-61) though it is unclear to what extent it might be used
where alternative materials are used for anal cleansing.
Affordability of services needs to be understood from two angles, “ability to pay” and
“willingness to pay” (Van Ryneveld 1995). In other words, “households may be able
to pay, but unwilling or may be willing to pay, but unable to. In this regard, ability to
pay is directly linked to income levels of the customers (Van Ryneveld 1995). Though
water is considered to be ‘life’, consumers are more eager to pay for electricity, due to
the fact that it cannot be received from different sources, like in the case of water,
which can be “carried home”, hence distorting the value of water (Whittington et al.,
2008: 6-7). Hence the need for differentiated services, depending on customer
preferences and willingness to pay, to ensure expansion of services to un-serviced
poor areas through exploring alternative sources providers and flexible options such
as WaterChoice points and water tankers provided it is undertaken with the
appropriate regulatory framework (Figure 2-3) (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008:256).
Figure 2-3 Targeting a universal service obligation. Source: (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 256)
Franceys and Gerlach (2008:253-256) advocate universal service obligations to be
met by government and service providers. This requires exploring best technical and
costs options to expand services beyond the provider pipe network efficiency frontier,
through tank services or pre-paid water meters. Furthermore, subsidies from
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government are suggested to meet the demand of the very poor, however where no
alternatives are available cross-subsidies should also be considered. Subsidies are
seen as the solution for the ‘conflict’ between cost, price and affordability. The full
cost recovery principle upon which many local authorities operate, is challenged in
this respect, because it makes them dependent on subsidies, which in the long-run is
not sustainable (van Ryneveld, 1995). It is recognised that it is difficult to identify
recipients for subsidies, and so far cross-subsidies from non-domestic sector are
deemed as a ‘potential’ way in which water services to the poor can be serviced,
under the rising block tariff, however it has not been found efficient and various
debates are still on-going in this respect (Sohail, 2004: 19). The issue of cross-
subsidies from those more able to pay, to cover the costs of those unable to pay is also
a contentious debate. Though these subsidies will follow the specific socio-political
context of various countries, the principles of transparency and communication need
to be followed (IWA, 2004: 9), such that those paying for less able consumers are
aware and willing. These principles are thus highlighted as crucial for an effective
price-setting process (Speers, 2007: 3). The rising block tariff structure is an example
of cross-subsidisation method to ensure affordability among consumers (Winpenny,
2003: 19).
However, since the majority of the urban poor are not connected to water and
sewerage networks, therefore do not benefit from such subsidies (Whittington et al.,
2008: 22; Franceys, 2005: 209; Kayaga and Franceys, 2007: 270; Foster et al., 2003:
1). Household subsidies may be calculated by subtracting the “household monthly
utility charge from the full economic cost of producing the monthly household
consumption”, and based on this equation it is estimated that the non-poor consumers
in Kathmandu (Nepal) receive approximately 44% more of the targeted subsidies,
15% more in Bangalore (Foster et al., 2003: 5). In this regard, it is advocated that
subsidies should be targeted to public taps instead of through the Increasing Block
Tariff, which targets all connected consumers, and hence minimising the benefits to
urban poor (Foster et al., 2003: 7).
Social tariffs are subject to the ability of governments and customers to cross-
subsidise and the measures in place to facilitate any such cross-subsidies (Herrington,
2007: 14). Targeted assistance may be based on medical issues (eg England &
Wales), the size of families (eg Greece) and retirement (eg Belgium), as reasons
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which may form part of social tariffs. Furthermore, countries such as Switzerland,
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Ireland have “large (above 30%) subsidy measures
in place, while in countries such as France and UK, subsidy measures are limited,
though cross-subsidies are inclusive in the tariff structure schemes (Schouten and van
Dijk, 2007: 27).
Nevertheless, any increases in tariffs should ideally be linked to improvements in
service, which is why it is necessary for providers to invest in mechanisms to improve
services (Whittington et al., 2008: 8; Van Hofwegen, 2006: 6), such that the service is
both acceptable and affordable and thus sustainable (Winpenny, 2003: 19). However,
this presupposes that tariffs are already close to cost-reflectivity. Improved services
are generally associated with increased cost and hence increased price for consumers.
However, information on the full cost of water supply is required to determine the
required improved service levels to meet the demands and willingness to pay levels of
consumers (Dutta and Tiwari, 2006: 135; Ntengwe, 2004: 1303). In this regard,
consumer’s willingness to pay the full cost is very low since water services are often
considered government’s responsibility, irrespective of consumer’s ability to pay
(Dutta and Tiwari, 2006: 141).
Rouse (2007:193) argues that the challenge of providing water services to the urban
poor is not dependent on the ability or willingness to pay, but on their ability to save,
hence his advocacy for pay-as-you-go systems, something developed further in
Franceys and Gerlach (2008: 250).
2.3 Water sector price-setting process: the current debate
In the past, water was considered “free” due to its importance for life, perceived
abundance and cheap nature (Rogers et al., 2002: 5). Water is considered both a
resource and a service of which there are huge deficiencies across the world,
especially within the challenges of water scarcity, climate change and population
growth (Nickson and Franceys, 2003: 4). However, the most appropriate manner to
deal with these challenges, is “to put a price on water” to meet “social, political and
economic goals” through appropriate water tariff structures (Rogers et al., 2002: 5). In
this sense, infrastructural development is key to ensure both quantity and quality
water and sewerage services are delivered. Water infrastructure is financed by major
sources; water users, taxpayers and or aid donors (Winpenny, 2003: 5-6). The water
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industry is known to be highly capital intensive and requires huge capital investments
and long-term returns, making it highly risky for investors (Whittington et al., 2008:
9; Winpenny, 2003: 10; Mandri-Perrott, 2009: 41).
Adequate pricing of water services is therefore essential for financial sustainability, to
ensure service providers can maintain infrastructure and serve the demand with
quality services (Liu et al., 2003: 211; Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002: 100). The
“water-for-free policy” essentially promotes increase of government subsidies to
ensure access to water for the urban poor, however it benefits the upper income
groups more instead of those in need (Sansom et al., 2004: 3; Liu et al., 2003: 211;
Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002: 100). In which sense, subsidies do not support
efficient cost recovery, and further promotes the vicious cycle of service deterioration
and limited quality and quantity services, therefore pricing is the key to the “free
water dilemma” (Liu et al., 2003: 211; Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002: 100). In this
regard, for the purpose of water pricing, the institutional capacity to deliver and
maintain sustainable (especially financially) services, charging at full cost to those
that can afford it (for example industries) while ensuring equity in the sense that the
urban poor have access to basic (“lifeline”) services is recommended to be considered
(Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002: 101). In this regard, a gradual approach for setting
prices (Figure 2-4), is further advocated, such that prices should gradually be
increased to recovery full costs, while at the same time developing relevant
governance (regulatory measures) and institutions to guide the process (Gunatilake et
al., 2008: 24-27).
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Figure 2-4. Gradual approach for setting prices. Source: (Gunatilake et al., 2008: 27)
The price-setting process is driven by policy objectives (defined from specific
problems), instruments and institutional arrangements targeting specific groups and
outcomes. Water pricing policies are “conceptually” easy to develop, but difficult to
implement “politically” (Rogers et al., 2002: 1). Rosegrant and Cline (2002:6)
describes objectives of urban water pricing as:
 Creation of incentives for efficient water use
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 Cost recovery
 Financial sustainability, including ability to raise capital for expansion of
services to meet future demand
Furthermore, water pricing policies promotes equity, efficiency and sustainability
(Rosegrant and Cline, 2002: 6; Rogers et al., 2002: 2). Under-pricing (below cost
recovery) and inadequate tariff systems of water result in inefficiencies in the sector
(Alexander, 2006: 246). Low water prices not only lead to poor performance, but also
to low incentives to expand services to urban poor. This is especially relevant for
developing countries (Rosegrant and Cline, 2002: 6).
Financial flows play an essential ingredient to the institutional arrangements of the
water supply and sanitation supply chain. In this case financial flows refer to “service
costs, taxes or fees and subsidies”. Taxes or fees include operation and infrastructural
charges, which include “abstraction, production (effluent and treatment taxes or fees)
and distribution, use and sewerage charges” (Aubin and Varone, 2007: 46-47). “The
price of the service must correspond to the investment and running costs of the
service”, which is indicative of the French model, of which 80% of service fees are
collected from consumers and the rest is subsidised by the National Water fund to
support infrastructural investments of small municipalities (Aubin and Varone, 2007:
47).
Subsidies for investment depend on the affordability level of the beneficiaries, and
hence should cover the difference between project costs and affordability levels
(Almagro, 2005: 197-198). However, efficiency, in terms of tariff determination (to
cover investment and operation costs); sourcing additional funds to cover the costs
and maintaining operation costs at sustainable levels also plays a role in determining
the required subsidy levels (Alexander, 2006: 247). In this case, if tariff revenue is
low then subsidy levels will be higher and will require cross-subsidies from higher
income users for example (Sansom et al., 2004: 3; Liu et al., 2003: 211; Savenije and
van der Zaag, 2002: 100).
The issue of linking cost efficiency of providers with affordability is the focus of long
standing debates with regard to pricing of water supply and sanitation of services
(Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002: 100). In this regard, considerable emphasis is
placed on developing targeted “transparent public subsidies and cross-subsidisation
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from other users” to ensure equity and access to services for the poor (Rosegrant and
Cline, 2002: 7; Winpenny, 2003: 1-2; Tsagarakis, 2005: 7; Liu et al., 2003: 212;
Metha, 2004: 4). Furthermore incentives and simplicity in subsidy designs are called
for especially for the benefit of urban poor (Metha, 2004: 4). Similarly, the debate of
water industry ownership (public or private) also still prevails, in terms of efficiency
gains, effective management and access to basic services (affordability). It is further
noted that only 3% of the developing country population is serviced by private
operators, while the remaining 1.1 billion and 2.4 billion without access to potable
water and sanitation respectively are under public service (Winpenny, 2003: 7).
The full economic costs of water and sanitation services are poorly understood by
consumers in both developed and developing countries, primarily due to high
subsidies by government or industries, which distort the true capital, operation and
maintenance costs per volumetric use (Whittington et al., 2008: 20). Clarity and
transparency of information on consumer bills is found to increase consumer
“responsiveness” to price and hence results in positive payment rates as well as
conservation behaviour (Ntengwe, 2004: 1303; Gaudin, 2005: 163 171). In addition,
consumer awareness is indirectly linked to cost recovery and hence sustainable water
use (Ntengwe, 2004: 1301). Other statistics, such as information on water resources,
water supply and pricing should form the basis of water policies, calculating water
balance and determining appropriate performance indicators striving for performance
improvement and sustainable use of water resources (Tsagarakis, 2005: 8-9). Hence
“appropriate financing and pricing are required to ensure economic efficiency,
equity, resources conservation and affordability” (Tsagarakis, 2005: 10).
2.4 Governance and institutional frameworks in the water sector
Governance deals with “power and how it is used” (DFID, 2007: 14). It is made up of
three essential elements namely “state capability, accountability and responsiveness”
(DFID, 2007: 14). Capability is directly linked to the political stability and capacity in
achieving set goals, while accountability and enforcement of set standards and goals
complement each other. Responsiveness relates to how “leaders” respond to societal
needs and interests of equity (especially for low income groups) and sustainability
(DFID, 2007: 14-16). The water sector has been hampered by various ‘governance’
issues, which limits the ability of providers to deliver basic, and much needed, water
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and sanitation services to consumers. These issues are highlighted by Winpenny,
(2003:9) as follows:
 Low priority of central governments to water sector issues
 Confusion of social, environmental and commercial goals
 Political interference
 Poor management structures and imprecise objectives of water undertakings
 An inadequate general legal framework
 Lack of transparency in award of contracts
 Non-existent or weak and inexperienced regulators
 Resistance to cost recovery tariffs
In this regard, the water sector institutional framework depends on three functions
(Allouche et al., 2007: 218):
 “policy making (defining medium/long term sectoral guidelines)
 regulation (facilitative role by public authorities-dependent or independent-
over activities on behalf of society)
 operation (implementation of activities and processes, guided by policies, by
operators to provide water services)”
The foundation of a sustainable institutional framework (Figure 2-5) however is built
upon three criteria namely “stability; efficiency and legitimacy” (Allouche et al.,
2007: 218). Stability primarily reflects on actors performing institutional functions
and their relationship. In this sense coherence is used as an indicator for stability,
referring to organisational separation of institutional functions (Nickson and Franceys,
2003: 10-11). For example, it is advocated that operational and regulatory functions
be free from “political interference” and the former should be dependent on upon the
framework of the latter. Other indicators of stability include “balance of power”
amongst water sector organisations as well as “conflict resolution mechanisms” in
order to control and manage the various conflicting interests of actors given the
dynamics of the sector (Allouche et al., 2007: 219).
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Figure 2-5 Elements of sustainable institutional framework. Source: developed from text of
(Allouche et al., 2007: 218-220)
Efficiency, refers to “minimising comprehensive (production and transaction) costs”
which is driven by indicators such as “level of transaction costs; adaptability and
incentives to perform”. Transaction costs are highly dependent on information flows
and hence can be hampered by information related problems such as asymmetry;
uncertainty and non-verifiability of information (Allouche et al., 2007: 219).
Incentives of institutional arrangements includes “water rights, price of water, water
use allocation and prioritisation, enforcement of laws and regulations and access to
information (Kemper, 2001: 111-112). Incentives and efficient use of water resources
are closely linked, for example, the price of water needs to be appropriate to
encourage efficient water use (Kemper, 2001: 112)
Finally, legitimacy indicates the policy-making and decision-making capacity of the
institution. Indicators for legitimacy are based on good governance principles. These
are categorised as “out-put oriented legitimacy (effectiveness, coherence and
accountability) and in-put oriented legitimacy (openness/transparency and
participation)” (Allouche et al., 2007: 220). In this regard, “access to reliable
information” highly influences the transparency and also serves as a pre-cursor for a
participatory decision making process (Sansom et al., 2004: 51; Allouche et al., 2007:
220). In essence, the roles and responsibilities within the institutional framework
should be clear, such that each organisation could account for their respective actions
(Bartle and Vass, 2007: 261-262). Clear roles and responsibilities, together with
“independent audit monitoring and open disclosure of information” enhances
transparency, which builds trust and credibility amongst stakeholders (especially
“users and investors” (Sansom et al., 2004: 72). In addition, accountability and
empowerment of utilities through “financial and organisational autonomy” is
necessary to achieve sector objectives and hence acts incentives for efficient
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performance and further extending service coverage (Sansom et al., 2004: 51).
Performance of utilities is measured by key performance indicators to facilitate the
decision making process (amongst key stakeholders namely, government, regulators,
utilities and consumers) and inform policies accordingly, but more so it helps utilities
to assess their performance and make relevant improvements in accordance with
regulatory standards and targets (Nickson and Franceys, 2003: 20). In this respect,
stability and efficiency leads to legitimacy, which ultimately translates into a
sustainable institutional framework.
The financing challenge of the water and sanitation sector are three-fold; lack of
effective and efficient institutional frameworks and policies; inadequate public
resources to meet sustainable costs of services and failure of urban poor benefiting
from existing services (Metha, 2004: 2-3). Sector reform in this regard, requires
government commitment, financial development and increased capacity for service
providers (Metha, 2004: 4).
The institutional relationship of responsible parties and service providers are
classified into direct and delegated public and private management systems
(Morrison, 2003: 46-47).
Table 2-2 indicates institutional arrangements under these categories with related
characteristics. Clarity of stakeholder roles (including politicians) and involvement
results in enhanced accountability and transparency in decision making processes
(Morrison, 2003: 46-47). Stakeholder involvement also takes into consideration the
issues of scale and hence factors such as “direct representation” or “representational
democracy” which influences the process (Sansom et al., 2004: 65-67; Tsagarakis,
2005: 10; Morrison, 2003: 47).
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Table 2-2 Institutional characteristics of responsible entities and service providers under
management systems (public/private)
Management
systems
Public Private
Characteristics Direct Delegated Direct Delegated
Service provider Municipality Public company
controlled by
public
shareholders
Private company Contractor
(municipalities
sub-contract to
private companies)
Decision-making
power of service
provider
Not autonomous Semi-
autonomous
Autonomous Autonomous
Tariff setting
power
Set by
responsible
entity
Delegated to
service provider
but responsible
entity have final
decision
Service provider
regulated by
economic regulator
Based on
contractual
agreement
Ownership of
infrastructure
Owned by
responsible
entity
Owned by
responsible
entity
Service provider Owned by
responsible entity
Control over
Budgets and funds
for investment
No control-
municipal
budgeting and
investment
planning
Semi-
autonomous-
receive subsidies
from responsible
entity for major
investment
Autonomous Based on
contractual
agreement
Country examples Denmark,
Luxembourg,
Switzerland,Swe
den, Austria,
Finland
Italy,
Portugal,Scotlan
d,Greece
England and Wales France, Spain
Note: responsible entity refers to municipal council depending on local government arrangement.
Source: (Schouten and van Dijk, 2007: 20-24)
The debate with regard to ownership of infrastructure influencing productivity and
efficiency of service providers is long standing (Abbott and Cohen, 2009: 4; Weeden,
2003: 144-145). Saal and Parker, (2001:66 as cited by Abbott and Cohen, 2009:6)
illustrates that private ownership is associated with “management incentives linked to
efficient operations” compared to public ownership which is primarily bounded by
“political and economic goals which sometimes conflict with efficiency objectives”.
However, it is more consistently found that regulation has a higher influence on
productivity and efficiency compared to ownership of infrastructure (Abbott and
Cohen, 2009: 8).
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The perceptions of customers in the drinking water and sewerage services market are
considered very important and have been known to shape the institutional
arrangements within the sector. This is particularly noted with regard to water pricing
level assessments, which were negatively perceived (as high as 50% in France and
Germany), though is it is not directly linked to service levels. Customers prefer “good
value for money” and not necessary the price level (high or low). In this regard,
countries such as Italy, France and Greece are in the process of water sector reform
(Schouten and van Dijk, 2007: 25). However, direct public management takes
precedence in the European water and sanitation market, though change tends to lean
towards delegated public management and privatisation, especially amongst southern
member states such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy (Schouten and van Dijk,
2007: 32).
2.5 Alternative price-setting processes
Conventional statutory regulation is changing rapidly, as a result of water sector
reform processes, and “alternatives to state regulation” are explored in the quest for
greater regulatory governance addressing issues such as “inadequate competition,
fraud and deception, imperfect information and vulnerable consumers” (Bartle and
Vass, 2005: 11-13). In this regard, regulation is often practiced as a result of “conduct
failure”, dealt with by government or delegated to “non-departmental public bodies or
non-ministerial departments” (Lawrence et al., 2002: 3). Conduct failure, otherwise
known as market failure, occurs mainly due to the “abuse of monopoly power (prices
too high, little choices), public goods and externalities (poor standards and safety;
pollution) and social exclusion and inequality (inadequate income; discrimination)
(Lawrence et al., 2002: 3; Simmonds and Vass, 2002: 4). The regulatory framework is
thus based on addressing conduct failures, through the establishment of institutional
structures, with respective roles and responsibilities. In most cases, the regulatory
framework consists of general- (government), cross-sectoral- (audit agencies),
sectoral (economic - independent) –regulatory functions (Lawrence et al., 2002: 3-5).
In a sense, regulators are “external review bodies with powers of enforcement”
(Simmonds and Vass, 2002: 5). In this regard, major regulatory related issues include
(Sohail, 2004: 25):
 “Ensuring that tariffs are effectively designed and applied
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 Checking that revenue stays with the water and sanitation sector
 Regulating cross-subsidisation between different users and customer
 Updating tariffs in line with inflation and other factors to an agreed protocol”
It should be noted that there is a difference in price-monitoring and price-setting, of
which the former is more common in governmental departments, where they play a
“passive role” (Schouten and van Dijk, 2007: 26). Prices may be controlled by a wide
range of regulatory body types, which include (Schouten and van Dijk, 2007: 26):
 (non) State departments (eg Ofwat in England and Wales)
 Regional Government bodies (Spain, Italy, Dutch Water Boards)
 Contractual mechanisms (contract regulation)
These regulatory functions are based on the premise of separate functions, hence to
separate policy, regulation and delivery functions within the water services sector
(Sansom et al., 2004: 74). As a result, the “establishment of corporatised public
utilities” is becoming the norm within any public sector reform process, for the
purpose of service efficiency (Rouse, 2007: 25) and mainly as an “alternative to state
regulation” various forms of regulation, especially economic (independent) regulators
are introduced (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 11). Independent regulation of drinking water
and environmental quality is also being promoted due to the different roles and
responsibilities involved in these functions (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 22;
Lawrence et al., 2002: 6-7). In terms of water services, independent regulators refer to
those that have the autonomy “to set tariffs, take enforcement action and impose
sanctions” (Rouse, 2007: 29). An appropriate level of independence or autonomy of
the regulatory function is primarily “to give objectivity” to the price-setting process
(Gerlach and Franceys, 2009: 1).
Regulation involves a multi-disciplinary approach and has been defined in various
ways which includes “promulgation of a binding set of rules to be applied by a body
devoted to its purpose” or “regulation covers all state actions designed to influence
industrial or social behaviour” (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 2). Regulation is also
sometimes seen as “an activity that restricts behaviour and prevents the occurrence of
certain undesirable activities”(Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 2). In that sense, it is further
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defined as “impartially improving accountability and transparency to enable more
effective service provision” (Sansom et al., 2004: 74). The role of a regulator is
multi-functional (Table 2-3), whether it is done through an independent body or
government department (Sansom et al., 2004: 75-76). In this respect, some level of
independence, though within a governmental framework, is a pre-requisite for
regulators to operate efficiently, given the multi-purpose nature of water resources
(Braga, 2003: 27).
Table 2-3 Effective regulatory requirements and functions
Requirements Functions
Sub-dividing functions (water and sanitation
performance and tariff regulation, environmental,
water quality)
Ensuring responsiveness to consumers needs
(consumer satisfaction leading to cost recovery
Strengthening technical capacity for different
functions
Flexible technical and service standards
Independent (open and publicly accountable
process of recruitment, publication of studies and
decisions)
Performance planning and monitoring
(performance indicators)
Necessary legal framework backing Safety net regulations for the poor (encourage
utilities to extent service coverage)
Funding of regulatory activities through dedicated
budget
Ensure development of essential infrastructure
Consider forming a multi-utility regulatory
framework
Promote asset serviceability and efficiency over
time (support for asset management plans)
Agreeing projected water and sewerage tariff
policies (cost-recovering tariff determination)
Source: (Sansom et al., 2004: 75-76)
An independent regulator is often noted to improve performances of service
providers, however several country specific conditions such as the problems, sector
objectives and institutional arrangements and tools in place also play a critical role in
the regulatory framework (Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 5). There are several success stories,
where performance is achieved in the absence of an independent regulator, such as the
cases of Botswana, Burkina Faso, New Zealand, Netherlands and Scandinavia. So too
is the evidence of the huge influence of regulators on transparency and effective
sector performance in countries like the United States, United Kingdom and Australia
as other examples (Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 7). Hence much depends on the regulatory
design (Figure 2-6) and the political environment in which it operates. In this sense it
is important to identify clearly what the regulator is to address and what outcomes are
expected (Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 5).
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Figure 2-6 Approach to regulatory design. Source: (Castalia as cited by Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 8)
Policy and structural reforms are often required to achieve sector objectives, however
often a good regulatory system is required, with the understanding of the strengths
and limitations of such systems (Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 9). Regulation, in itself, cannot
solve the problems of sector performance and it needs to be complemented with
government support in influencing policy decision making, governance structures and
adequate coordination of involved stakeholder activities (Ehrhardt et al., 2007:11). It
is further highlighted that regulators cannot ensure affordability of services, provider
efficiency, improved capital expenditure planning and cost recovery (especially not
payment from government departments and agencies) (GTZ, 2008: 14) though they
can influence the incentives acting upon service providers.
Regulatory frameworks (Table 2-4) are highly dependent on accountability
characteristics and information, therefore lack of detail in the regulatory tools has
been known to distort the process (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 27). For example,
issues such as clarification of the financial models used for calculating costs. Even
though the demand for detailed information is high, any such system should generally
not be “over-sophisticated” and should be kept simple (Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 24-25).
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The core of the framework is about policy (defining regulatory objectives and
outcomes) and control (monitoring, enforcement through incentives) (Simmonds and
Vass, 2002: 4).
Table 2-4 Regulatory framework based on stages of accountability
Structure and process considerations Three stages of accountability
 The legal framework
 Separation of roles and responsibilities
 Principles of good regulation
 Forming a ‘whole of government’ view
 Provision of relevant information
 Giving reasons for decisions
 Exposure to scrutiny
 The possibility of independent review
Source: based on text from (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 47)
Separation of roles and responsibilities is described as the best way to achieve
accountability and hence effective regulation (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 47). However,
independent, technocratic regulators, should be seen as being part of the state’s
regulation process and not as separate (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 47). Economic
regulation is associated with objectivity and transparency in the process of delivering
efficiency and quality in the water sector (Gerlach and Franceys, 2009: 1). Hence
economic regulation is directed specifically to regulating monopoly providers,
through either strictly imposing or removing regulations as set out by the central
government or state. It is normally supported by the threat of sanctions or fines
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 9-12). In this regard, it focuses on “setting, monitoring and
enforcing rules on tariffs and service quality” (Mandri-Perrott, 2009: 41). Commonly,
regulation is exercised on “market entries, prices, wages, pollution effects, standards
of production for certain goods and services”. In this regard economic regulators are
facilitative agencies, appointed by the state, to both implement its rules and laws
while controlling service providers’ behaviour for the best social benefit/interest of
their customers (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 9-12). In fact any issue(s) that
compromises the benefits owed to consumers or the public in terms of access, quality
of service and fair payment thereof, calls for the mediation of a regulator. This
includes ‘information inadequacies; anti-competitive behaviour and predatory pricing;
unequal bargaining power; improper planning (disregarding ‘altruistic intentions’)
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scarcity and rationing and discontinuity and unavailability of services (Baldwin and
Cave, 1999: 12-17).
2.5.1 Elements of Regulation
An ideal regulatory system is one that operates within the policy framework set by
government, with the aim to maximise social welfare, while operating on “minimum
economic costs”, i.e being effective and efficient. Economic costs in this sense refers
to the “administrative and compliance costs of regulation” (Parker et al., 2002: 8). The
goals of effective regulation are summarised as ensuring financial viability,
operational efficiency, dynamic efficiency and distributive justice. Financial viability
in this sense refers to creating incentives for service providers to recover investment
costs whilst delivering quality services. Operational efficiency allows services to be
priced appropriately to “optimise consumption and supply”, while dynamic efficiency
focuses on increasing competition and expanding services to meet future demands.
Finally distributive justice, refers to social objectives of universal service, and this
includes considering subsidies. (Mandri-Perrott, 2009: 39-40).
Furthermore, ingredients for successful independent regulatory activities include
“adequate resources; legal mandate and operating principles” given the proper
political and economic settings (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 30; Berg, 2000: 160).
Nine activities are perceived to be key to measure ‘effective regulation of prices’ and
have major impacts or implications on costs and tariff setting. These include (Berg,
2000: 161):
 licensing
 performance standards on quality and reliability
 monitoring of data on costs, revenues and performance
 tariff setting for revenue sufficiency for operating and capital costs
 uniform accounting systems for comparable cost data
 arbitration among firms and consumers
 management audits
 human resources policies
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 reports on costs and tariffs for current and future performance and efficiency
These activities are highly dependent on the legal framework as well as “incentives
for cost containment”. These activities legitimise the mandate of independent
regulators which is necessary to differentiate its roles and responsibilities from that of
government institutions. However, political influences can hamper the
implementation of these nine activities, hence putting the autonomy of such regulators
to the test. In this regard, there are three crucial elements (amongst others) that are
necessary for a regulator to succeed and these are clarity of roles; autonomy and
accountability (Stern and Holder, 1999). A further nine operating principles are
deemed necessary to measure ‘good regulation’ which include (Berg, 2000):
 communication (information to stakeholders on a timely and accessible basis)
 consultation (participation of stakeholders in meetings)
 consistency
 predictability
 flexibility
 independence (autonomy in that decisions are free from political influence)
 effectiveness and efficiency
 accountability
 transparency
Out of these elements, the Better Regulation Commission (BRC), (2005) highlights
proportionality (needs based intervention); accountability (justify public decisions and
open to public scrutiny); consistency (coordination and fair implementation);
transparency (open, simple and user-friendly regulation) and targeting (focusing on
the problem and reduce side effects) as the most important principles required for
regulatory governance (Table 2-5).
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Table 2-5 Elements of regulatory governance
Elements Characteristics Guiding principles
Regulatory purpose Objectives (outputs)
‘the problem to be addressed’
Objectivity
Coherence
rationality
Regulatory means Instruments (inputs)
‘the options available to solve
the problem’
Proportionality
Targeting
Consistency
Regulatory framework Structure and process
(governance)
‘the control mechanism aimed at
optimising regulatory outcomes’
Transparency
Accountability
Source: (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 47)
Regulatory governance is described as “accountability of both regulators and the
regulated through transparency of process and reporting is the essential operating
mechanism required to maintain effective regulation” (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 46).
Similarly, from an African perspective, regulatory governance elements deemed
necessary are comprised from internal and external governance issues (Table 2-6)
(van Baston, 2007: 7).
Table 2-6 Internal and external regulatory governance elements required, specifically for African
regulators
Internal External
 Limited government interference
 Clear differentiation of roles and
responsibilities of staff and governance
structures
 Governance structure should be
accountable for performance of
regulatory agencies through internal
audits
 Well defined documentation and
communication process of decisions
 Remuneration of staff should be market
related based on relevant skills and
expertise required
 Regulatory frameworks should be guided
by primary legislation
 Governance structure (board members)
should be multi-sectoral
 Human resource capacity should
complement regulatory functions and
ambitions
 Independence should be long-term
objective, with regulatory discretion and
robust appeal mechanisms in place
 Public notifications of decisions and
actions
Source: (AFUR, 2002 as cited by van Baston, 2007: 7)
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Overall, independence, accountability and transparency are regarded as key elements
for competent regulatory body (Mandri-Perrott, 2009: 48). The elements of a good
regulator tie in well with those of a sustainable institutional framework (Figure 2-5)
which is based on legitimacy, stability and efficiency. More specifically coherence,
predictability, credibility, transparency and accountability is most frequently given as
a criteria within in which regulators can operate efficiently (Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 13-
14). To achieve sustainable development, it is advocated that policy integration be
part of the functions of economic regulators. However, separation of functions is
highly recommended for independent regulators, therefore policy integration
contradicts the aforementioned requirement of an effective regulatory process (Bartle
and Vass, 2007: 261-262). The motive behind policy integration for economic
regulators is due to the extent to which environmental and social objectives of policies
have been neglected and hence it is necessary to balance the three pillars (economic,
social and environmental) to achieve sustainable development (Bartle and Vass, 2007:
262).
So far, the ideal scenarios of good regulation have been identified in the literature.
However in practice all the ‘right’ elements are rarely present, which makes the task
of independent regulators very difficult. The major tasks being that of ‘balancing the
different interests of primarily three groups: consumers, investors and government’
(Mandri-Perrott, 2009: 48; van Baston, 2007: 7-8). These interests are all centred on
the price of the service from different angles, for example industrial or residential
consumers - either would like low prices for high quality service, while investors
would like easier entry regulations and government is concerned about elections and
does not have charging for services as a priority on their agenda. Independent
regulation constitutes a balance between the legal mandate, resources and operating
principles. One without the other is not ruled out; however it is most likely to affect
the performance of the sector as well as the creditability and legitimacy of the
institution (Berg, 2000: 163-167). This being said, it is recognised that political
pressure is in most cases inevitable, thus it is the ‘art of regulation’ to know the
boundaries of such pressure influences (Mandri-Perrott, 2009: 48; Berg, 2000: 165).
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2.5.2 Regulatory structures
The last two decades have witnessed several debates on the structures of regulators,
and various forms of regulation, moving from typical “command and control
regulation” towards “self-regulation and co-regulation”, then “deregulation” followed
by “liberalisation of markets” (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 15-18). However, recent trends
indicate various regulatory bodies (Table 2-7) emerging in the water sector (Rouse,
2007: 28). Four distinct types of economic regulators for utilities are evident;
integrated, semi-independent, independent (Parker et al., 2002; Stern and Holder,
1999; van Baston, 2007: 5) and self-regulation (Rouse, 2007: 23; Bartle and Vass,
2005: 17). Integrated structures refer to public regulation which is part of a
government ministry controlled by the respective Minister. Semi-independent
regulator has a degree of independence from the ministry, but its decision can be
over-ruled by the minister; while independent regulators are not controlled by
government (Rouse, 2007: 23) but almost certainly and necessarily remain open to be
influenced by governmental priorities. Independent regulators are mostly used in
high-income countries, with the UK and US models being the most frequently cited
examples (Parker et al., 2002: 7; Lawrence et al., 2002: 4).
Table 2-7 Types of regulatory structures
Regulatory structures Description
No regulation No explicit controls on an organisation
Statutory regulation (classic) Regulations are specified, administered and
enforced by the state
Co-regulation Regulations are specified, administered and
enforced by a combination of the state and the
regulated organisation (s)
Quasi-regulation Regulation are specified and administered by
the state, and enforced by industry
Self-regulation Regulations are specified administered and
enforced by the regulated organisation (s)
Source: (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 19 22)
There seems to be confusion of definitions of regulatory structures- such that semi-
independent and integrated regulation refers to co-regulation, while many confuse
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self-regulation with statutory regulation. The variations within regulatory structures,
reflects the complexity of regulation and thus it is difficult to “fit” it in specific
categories (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 24). The role of government in regulation
structures are not clearly defined (except in statutory regulation) (Bartle and Vass,
2005: 20), but cannot be completely divorced from the regulation process either,
therefore there will be a degree of government involvement, irrespective of the
regulatory structures in place (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 126).
Service providers in lower-income countries are mostly state owned (Parker et al.,
2002: 10). The trend had been towards changing to private ownership but with state
regulation” due to ‘regulatory/state failure’ (Parker et al., 2002: 1). Elements needed
in state regulation include good public administration (institutional setting) and
responsibility (backed up with proper information); “regulatory rules and processes”
(Parker et al., 2002: 5 9). The Australian case, represents corporatized public
regulation, with independent powers to set tariffs, standards and conditions of service
for all utilities, including water, under the auspices of the Essential Services
Commission, for the state of Victoria (Rouse, 2007: 31). In contrast, the Regulatory
Office in Manila, Philippines, does not set the tariffs, but has more of a monitoring
role based on concession contract conditions, making use of independent observers
(Rouse, 2007: 31).
Self-regulation is normally practiced internally by the utility or through associations,
which includes developing “technical standards and codes of practices” (Bartle and
Vass, 2005: 19). An example of self-regulation is taking place in Ghana, where water
tanker operators practising a “code of practice” through associations to their
customers. Perceived benefits are direct control and recognition of suppliers within
the “public water supply distribution system” (Rouse, 2007:24). One of the biggest
criticisms against self-regulation is that it is not efficient and sustainable, due to its
political influence on setting charges (Rouse, 2007: 24). South Africa is also
practising self regulation through a three-tier government structure, which comprises
government setting tariff strategies to be followed by the sector, water boards (part of
government) regulating bulk water suppliers to municipalities and the latter regulating
water supplied to end users (van Baston, 2007: 29). This system is further described
as “problematic opaque regulatory relationships currently in place”, hence the
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recommended need for an independent regulator to facilitate the process (van Baston,
2007: 30).
Political and social relations frame the processes and outcomes of the ‘regulatory
regime’ (Parker et al., 2002: 4-5). ‘Institution building’ forms a very crucial aspect of
economic development, such that it enhances “economic incentives, reduce
information imperfections and reduce transaction costs” (Parker et al., 2002: 5).
Threats to regulatory success depend on the strength of the regulator to handle ‘hold-
up’, regulatory and political capture’ situations. ‘Hold-up’ in this case refers to
negotiating the terms of the contract after agreement between the regulator and the
investor, otherwise leading to under-investment of one of the negotiating parties.
‘Regulatory and political capture refers to the regulator favouring the interest of the
utility over that of the consumer and or being subsumed by political pressure and
operating on political terms respectively (Parker et al., 2002: 6-7). Regulation of the
industry structure and regulation of market conduct are two major ways of dealing
with monopoly regulation. In the case of structural industry regulation, promotion of
competition through “setting rules regarding market entry and shape of corporate
entities operating in market” is prevalent, while with regulation of market conduct is
limited to “behaviour of market suppliers in terms of quality, pricing and access” of
services (Ballance, 2006; Ballance and Taylor, 2005).
In the case of England and Wales, the focus is on improving the quality of services,
whilst ensuring financial sustainability to maintain desired service levels. There are
four main regulatory bodies, focusing on separate issues (economic, drinking water
and environment, consumers), yet working together. Consumers are represented
through an independent body, the Consumer Council for Water, to ensure that they
are fully involved in the process and issues are represented and dealt with (OFWAT,
2007a). Similarly, the regulator in Chile, Superentendencia de Services Sanitarios
(SISS), operates strictly on the full cost recovery principles and does not focus on
social objectives (for example affordability), which includes subsidies for poor
(Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 162). Contrastingly, following the water sector reform
in Zambia, an independent regulator, the National Water Supply and Sanitation
Council (NWASCO) was established, with a strong focus on the urban poor.
NWASCO regulates both private and public utilities, with economic and quality
regulation functions (NWASCO 2004: 11). The Zambian regulator has built up a
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successful reputation of managing with limited resources and investment in
infrastructure, amongst the developing countries as well as the world (Rouse, 2007:
30-31).
Effective and efficient regulation in developing high-income and lower-income
countries are different, in the sense that in lower-income countries (depending on their
economic history) goals of poverty reduction and social welfare top the agenda
whereas in high-income countries economic development feature stronger. For
example in South Africa ‘black empowerment and affordable access to services’
drives their policy (Schwella, 2002 as cited by (Parker et al., 2002: 15). In the case of
lower-income countries the following issues are critical when assessing economic
regulation (Parker et al., 2002: 16):
 Cross-subsidies and market liberalisation policies
 Link between empowerment, participation and poverty reduction with
economic regulation
 Privatisation and economic efficiency
 Benefits to low-income consumers (and their respective needs)
 Effective economic regulation in developing countries are measured on ‘scope
and quality of services provided’ and not necessary on improving ‘network
infrastructure’
Criticism about lower-income country regulators are mostly related to adaptation of
“developed” country solution, without exploring low-cost options (Baker and
Tremolet, 2000: 2). In addition, institutional building in lower-income economies is
hampered by “technical and political constraints” (Parker et al., 2002: 11).
An alternative to having a permanent regulatory body is to make use of expert panels,
boards or committee, to be used only when necessary due to lack of resources. The
role and autonomy given to these temporary arrangements might differ depending on
the country situations; however it could be seen as more credible process. In some
developing countries, NGOs are known to be given this role and has worked quite
well (Rouse, 2007: 33-34).
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The need for some sort of independent regulator cannot be overemphasised according
to the literature, especially in lower-income countries where the pressure from the
international world is promoting various standards to be upheld.
Table 2-8 indicates the global requirements and the role of regulatory to address these
requirements to ensure sustainable water services (UNDP Human Resources Report,
2006 as cited by Rouse, 2007: 34-35).
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Table 2-8 Actions and elements required for sustainable water services regulation
Actions required by governments Elements required to fulfil the required actions
 Making access to water a human right
with implementation based on 20 litres a
day of clean water for everyone
 Develop sound objectives and policies
including the need for adequate cost
recovery for sustainability
 Introducing ‘lifeline tariffs’, cross-
subsidies and investment in standpipes
 Independent regulators to
 Implement policies
 Monitor compliance (including
system extension and increased
access targets) by service providers
 Setting tariffs and standards
 Ensure effective public consultation
and information dissemination takes
place
 Regulating water utilities to improve
efficiency, enhance equity and ensure
accountability to the poor
 External support to pay for start-up
refurbishment costs
 Enacting legislation that requires female
representation on water committees and
other bodies
 Subsidies directed at the poor to provide
assistance on access charges, and either
low-tariff pre-payment meters or means
tested direct support on water bill
payments
 Giving priority to the needs of the poor
in public investment and service
provision strategies for water and
sanitation
 Local water committees to provide the
focus for public participation
 Empowering independent regulators to
hold service providers to account for
delivering efficient and affordable
services to the poor
Source: Table created based on information provided by (Rouse, 2007: 34-35)
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The need for structural reform and strong regulation (drinking water quality standards,
pricing and environment) procedures in place to ensure productivity and efficiency
(based on performance indicators) of the sector cannot be overemphasised (Abbott
and Cohen, 2009: 3,7; Saleth and Dinar, 2005: 17).
2.5.3 Regulating for the urban poor
Water sector reforms usually include the development of regulatory frameworks
which adopt different country characteristics resulting in different types of regulators
in place (Ehrhardt et al., 2007: 7). The impact of regulatory frameworks towards
access of services to urban poor is significant; hence the recent trend towards pro-
poor regulation (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 44-45). Regulating for the urban poor
includes understanding the motivation and incentives of regulators to encourage
formal providers to increase service coverage. This is referred to as “regulating the
regulator” (Tremolet, 2006: 6).
The urban poor typically make use of informal providers for water services due to the
high costs of accessing the services of formal providers. Therefore it is advocated by
some that regulators focus on informal providers as well, to regulate their activities
and monitor standards. However due to lack of information this is a huge challenge
and some argue that it is not so necessary where informal providers are actually
operating within a real market (Nickson and Franceys, 2003: 5). Similarly, regulators
find it difficult to address affordability issues (primarily due to political influence)
regarding the urban poor, in which case pro-poor low tariff structures are proposed to
be considered (Tremolet, 2006: 11; Gerlach and Franceys, 2009: 9). The interest of
the poor may not be an implicit part of the regulatory process, as witnessed in Jordan,
which can influence service delivery to urban poor significantly (Gerlach and
Franceys, 2009: 9). The most credible solution for regulating for the poor, according
to the literature, is to make it a regulatory responsibility with the addition of consumer
representation, so as to keep abreast on critical issues concerning the groups. In this
regard, Zambia’s Water Watch Groups are noted to have a huge influence within the
regulatory framework and in turn benefiting urban poor (Tremolet, 2006: 13).
Independent regulators are often formed as a result of privatisation, which is
associated with increased efficiency and service quality and as a result increased
prices. Private companies are tailored for the high income groups, to recover costs and
Chapter 2: Literature Review
61
thus do not consider low-cost options for the urban poor. In which case the urban poor
are neglected and have to resort alternative water sources, which have health
implications. In this regard, flexibility in regulatory frameworks and “infrastructural
diversification” are called for, to permit alternative providers entry into the system to
cater for the needs of the urban poor (Baker and Tremolet, 2000: 1-3). Another
alternative is to provide differentiated services based on income levels of consumers,
allowing consumers to choose lower quality services for lower prices. However
technicalities about this option prove to be difficult to implement since urban poor
areas are not clearly demarcated and are mixed with other income level consumers
(Baker and Tremolet, 2000: 2-3).
2.6 Theories of regulation
Normative theories of regulation deal with “how regulation should be done”, while
positive theories of regulation focuses on “why regulation occurs” and more
specifically on the “roles of stakeholders within the policy-making process”. (Jamison
et al., 2004: 11). This research focuses on positive theories of regulation. Typically
regulatory problems are three-fold associated with “market power; opportunisms and
asymmetric information” (Jamison et al., 2004: 11; van Baston, 2007: 4). The latter
situation occurs if an operator has an information advantage over government in terms
of efficient operation abilities and capacities (Jamison et al., 2004: 13). However, in
the absence of such information advantage, typically it results in “control and
command regulation”, where government could ‘instruct’ operators to operate in a
certain manner (Jamison et al., 2004: 13). Jamison et al. (2004:14) highlight three
ways to deal with information asymmetry:
 Increase competition
 Gathering and publishing information on operator and market
 Applying incentive-based regulation
Competition allows consumers to opt for better quality and price, hence forcing
operators to increase efficiency – however this form of competition is not common
amongst monopolistic water providers.
Typically to avoid information asymmetry, regulators obtain mainly “financial data
and operator statistics” to facilitate and monitor the sector efficiently (Jamison et al.,
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2004: 16; Simmonds and Vass, 2002: 19). In this regard, operators are required to
adhere to accounting rules, which require financial data such as financial statements,
including “capital structures and depreciation schedules”; while operating statistics
range from price information, number of consumers and employees, quality of
services and operating details (Jamison et al., 2004: 16). Furthermore, comparing
various performances of operators in terms of efficiency and effectiveness can be
done through benchmarking or yardstick regulation, with the incentive to reward the
operators for out-performance (Alegre et al., 2006: 3).
Incentive regulation as a means to reduce information asymmetry is to control price
levels of operating and as a result reward operators for achieving societal objectives,
through maintaining accounting profits (Jamison et al., 2004: 17). Price-cap and
revenue cap incentive based regulation can be used, taking into consideration inflation
in relation to the price or revenue respectively (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 27-28).
To maximise rewards, many operators use “hybrid incentive schemes”, mixing the
various approaches, for example in UK one author describes how “rate of return and
price-cap regulation” systems are used (Jamison et al., 2004: 18). Further issues to be
addressed as incentives are investment related aspects such as the need and timing of
investment, the related efficient costs levels and inclusion of investment into the
regulatory asset base (RAB) (Alexander, 2006: 245). Ideally, the regulator should aim
to align the rate of return and cost of capital of companies, to avoid abuse of
monopoly power, while encouraging investment (Andres et al., 2007: 4).
To ensure that the companies perform well, interests (often conflicting) from key
stakeholders namely, shareholders/investors, board of directors and management must
be synchronised for mutual benefit of the organisation. The relationship amongst
these three key stakeholders refers to corporate governance (Wheelen and Hunger,
2002: 26), which in this case can be related to the water sector. The role of top-
managers are very essential, such that they are responsible for the day-to-day running
of the business, in that sense they are not the owners and are usually referred to as the
“hired-hands” (Wheelen and Hunger, 2002: 30). In this regard, the managers might
have their own personal welfare interests at heart, compared to those interests of the
shareholders for example. Managing or resolving the relationship (interests) between
‘principals’ (owners/shareholders) and agents (top management) involves the
application of principal-agent theory (Figure 2-7) (Wheelen and Hunger, 2002: 30;
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Mallin, 2007: 12). There are two typical problems experienced within this theory
which are (Wheelen and Hunger, 2002: 30): “the desires or objectives of the owners
and the agents conflict” or difficulties faced by principals to find out the exact
activities of the agents different attitudes of principal and agents towards risk-sharing
problems.
Figure 2-7 Illustration of the principal-agent theory (P=Principal, A= Agent).
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Principal_agent.png#filehistory
It is indicated that these problems are likely to occur if the principals have very little
knowledge about the activities of the company or are mostly comprised of social
relations or where the majority are ‘inside’ managers serving on the board (Wheelen
and Hunger, 2002: 30). Information asymmetry is one of the biggest problems faced
in the principal-agent relationship. In this case, the agent has an advantage over the
principal due to access to more detailed information. According to Blair, (1996 as
cited by Mallin, 2007: 13) “managers are supposed to be the ‘agents’ of a
corporation’s ‘owners’, but managers must be monitored and institutional
arrangements must provide some checks and balances to make sure they do not abuse
their power”. “Information asymmetries” in market related decision-making is
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identified as one of the main attributes of market failure. In this respect market failure
is defined as having an ‘unfair’ advantage of information over the other party during
the market transaction (Berg, 2008: 3).
In the case of monopoly water providers the principal-agent challenge is not so much
between shareholders and managers but rather between price-setters (government or
its regulator) and service provider management. For example, the influence of market
competition in France on the negotiation of a “better price” with the operators is not
clear; hence it is noted that information asymmetry problems are very prominent
within the French system, making cost analysis (and therefore price-setting) very
complex and non-transparent (Garcia et al., 2005: 175 180).
This research builds its foundation on the principal-agent theory in the context of the
water sector. As opposed to corporate governance being promoted, this research will
take a closer look at regulatory governance, in which case, the government is the
principal and the agent is the service providers. However, realising that more
stakeholders are involved, the study also draws on stakeholder theory, taking into
consideration the consumers, environmentalists, other organisations and private
sector. In applying these theories, the study suggests that institutional development
forms part of the solution to the problems facing the water sector in Namibia and it
should be in the form of establishing the appropriate level of regulator, to monitor the
activities of the agents on behalf of the principal.
There are different opinions regarding information flow depending on type of
regulators: either state or private regulators. One opinion is that information flow to
regulators is better when the state both owns and regulate, hence facilitating the
process of contracting (Shapiro and Willing 1990 as cited by Parker et al., 2002). The
counter opinion is that if it is state owned then the incentive to gather information is
less and thus minimises welfare benefits (Hayek, 1945 as cited by Parker et al., 2002).
Either way the information flow process depends on the ‘commitment’ of the
regulator and the ‘credibility’ of the regulated parties (Parker et al., 2002: 5).
On a wider scale, stakeholder theory takes into consideration not only the relationship
between shareholders and managers, but also the interests of other stakeholders such
as customers, suppliers, government and the local community (Mallin, 2007: 16;
Prosser, 1999: 206). As a solution, stakeholder theory supports interests of
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stakeholders to be considered provided it contributes to the “long-run value” of the
organisation, due to multiple interests that arise from stakeholders (Mallin, 2007: 16).
This theory also further encourages “participative procedures in regulation” (Prosser,
1999: 209).
Sector performance is known to be influenced by the relevant information, incentives
and institutions involved (Berg, 2008: 3). Hence, stakeholders make decisions based
on information they have, in which case four conflict scenarios (Figure 2-8) arises as
identified by Shabman, (2005 as cited by Berg, 2008:5):
 Authority conflicts: “who should make decisions”- reflecting on clarity of
roles and responsibilities and coordination amongst decision makers
 Cognitive (factual) conflicts: “what can be done”- reflecting on current and
historical facts/trends
 Values conflicts: “what should be done”- reflecting priorities
 Interest conflicts: “who should benefit from decision”- reflecting on different
benefits for stakeholders (producers, consumers and policy-makers)
Figure 2-8 Sources of conflicts facing regulators. Source: (Berg, 2008: 6-10)
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Regulatory decisions are complex and therefore information and transparency can
facilitate the process of balancing these various conflict types. The authority conflict,
deals with stakeholder authority, which even if roles are clear in some instances,
authority levels dictate. In this sense the decision making process is very complex
takes into consideration issues such as service coverage areas, sources of funding,
prices to be charged to achieve financial sustainability, water quality and
environmental standards and resource allocation options (Berg, 2008: 6-7). It is very
critical to verify the possible service options with factual information to avoid
cognitive conflicts. Lack of appropriate financial and operating statistics is associated
with under-performing and hence depends on the credibility of managers to
demonstrate performance because it is believed that “managers can only manage what
they can measure” (Berg, 2008: 7). Similarly, value conflicts can be resolved through
public awareness, to understand the trade-off involved in making the relevant
decisions. Often these conflicts arise over the need to extend to unserved areas or
improving water quality linked to health risks (Berg, 2008: 7-8). In the absence of
information, it difficult to determine what is available to implement various options.
The interest conflict is centred on stakeholder power and influence, which is based on
available information and understanding consequences of the various options and
decisions. For example, affluent consumers (usually the minority), are more
‘powerful’ and more organised and thus can represent their case (improved quality)
better in comparison to poor consumers (majority), who in many cases are difficult to
organise and are uninformed about investment options (expansion of services and
available technology) and prices to be able to influence the process properly (Berg,
2008: 9-10). “In addition, in some cases, regulators and policy-makers may wish to
avoid the political pressure generated when poorly performing utilities are singled out.
“Knowledge is power,” and providing information to stakeholders disturbs the status
quo” (Berg, 2008: 1-2).
It is noted that information asymmetry has a huge impact on the performance of water
utilities, since without centralised data systems the relevant information required for
critical decision making in accordance with policies is not available (Berg, 2008: 2).
Access to water and sanitation services is often referred as “human right”, a “right to
dignity” and in this sense it is summarised as “distributive fairness”, which is a
concept strongly linked to “procedural fairness” that refers to access to reliable
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information so as to allow consumers to make informative decisions. Though it is
widely recognised that water is an economic good, it is also recognised that quality of
service can only be obtained through financial sustainability, and as such procedural
fairness receives preference and in this case access to information becomes a key
indicator for performance of service providers (Berg, 2008: 2). “Information can be a
catalyst for reform” through consistent and reality-based benchmarking (Berg, 2008:
3)
Finally “regulation is performed in a network of relationships among persons,
institutions that differ in their objectives, incentives and sets of information”(Jamison
et al., 2004: 24). Hence to facilitate an efficient process the following elements are
required (Jamison et al., 2004: 24):
 Decision making procedures to limit information asymmetries
 Incentives for operators, government and regulators to the benefit of
consumers
 Requirements for service quality and access to poor
 Align the goals and capabilities of regulator with welfare of consumers
Delegation of power as a means of maintaining “credible commitment” to long term
objectives is one of the major reasons behind principal-agent relationships (Bartle and
Vass, 2007: 263). In this respect, information asymmetry challenges between
principals and agents are reduced by “functional specialisation”, such that the agent
implements policies developed by government, allowing principals to deal with policy
implications, hence increasing efficiency and effectiveness of agents (regulators)
(Bartle and Vass, 2007: 263; Prosser, 1999: 198-199). Furthermore, regulatory
agencies are recognised as the “optimal way” to manage “conflicting interests” and
efficient water use, especially through the water charging process (Braga, 2003: 25).
2.7 Chapter summary
Urban water and sanitation services are seen as part of the basic functions of
government to achieve sustainable development. However, the pillars of sustainability
namely social, economic and environmental aspects, often conflict when it comes to
the provision of services, especially the price-setting process thereof. In this regard,
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the implementation of pricing policies is a complex process entailing understanding of
costs of services (full cost recovery principles), the income base of target groups,
especially the urban poor (ability and willingness to pay), the capacities and
incentives of providers (financial sustainability) operating within scarcity challenges
of the resource base. In this respect, the governance and institutional arrangements
play a critical role within the process. Separation and clarity of roles and
responsibilities as well as expectations of such institutions (especially regulators),
combined with the need of financial, structural, and functionality independence, is
comprehensively highlighted as necessary to deal with the challenges facing both high
and low-income country price-setting processes. Regulators (on behalf of the
principal, ie government), have the daunting tasks of facilitating the process while
balancing conflicting stakeholder interests, in the quest for efficient service provision
(improving performance). In this regard, it is advocated that regulatory frameworks be
based on country objectives (clearly defined expectations), complemented with
relevant institutional arrangements, while realising the relevant limitations. The
biggest challenges faced by regulators are imbedded within the regulation theory of
the principal-agent problem, which addresses the challenges of information
asymmetries and differing objectives/interests of relevant parties. In this sense, access
to, and the ability to make public, relevant, accurate information (transparency) along
with stakeholder involvement to consider that information is equally important for the
price-setting process of the urban water and sanitation sector.
This chapter has set the scene, the conceptual framework, for the field research
conducted throughout the study and forms the basis against which the methodology is
developed.
“The only way to hold your government
responsible is through transparency and accountability”
President Barack Obama, 21 May 2009
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Chapter 3: Research Strategy and Methods
This chapter outlines the research design and methods used throughout the research
period. The data collection methods, including case study strategies and relevant
justification for method selection are elaborated upon. The chapter further gives more
insight on the country cases selected followed by methods of data analysis for both
qualitative and quantitative data collected.
3.1 Research design
The research was undertaken in three phases, where the first phase consisted primarily
of drafting the concept and literature review chapters (though this is an iterative
process) and finalizing the methodology of the study. The second phase concentrated
on active research (consisting of pilot fieldwork and main fieldwork), during which
research on the required variables was undertaken. The final research phase consisted
of results analysis, developing conclusions and recommendations. The research is
primarily qualitative by design (descriptive studies) but incorporates quantitative data
collection methods and exploratory work (case studies) (Robson, 2002: 87 164).
Hence, the research follows a flexible design leaving room for further development
during data collection (Robson, 2002: 164; Neuman, 2006: 158). Furthermore,
flexible designs include fundamentals of evolution as the understanding of the
research evolves (Yin, 2009: 94) and this design characteristic is evident in
development of the research proposition, objectives and methods.
The qualitative aspect of the research was undertaken through the case study data,
collected from various key informant interviewees in the selected three countries,
complemented by focus groups where appropriate. The quantitative data was mainly
collected through secondary data, such as existing statistics and financial
reports/information mainly from the provider groups.
3.1.1 Evolution of objectives and methods
The research proposition is classified as conjunctive, which links the concepts under
investigation. Conjunctive propositions are noted to generate multiple response
categories, which further guide the research questions and objectives (Van de Ven,
2007: 117). The research was primarily centred around assessing the price-setting
process and identifying the potential role of a regulator in Namibia, based on
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understanding the price review processes in England and Zambia. Due to the
exploratory nature of the research, the process was driven by “discovery” and was
influenced by a various decisions based on research findings and hence resulted in
“reformulation” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967 as cited by (Denscombe, 2003: 25;
Smithson, 2008: 218)) of the proposition, objectives and subsequently the methods in
a process known as “sequential discovery”. This is further based upon a strategy of
qualitative research; (Lincoln and Guba, 1985 as cited by (Denscombe, 2003: 25)
described as “emergent and sequential” where findings of research determine the
direction in which research develops. As a result of this strategy, the research draws
on wide variation of data collected (including contradictions) to explain the
“complexity” of the research.
3.2 Data collection methods
The research relied on several data collection strategies including surveys (document
surveys; face-to-face and telephone interviews) and focus group discussions. The
face-to-face interviews allowed for more detailed data from respondents, while the
telephone interviews were used as supplementary and verification means rather than a
primary source of data (Neuman, 2006:300-301; Yin, 2009: 102-103). These survey
strategies were selected based on their reputation for producing ‘honest’ data, such
that it equips the researcher to “immediately validate” the data through probing and
getting direct responses as oppose to postal and internet questionnaires (Robson,
2002). The research capitalised on the major advantages of surveys which aim to get
information “straight from the horse’s mouth”, and hence the results display “real-
world observations” (Robson, 2002: 4; Van de Ven, 2007: 77; Miles and Huberman,
1994: 4-5,10). Furthermore, the research focused on case study approaches to obtain
depth, detail and variety (to understand the ‘bigger picture’ from the research) (Yin,
2009: 4)
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Photograph 2: Focus group discussion, with community members in Freedom land A. Source: R.
Franceys, Windhoek, 2007
A non-probability sampling technique, purposive snowball sampling, was used
throughout the research because the target group types were identified in advance,
based on literature surveys, in terms of their relevance to the research and particular
characteristics (Neuman, 2006: 220) such as knowledge of price-setting process and
representatives of consumer groups.
The benefit of using the snowballing technique was mainly to get references to those
informants that are familiar with the issues researched making it easier to discuss the
topic and to get as much as possible information. The same technique was used with
regard to obtaining the relevant documentation (or referred to those people that would
have the documents). This technique also provided the researcher room to have
“quality” interviews (due to credibility of referees or prior contact) with the
interviewees, therefore the researcher did not require a statistically representative
sample size, since the purpose of sampling was based on quality and not on quantity.
In this sense, the research is classified as small-scale qualitative research (sample size
between 30 and 250) (Denscombe, 2003:24). Furthermore, following characteristics
of qualitative research, the sample size was not known from the beginning of the
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research, though a relatively small sample size was anticipated (Neuman, 2006: 221-
223), however data was gathered from a total sample size of 158 individuals from all
case studies (see Error! Reference source not found. for detailed breakdown).
3.2.1 Case study strategy
A case study approach is selected primarily because it deals with the questions “how”
and “why” with no control over events in the contexts of the investigated real-life
("naturally occurring”) phenomenon (Yin, 2009: 10). Case studies are also commonly
used for understanding relationships, experiences or processes in different disciplines,
including socio-economics and development (Denscombe, 2003: 31; Smithson, 2008:
214). This study combines exploratory and descriptive case studies. In the exploratory
cases, the questions “what” were more prevalent, whereas in the descriptive cases
“how many and how much” questions were asked (Yin, 2003b). Error! Reference
source not found. indicates the choice for case studies above other social research
strategies.
Table 3-1 Relevant situations for different research strategies
Strategy Form of research
Question
Requires control of
behavioural events?
Focuses on
contemporary events?
Experiment How, why? Yes Yes
Survey Who, what, where, how
many, how much?
No Yes
Archival analysis Who, what, where, how
many, how much?
No Yes/No
History How, why? No No
Case study How, why? No Yes
Source: COSMOS Corporation as cited by Yin, 2009: 8
Case studies are classified as comprehensive research strategies in comparison with
the other strategies, because case study research includes investigations between real-
life context and phenomenon that are not clearly defined dependent on multiple
sources of evidence (including triangulation) (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 29; Yin,
2003b: 13-14,97). Contrary to popular belief, case studies can be conducted with
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quantitative and qualitative evidence and should not be confused with ethnographic
methods which are mainly based on qualitative data. To refine the case study further,
an embedded multi-case approach was taken (Figure 3-1, Type 4), meaning that
within each case, there are multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2009:60). The sampling
size differed depending on country situations and logistical arrangements (Yin, 2003b:
52-53). Thus the main unit of analysis are the perceptions of stakeholders on the
different country price-setting processes within the context of regulatory frameworks
and consumer presentation with specific reference to the urban water and sanitation
sector.
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Figure 3-1 Basic types of designs for case studies. Source: Adapted from COSMOS Corporation as
cited by Yin, 2009:46
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The case studies in this research primarily comprises of documenting the perceptions
of stakeholders, which is classified as “phenomenology” by Smithson (2008:215). In
this regard, the research forms part of “interpretivist case studies”, which also reflects
on personal experiences of the stakeholders (Smithson, 2008: 216). Reliability of the
research is ensured through detailed description of the research strategies and through
repeating the strategies developed and modified from the pilot-fieldwork phase in the
main-fieldwork phase in Namibia, resulting in similar findings and conclusions. In
addition, the financial data obtained are re-calculated to ensure it is reliable. The
reliability and construct validity (making use of “multiple sources of evidence”)
research test were built into the data collection phase to ensure research quality and to
minimise errors and biases (Yin, 2009:41-45). Furthermore the research design is
characterised as stable, dependable and predictable in accordance with Kerlinger and
Lee (2000:642). Hence the research is classified under representative reliability
(Neuman, 2006: 189).
The validity of the research design is subjective which is typically characteristic of
interpretive research. In addition, the data triangulation method (as further explained
in section 3.2.2) was part and parcel of the design to increase the validity of the
research (Smithson, 2008: 221). The issue of generalisation in the context of case
studies have been widely critiqued. However, this research falls within “analytic
generalisation” category, as opposed to statistical generalisation, where the identified
theory is linked with research findings can be generalised (Firestone, 1993: 17 as cited
by Smithson, 2008: 223). In this case, the research makes use of principal-agent
theory as part of the interpretive process (Smithson, 2008: 224).
3.2.2 Data needs and information sources
Different sources of information were collected during this study, which included
documentation (unpublished reports, minutes of meetings, published reports, annual
reports and newspaper clippings); archival records (service records, organisational
records, maps and charts, lists of names and other relevant items, survey data);
interviews (focused semi-structured interviews) and direct observations (Yin,
2003b:85-89). Detailed data needed from providers and other stakeholders is listed in
Appendix C (and was used as a check-list during the study).
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Table 3-2 Data needs and sources to address specific research objectives
Objectives Data/information needs Data/information sources
1.Identify specific
lessons/experiences learnt from
price-setting processes in
selected countries, England and
Zambia, to investigate possible
improvements to the Namibian
price-setting process
- price-setting processes
(institutional arrangement
including legal frameworks)
- price-setting tools, performance
indicators, enforcement sanctions
and incentives
- Service levels, types of water and
sanitation facilities/options
available and in use (including
perceptions of services and
providers)
- Annual reports from
regulators and service
providers
- Sector reports
-Consumer bills
- Interviews (semi-structure
questionnaires)
2.Understand the current price
review process in Namibia,
within the legal framework in
terms of its capacity to deliver
water and sanitation services to
urban consumers (particularly
poor households)
- Institutional relationships, roles
and responsibilities
- tariff determination process (who
is involved and how?)
-Consumer involvement in process
- Policies
- Government reports and
documents
3. Determine the affordability
levels of water and sanitation
services for urban poor in
Namibia and the potential role
of cross-subsidisation amongst
domestic water users
- Income and payment levels for
services from low, middle and high
income users
- Service levels, types of water and
sanitation facilities/options
available and in use (including
perceptions of services and
providers)
-Costs of service provision
-Available subsidies for urban poor
- Consumer bills
- Annual reports from
service providers (emphasis
on financial reports)
- Socio-economic statistics
4. Identify the perceived level
of transparency and stakeholder
involvement required for the
price-setting process in
Namibia
-perceptions of stakeholders on:
- role and expectations of
potential regulator
- level of preferred access to
information
- level of preferred stakeholder
involvement
- Interviews (semi-structure
questionnaires)
- Verification workshop
-Focus-group discussions
5. Identify the appropriate
regulatory framework needed to
improve current price-setting
process in Namibia, balancing
the needs of all stakeholders but
with a bias towards the needs of
the urban poor, to inform
relevant policy accordingly
- combination of above mentioned
data needs
- Interviews (semi-structure
questionnaires)
- literature on regulatory
frameworks
-Literature on country
experiences on similar
processes and issues
Access to information, especially financial information was relatively limited in
Namibia which hampered the data collection process - but was also a research finding
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in itself with regard to the concerns of information asymmetry and transparency, at
the core of the research question.
During interviews audiotapes were used, depending on the permission of
interviewees, in conjunction with note-taking by the researcher. Ethical issues such as
obtaining permission of interviewees before the interviews; privacy and
confidentiality (or anonymity) was highly considered and adhered to according to
request from interviewees (Robson, 2002: 65; Silverman, 2006: 319-320; Punch,
2000: 59; Kerlinger and Lee, 2000: 444-445). Appointments for interviews were
arranged with providers, non-domestic users and consumer representatives in
advance, but domestic users were asked to participate “on the spot”.
The data triangulation (based on multiple sources of evidence-see Table 3-2) approach
was used in conjunction to a workshop to validate/verify information from
interviewees. It improved the quality and accuracy of findings (Robson, 2002: 174
371). Data triangulation was undertaken by collecting data from various sources with
the aim of verifying certain facts (Yin, 2003b: 97-99), while the information gathered
from the pilot fieldwork, as well as information from other case study countries, was
presented during a participatory workshop in Namibia as part of the triangulation
process. The workshop focused on four major questions/issues used in marketing
research (Sansom et al., 2004: 15): overview of current situation (where are we
now?); lessons learnt from other countries (where do we want to be?); options for
regulator (how do we get there?); identification of issues (indicators) to consider (how
do we ensure success?). Participatory methods were used during the workshop,
making use of ‘zopping’ (German-led method to engage all workshop participants,
making use of colourful cards, and clustering ideas) materials such as pin boards,
brown paper, and sticking dots. The questions had 5 options each and participants
were asked to use the sticking dots to ‘vote’ which options best suit the Namibian
conditions based on results and comparisons with other case countries. The
justification for the various choices was discussed in detail, forming part of a ‘rich’
source of information.
3.2.3 Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the use of “interview guides”
(Bernard, 2002: 205) which were tailored for each target group (Appendix D), though
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certain guide questions were similar for all target groups, especially regarding issues
on the price-setting processes, potential role of regulator, levels of information
requirements and stakeholder involvement.
Specific semi-structured guides with a combination of open and closed questions (1
hour maximum duration) were developed to fully grasp their roles and perceptions on
the price-setting process in the water and sanitation service sector. The interviews
were mainly conducted face-to-face to allow for further probing, though telephonic
interviews were also conducted to those critical interviewees that could not be
reached. Interviews are noted to gather invaluable information compared to other
methods (Yin, 2009: 106-107). Personal interviews provided in-depth knowledge on
justifications for actions, beliefs and attitudes of respondents that can enhance the
researchers understanding of the research problem, hence semi-structured interviews
are referred to as “depth interviews” (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000: 602-603 694).
Focus group interviews were conducted with a group of domestic water user groups
from informal areas (minimum 2, maximum 10), “to generate diverse viewpoints”
(Smithson, 2008; Kerlinger and Lee, 2000: 700).
Table 3-3 Details of focus group discussions undertaken in selected informal areas in Windhoek
Interview data Location Number of participants
Male Female
12 /05/07 Freedom land A 2 1
16/05/07 Havanna Proper 0 3
26/11/08 Greenwell Matonga C 2 8
26/11/08 Kapuka A 2 0
27/11/08
27/11/08
7de laan
Onyika
1
3
1
2
Total 13 12
The focus group discussions were pre-arranged with the assistance of the City of
Windhoek community development officer. The discussion was a maximum of 2
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hours, but varied from group to group. Focus group discussions are also noted to be an
effective way of drawing out user “perceptions, preferences, practices and attitudes
(Sansom et al., 2004:25). The researcher facilitated the discussions and enabled all
participants to share their opinion. The discussions followed a flexible yet structured
manner, to make the group feel relaxed and at ease. Focus group discussions also
allow for group interaction on the researched topic (Yin, 2009: 108-109; Smithson,
2008:358; Rosenthal and Rosnow, 2008: 167), which is interesting to observe and
also tells a ‘story’ on its own. Making use of focus groups typically falls within
flexible research designs, using semi-structure interview guides to lead the discussion
(Smithson, 2008: 360).
Translators (for Herero and Oshiwambo languages) were used during interviews in
Namibia with certain domestic user groups. The researcher speaks Afrikaans and
Nama/Damara, thus at least 5 language groups were covered. These are the majority
of the languages spoken in Namibia and since English is the national language, the
majority of interviewees were conversant in this language.
3.2.4 Identification of interviewees and fieldwork schedule
The study targeted six different audiences, namely government (policy decision
makers), regulator (where independent), service providers, consumer representatives,
users (domestic and non-domestic) and other interested groups (NGOs, private
consultants). These are the ‘actors’ identified to be involved (or influenced) in the
urban water and sanitation price-setting processes based literature (Rouse, 2007: 94-
98; Franceys and Gerlach, 2008: 15-17). Key informants ranged from senior
management to chairpersons of consumer groups, including retired officials.
The pilot fieldwork period took place over 2 months (April-June 2007). The purpose
was to test the feasibility of the questionnaires for clarity and appropriateness to
ensure that the correct data was collected in the best possible manner considering
resources and time. The pilot period provided conceptual clarification for the research
(Yin, 2003b: 79). A further 4 months (September-December 2008) was spent in
Namibia as part of the main field work period, while July-August 2008 was used as
fieldwork period in England and October-November 2008 in Zambia to collect data.
A total of 158 individuals were interviewed during the research period (Table 3-4).
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Table 3-4. Fieldwork periods in case countries and sample size of major target groups.
Fieldwork period
and target groups
Namibia England Zambia Namibia
Fieldwork period Apr-Jun 2007 Jul –Aug
2008
Oct-Nov 2008 Oct-Dec 2008
Providers NamWater (3)
City of
Windhoek (11)
Anglian
Water (3)
Lusaka Water
and Sewerage
Company (4)
Kafubu Water
and Sewerage
Company (6)
NamWater (2)
City of Windhoek
(4)
Government MAWRD (4)
MLGHRD (1)
MLGH (3) MAWF (3)
MLGHRD (1)
Regulators Ofwat (2) NWASCO (2)
Other orgs NGOs (4)
Consultants (4)
Donor (1)
NGOs (1)
NGOs (6)
Consultants (3)
Users Industry (2) Local users
(9)
Local users (13) Local users (43)
Consumer
representatives
Community
Committees (6)
CCWater (4) WWG (1) Community
committees (12)
Total interviewees 35 18 31 74
Sampling methods Purposive
Snowballing
sampling
Face-to-face
interviews
Focus Group
discussions
Purposive
Snowballing
sampling
Face-to-face
interviews
Purposive
Snowballing
sampling
Face-to-face
interviews
Focus Group
discussions
Purposive
Snowballing
sampling
Face-to-face
interviews
Focus Group
discussions
Verification
workshop
Note: Figures in brackets indicate number of interviewees (which is a combination of both focus group
discussions and individual interviews) .
The data collected from the pilot fieldwork period formed an integral part of the result
analysis and guided the research focus. In the Namibian case, as part of the
triangulation process some of the interviewees from the pilot fieldwork were
interviewed again, however in the majority of cases new informants were identified
and interviewed. During the main fieldwork in Namibia, the non-domestic users were
not interviewed again, due to non-involvement/interest in the price-setting process as
indicated during the pilot fieldwork. The main fieldwork also focused on interviewing
local users in Namibia in addition to consumer representatives, which was not the
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case during the pilot fieldwork. The sample size was determined by reaching
saturation point, such that no new information (value) was generated from interviews
(Robson, 2002: 192).The English and Zambian case study sample sizes were mainly
limited by available resources.
3.3 Selection of study area and case studies
The study was highly dependent on key informants and individuals, but also focused
on specific urban-poor areas in the selected countries using primarily semi-structured
interview questionnaires. The primary focus of the study was on Namibia, however,
for guidance, another southern African country (Zambia) was selected on the basis of
having an established regulator, to identify relevant lessons learnt, to objectively
analyse and conclude based on the study objectives. Furthermore it is envisaged that
the comparative study could be used as a basis for future comparative purposes
regarding regulatory processes within southern Africa as a whole. Throughout the
study, a third country case was investigated reflecting on the England and Wales
price-setting process as an example of incentive-based regulation with participation
with all relevant stakeholders. Figure 3-2 highlights the three case countries where the
research was conducted. More specifically, the cases were primarily selected based on
interest from the researcher in addition to three other principle reasons as categorised
by Denscombe (2003:34):
 Extreme instance: the Namibian case is characterised by extreme water
scarcity and skewed income distribution, making price-setting process more
complex compared to other cases
 Least likely instance: the theory of principal-agent challenge is described as
more challenging in an utility operating in a developing country with extreme
conditions, such as in Namibia
 Pragmatic instance: England and Zambia case study selections were done due
to presence of well established economic regulators from which lessons on
price-setting processes could be deduced easily, as well as on basis of
convenience in terms of resources and logistical arrangements. The latter
choice was based on regional (southern African) significance related to the
operation of the economic regulator.
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The reason for selecting 3 case countries (hence multiple-case design as oppose to
single case study) was to strengthen the research quality (Yin, 2009:53). The research
replication logic is further based on theory, such that the different case results were
anticipated to be different and in some cases contrasting. More (more than the
selected 3) would have hindered the researcher’s ability to conduct detailed research
and therefore only 3 cases were selected to enable quality research and to fully
understand the price-setting processes in these countries.
Figure 3-2 Map highlighting the three countries (Namibia, Zambia and England) selected as case
studies. Source: Created in Arc-GIS by Shamal Mohammed, Cranfield University, 2009
3.3.1 Case study I: Namibia
The primary focus area was Windhoek, the capital of Namibia, with selected urban-
poor areas highlighted. Windhoek has an estimated population of 250,000 with a
rapidly increasing (5% urbanisation rate per annum) population growth, including
water demand challenges (NWRMR, 2000: 22). Furthermore, Windhoek serves as the
administration centre in the sense that it is home to all headquarters, such as
governmental offices, NamWater and City of Windhoek (municipality), hence making
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it ideal for the purposes of this research. More interestingly, this city is located in the
centre of the country, making it one the most difficult areas to access water, hence one
of the areas with very limited water resources, predominantly dependent on
groundwater sources.
Figure 3-3 shows the map of Windhoek demarcating the residential areas, primarily
based on income levels. The selection of visited informal areas were facilitated by
City of Windhoek officials, based on the availability of different types of facilities
(for example pre-paid meters, communal taps, flush toilets or VIPs). The idea was to
visit areas with different facilities, to understand affordability levels and related
challenges faced by informal area residents. A sample from middle and high income
area residents were also selected to understand the gap between ‘rich and poor’ and
the service differentiation.
Figure 3-3 Map of Windhoek residential areas. Source: adapted from City of Windhoek, 2001.
Income level demarcation estimated based on results.
It should be noted that there are exceptions within the boundaries of the indicated
income level demarcations, such that there are high income residents living within the
low and middle income bands, though the map depicts the average income levels.
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Figure 3-4 Informal area map of Windhoek, with visited areas highlighted in red dots. Source:
City of Windhoek, 2008
There are 32 informal areas in Windhoek, located on the periphery of the north
western part of the city. Figure 3-4, further shows the informal areas, with the visited
8 informal areas.
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Photograph 3: Lay-out of Havana informal area. Source: Author. Windhoek. 2008
3.3.2 Case Study II: Zambia
The majority of the interviews took place in Lusaka in Zambia, though Ndola, a
mining town in the copperbelt area was also visited, with the aim to understand the
differences in tariff setting (if any) depending on characteristics of towns. Kafubu
Water and Sewerage Company and local users in informal areas, were interviewed in
Ndola. Lusaka share similar characteristics with Windhoek, in the sense that it is the
administrative centre, as well as the most populated in the country, with the exception
of the severe water challenges, though their challenges are more management related.
Figure 3-5, indicates the areas visited in Zambia. The visited urban poor area,
Kanyama (indicated to be the largest informal settlement in Lusaka), is located within
the centre of Lusaka.
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Figure 3-5 Zambian field visit sites (Lusaka and Ndola), indicated in red dotted blocks. Source:
adapted from (NWASCO, 2008:iii).
3.3.3 Case study III: England
The fieldwork visits in England were mostly conducted in Birmingham, where the
independent regulator for water and sanitation services, Ofwat, and the Consumer
Council for Water (CCWater), is based. This included several trips to both conduct
interviews with selected individuals, but also to attend some of the public briefing
meetings organised by CCWater or Ofwat. Anglian Water Company’s headquarters
were visited in Huntingdon, being the company that provides water in the driest part
in England, facing significant climate change related challenges. This was the main
reason for selecting the company as part of the sample.
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Figure 3-6 Places where interviews were conducted in England. Source: Map created in GIS-Arc
by Andre Daccache, Cranfield University, 2009
Further interviews with selected CCW members were conducted in London and
King’s Lynn. Figure 3-6, indicates the areas visited in England. Water users
interviewed were from Cranfield village, Newport Pagnell and Bedford towns, which
were selected for convenience and limited resource purposes, based on surrounding
areas of researcher’s location (Cranfield University).
3.4 Data Analysis
Initial analysis and interpretation of data was started during the data collection period
which enabled the researcher to make necessary adjustments and evaluations
regarding data collection process. This also assisted the researcher to identify
alternative or additional information that can be collected to enrich the data set (Miles
and Huberman, 1994: 90-91). Qualitative data analysis primarily comprised of three
main approaches namely cross-case synthesis, explanation-building and time-series
(Yin, 2009:136-160 (in correspondence with flexible design) as explained in Table
3-5. Other analytical techniques involves pattern-matching and developing logic
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models (Yin, 2009:136-150), however these were not suitable for the purpose of this
research and were thus not selected.
Table 3-5 Explanation of application of analytical techniques.
Analytical technique Application
Cross-Case Synthesis - comparing the Namibian price-setting process
with that of England and Zambia (relating price-
setting processes with those described in theory
and linking it with theoretical principles) ,
making use of tables (word), matrixes, flow-
diagrams and conceptual diagrams
Explanation building - Explanations for price-setting process
experiences (as a result of a series of stakeholder
interactions) are elaborated upon, so as to draw
specific lessons for application to the Namibian
price-setting process
- Building explanations based on theoretical basis
of the research and revising it (and comparing
details) in the context of the various country
processes.
Time-series -“How”- and “why”- questions about
relationships & changes of events over time
-Comparing financial trends of various water
service companies in the various case countries
Source: Adapted from Yin, 2009:136-149
Cross-case synthesis was done by dealing with each country case separately first,
before looking at comparisons between country processes, which enabled researcher
to look for cross-case patterns (Yin, 2003b:133-135) through assembling word tables
of various cases (Yin, 2003a: 145). Cross-case analysis in combination with literature
review further strengthened the external validity of the research. Figure 3-7 indicates
the ‘road map’ which was followed, based on the conceptual framework.
The questionnaires used during the interviews were numbered and entered (in
classified groups) using Microsoft Word, following the interview guide outline,
entering different responses (based on numbering codes) per questions (Appendix E).
Diagrams and flow charts were drawn using Microsoft Visio, 2003 software.
Chapter 3: Research Strategy and Methods
89
Microsoft Excel was used for the financial data analysis. This included transcribing all
financial statements (balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements)
from annual reports (hard copies) into pre-determined format in Microsoft Excel. All
statements were converted to real time figures (further converted to Purchasing Power
Parity International dollar (PPP$) rates) to facilitate the conversion process to present-
day values as much as possible. Calculating and interpreting selected financial ratios,
formed part of the major analysis process, to understand the financial performance of
service providers to the extent to which the public domain information allowed.
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Figure 3-7 Research ‘road map’, including research and methods directions.
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The research followed a conceptual framework, which represents the researcher’s
understanding of the research and essentially guided the researcher throughout the
process, acting as a ‘road-map’ for the research (Figure 3-7). The analysis also
included a significant amount of “narrative reporting”, which enables the reader to
understand and have a ‘feel’ for the research process and results (Smithson, 2008:
219).
3.5 Critique of methods
3.5.1 Limitations on type of information gathered
Secondary data collection mainly composed of unpublished reports, including
government, local authority and other organisational reports. Much of the information
used for the England case were found on the internet, due to the very advanced and
‘more transparent’ regulatory culture, including the latest reports from the companies
and the regulator. The biggest challenge for this research however was to access
detailed financial data in Namibia and Zambia, which essentially resulted in an
adjustment to the research focus. In this regard, the research experienced the usual
‘case study related challenges’ such as access to information and lack of certain key
informants (Yin, 2009: 62), to take forward certain ideas, however this was also
viewed as an opportunity such that it lead the researcher in a very interesting ‘path’ of
discovery.
3.5.2 Limitations on research methodology
The researcher was aware of the various caveats of the research design and strategies
selected and as such many were addressed with counter methods. Though focus group
discussions are critised for being an “unscientific” way of collecting data, it does
generate a wealth of information that cannot be obtained through quantitative data
collection methods and it serve as a good tool for understanding peoples’ needs and
perceptions (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000: 701). Furthermore, Purposive sampling is
mostly selected based on “informativeness” as opposed to “representativeness” and
hence is the most appropriate design for this research (Neuman, 2006: 158; Smithson,
2008: 223). This method is critised for its potential to be bias. To address these
limitations, data triangulation methods were primarily used as well as multiple
sources (both qualitative and quantitative) of evidence and stakeholders to reconcile
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and verify information provided by the informants. Furthermore, cross-case synthesis
heavily relies on argumentative interpretation of collected data as oppose to numeric
evidence. In this case the researchers’ prior knowledge and ability to develop strong
arguments supported by the data collected also facilitated the data collection and
analysis process to address the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions.
3.6 Chapter summary
The study is dependent on both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods,
and is hence classified as descriptive and exploratory case study research. It has been
undertaken by reflecting upon equitable water provision based on financial and
environmental sustainability goals, under extreme conditions of water scarcity and
income distribution, and therefore entailed critical literature review of existing
information to understand the current price-setting process, which was supplemented
by field work periods (April-June 2007 (Namibia); July 2008 (England) and October-
December 2008 (Namibia and Zambia). Both the England and Wales and Zambian
regulators have been used as models of economic regulators world wide and thus
these systems were studied to understand the price-setting process dealing with
private and public utilities as an alternative to public water utility regulation in
Namibia.
The qualitative data of the research was gathered primarily through semi-structured
interviews and focus group discussions. Matrix analysis as part of template analysis
approaches were used to analyse the data, resulting in tabular and diagrammatic
presentations of information. Graphical representations were also used to analyse
financial data.
The subsequent results chapters elaborate on responses from the 158 respondents
across, England (18) and Zambia (31) and Namibia (109).
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Chapter 4: Water pricing processes in England and
Zambia
This chapter draws upon price-setting experiences from England2 and Zambia to
understand the processes involved. The cases of England and Zambia are highlighted
as countries with independent regulators driving the price-setting processes with
private and commercial utility companies as the major water and sewerage service
providers, with particular emphasis on Anglian Water (England) and Lusaka Water
and Sewerage Company (public, corporatised) and Kafubu Water and Sewerage
Company in Zambia. The institutional arrangements (including legal frameworks),
regulatory processes and tools are discussed in the light of perceptions of the major
stakeholders about the process and services. The views of 49 stakeholders are taken
into consideration for this chapter.
4.1 England case study: Institutions, Roles and Relationships
Similar to most countries, the UK underwent several policy and institutional reforms
within the water sector. Local authorities were replaced by regional water authorities
in 1974 to provide water and waste water services in ten regions. The Government
remained responsible for setting standards and norms, while the regional water
authorities were responsible for several tasks with the aim of facilitating an integrated
catchment management approach. These included service provision, application,
monitoring and enforcement of regulatory standards as well as being environmental
regulators (including regulating themselves and other stakeholders). This situation
presented various irregularities due to their dependence upon government such as a
decrease of investment, political influence within service provision and improper
regulation of services. Recognising these difficulties, service provision and associated
assets were privatised in 1989 (after various contentious public debates) whilst
environmental and drinking water regulation remained the responsibility of public
2 The regulatory system is officially for England and Wales collectively, but for the purposes of this
research it will be referred to as England throughout this study.
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bodies. In this regard, segregation of functions became the key feature of the UK
organisational and institutional arrangement. The Secretary of State for the
Environment, Transport and Regions3 and Secretary of State for Wales4 became
primarily responsible to give effect to standards and requirements, based on European
Commission standards, in UK legislation as well as to give legal guidance to the
Environmental Agency; independent regulators and private service providers with
specific functions and responsibilities described in Table 4-1 R (Summerton, 1998).
3 Now DEFRA
4 Now the Welsh Assembly Government
Chapter 4: Water pricing processes in England and Zambia
95
Table 4-1 Roles and Responsibilities of various institutions within the water and wastewater
service provision sector in the England
Function Responsible institution Roles and Responsibilities
Department for the
Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (DEFRA)*
- Improving the environment
and integrating environment
with other policies
Drinking Water Inspectorate
(regarding drinking water)
- Ensures drinking water quality
conforms with regulatory
requirements
- Enforcement action and
prosecutions for delivery of
unfit for human consumption
water
Environment Agency (non-
departmental public body of
DEFRA)
- Protection of water
environment (prevent and
control abstraction and
discharge of water pollution)
-Enforcement action and
prosecution powers over
abstraction licences and
discharge consents
Application of standards,
monitoring and enforcement
Natural England (coalition with
English Nature, Countryside
Agency and Rural Development
Service). Public body*
- Conserve and enhance natural
environment of English
countryside*
Economic regulation of private
service providers
Water Services Regulation
Authority (Office of Water
Services - OFWAT)
- Limit the prices of private
water suppliers and oversee
efficient service delivery
- ensure financeability of
companies*
- customer protection*
-monitoring and enforcing
performance standards*
-promote competition among
companies*
Provision of water and waste
water services
- Private companies (one for
each of the 10 regions)
- operate under licence (transfer
of operational assets used for
service provision)
Customer representation Consumer Council for Water
(independent body)*
-represent interest of customers
in relation to price and quality
of service from water companies
Source: (Summerton, 1998),* (Anglian Water Services, 2008a: 7)
The bodies (regulators) responsible for activities in England and Wales are distinctive
for being “politically-independent” while operating under set legislation to ensure that
companies provide their functions efficiently in accordance with specified standards
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and prices in the interests of all stakeholders, customers and society (Cashman, 2006:
490-494).
Privatisation was marked with a rapid increase in prices due to the increased demand
of quality services, which required huge increase in investment. Increase in
investment in “privatised transmission and treatment of water and wastewater” ranged
from £3 billion (PPP US$ 2 billion) in the early 90s to £50 billion (PPP US$ 32
billion) by 2005 (Byatt, 2004.). Consequently this resulted in an increase in
consumers’ bills by an estimated £100 per household per year (PPP US$ 66) between
1990 and 2005 for better quality water and wastewater. However, the incentive based
regulatory approach also delivered an increase in efficiency and prices eventually
reduced towards the year 2000 following the 1999 second quinquennial price review.
This period also marked the time for legislative changes such as banning
disconnections due to non-payment of water service related bills, as demanded by the
new incoming government (Byatt, 2004.). It is clear that there is still a role for
political involvement, even where there are semi-autonomous, ‘independent’,
regulators.
4.2 Providing Water and Sanitation Services
Ofwat regulates 10 private water and sewerage companies (the previous water
authorities) and 13 private water only companies (the remnants of a much earlier, and
very long-lasting, private sector approach to water supply in England) through
ensuring compliance with legal instruments as well as their respective licence
requirements. This enables the regulator to exercise comparative competition amongst
these companies, taking into account various differing conditions, such as geological
and geographical conditions, that are not controllable by the companies. The
comparative competition indicators include evaluating the costs (both operating and
capital); level of service and customer care services (Byatt, 2004.).
For the purposes of this study, only Anglian Water Services Company was
investigated. The focus of the interviews was on how the company sets tariffs and
prepares themselves for the price review period. At the time (July) of the interviews,
the company was in the process of submitting draft business plans to Ofwat, the
regulator as part of the Price Review for 2009, for the next 5 years. The perceptions of
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the interviewees (4 senior officials) regarding the price-setting process and service
provision were gathered.
4.2.1 Anglian Water Services
The 27,500 km2 Anglian water region, is recognised as the largest and driest region
(compared to other water company regions) with an annual rainfall of 600 mm
(Anglian Water Services, 2008a: 5). Anglian Water Services Limited company forms
part of Anglian Water Group Limited and serves 5 million domestic and commercial
customers in east of England and Hartlepool (Figure 4-1) (Anglian Water Services,
2008a: 4).
Figure 4-1 Map covering Anglian Water Service areas. Source: (Anglian Water Services, 2008b: 6)
The company is projecting a water deficit within the next 5 years (Figure 4-2), unless
other sources of water supply is developed.
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Figure 4-2 Predicted water deficit facing Anglian water region. Source: (Anglian Water Services,
2008b: 50)
The biggest challenge is dealing with uncertainty of rainfall patterns as a result of
climate change effects, thus the strategic plan focuses on how to curb these effects
(Anglian Water Services, 2008b: 50) (including risk sewer flooding and rise in sea
levels). Options that are being explored are re-use of wastewater, development of
major storage reservoirs and desalination (depending on sustainability factors)
(Anglian Water Services, 2008b: 50).
The company declares that it strive to provide “reliable, high quality service” in
accordance with regulatory requirements. In this regard, the company was identified
as the leading water and wastewater company against OPA criteria in
2006/2007(Anglian Water Services, 2008a: 10). Furthermore, the company had an
outstanding rating of 92% in 2007/2008 for customer satisfaction with service levels
(Anglian Water Services, 2008a: 11). Overall performance of the company is
measured through drinking water quality standards (including related investments);
leakage control (including metering), customer service and energy and employee
management (Anglian Water Services, 2008a: 12-18).
Based on the regulator’s 2004 Final Determinations of the third quinquennial price
review, Anglian Water’s price increases were the lowest compared to all other
companies, which the interviewees mentioned was a huge efficiency challenge for the
company. The operating ratio of the company was recorded as 34.2% in 2006/07,
indicating an increase in infrastructure renewal charges. Selected indicators (Table
4-2) of the company are used to indicate the progress made over various years.
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Table 4-2 Selected performance indicators of Anglian Water presented over past 6 years
Indicators 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08
Return on
Capital
Employed [%]
4.9 5.8 5.5 5.8 6.7 6.4
Gearing [%] 82 82 90 79 86 88
Leakage
[m3/km/day]
5 6 6 5.8 5.5 5
Customer
satisfaction
[%]
88 87 85 85 86 92
Source: Annual Reports of Anglian Water.
Further calculations from the company financials indicate that 2002/03 was the worst
year for the company in terms of recovering costs from assets invested. Major asset
disposals took place in that year hence the sharp decline in ROCE, but interestingly,
in 2003 huge capital investments were made, which resulted in an increase in long-
term debt trends. The company’s bad debt from customers profile reportedly
increased in the financial year 2007/08, and is predicted to increase still further given
the economic situation in the country. Overall, the company is recovering their costs,
with an average figure of 5.6% real return on capital invested, a satisfactory return in
a mature economy relative to alternative investments and risk profiles, as evidenced
by the purchase of the company during this period at a significant premium to the
regulatory capital value.
The company priorities for 2007/08 were reflected in their budget for water and
sewerage services (Figure 4-3). The company focus for water services are mostly on
water distribution, maintenance and treatment, while as for sewerage services the
focus is on sewerage treatment and disposal.
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Figure 4-3 Anglian Water Capital investment for water (top) and sewerage (below) out of total
budget of £191 Million (PPP US$ 125 Million) and £228 (PPP US$ 149 Million) respectively.
Source: (Ofwat, 2008: 30)
As part of the PR09 process, the company has developed a strategic direction
statement for the period 2010-2035 (required by the regulator), which highlights
seven challenges (partly resulting from a company led consultative stakeholder
analysis) to be addressed of which climate change and demand growth are one of the
biggest (Anglian Water Services, 2008b: 2), due to the region’s vulnerability (driest
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water region in England). These major challenges were confirmed during interviews,
with an added concern of the ability of consumers to afford improved services, in line
with quality enhancements to reduce environmental pressures, and increased
innovation requirements.
Anglian Water proposes to spend over £2 billion (PPP US$ 1 billion) over the next
period 2010-2015 (Anglian Water Services, 2009: 3) to maintain their aim of
delivering “reliable supply of clean, safe drinking water and effective wastewater
services at an affordable price” (Anglian Water Group, 2003: 7). The majority of the
costs are directed to maintaining and improving assets (Figure 4-4).
Maintaining and
improving assets
1.08
Meeting needs of
growing region
0.4
Environmental
improvement
0.36
Enhancing level of
customer service
0.07
Improvement to
water quality
0.13
Figure 4-4 Breakdown of Anglian Water Services proposed costs (£Billion) over next 5 years
(2010-2015). Source: Anglian Water Services, 2009: 3
The draft determination on price limits resulted in a proposed 11% decrease in
household bills, compared to the company business plan proposal, indicating an
average price limit of 0.2% per annum over period of 2010-2015 (Ofwat, 2009).
Though there is a proposed overall decrease in the price limits, the regulator states
that they believe that they have ensured that companies will still be able to make the
necessary capital investments to ensure quality services (Ofwat, 2009). Part of
Ofwat’s approach to price setting is to require Strategic Direction Statements, then
Draft Business Plans followed by Final Business Plans, all from the service providers
to which they then respond with Draft Determinations on prices for the subsequent
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five year period concluded, after a two year process, by Final Determinations in
November 2009. This apparently long drawn out process is designed to address the
principal-agent challenge in England whereby companies are ‘enabled’ to become
more transparent through this process – the regulator being able to respond
appropriately according to the strength of response by any company to any particular
feedback or draft decision.
As part of information sharing and transparency of financial data, the company annual
reports include sections on corporate governance and remuneration, which elaborates
on:
 Board members qualifications roles and activities (eg. meetings attended,
performance evaluation),
 Audit committee members and their roles,
 Information on shareholders (including Directors’ shares interests and
options),
 Incentive arrangements ( eg. annual bonus schemes, performance targets for
directors in particular) and
 Directors’ salary packages (including names, benefits, pensions, bonuses).
These represent normal commercial governance requirements of any private company
rather than anything specific with regard to regulation – however they do illustrate
another benefit of having private providers as a means of generating a different type
of transparency when compared to state providers.
In order to ensure universal access and affordability of water and sanitation services,
different types of ‘passport tariffs’ are reportedly being implemented by Anglian
Water. These are the national scheme called Vulnerable Groups Regulations (VGR)
and Aquacare Plus for large user consumers (more than 75m3 (205 lhd)) and So Low
for low user consumers (less than 75m3 of annual water consumption with no standing
charges). The VGR, was introduced in April 2000, targeting identified vulnerable
metered consumers. Since 2005, the recipients on the scheme criteria included people
on government benefits or tax credits; large families (three or more children) or
defined medical conditions, with significant water usage requirements. If these criteria
are met the household bill is measured against the average household bill for a
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specific area and the consumer then pays whichever is the lowest amount between the
two.
In 2006, it was reported that 5-10% of the population in England and Wales are on the
VGR social tariff (Herrington, 2007: 25), out of which 0.4% of metered households
are on the Anglian social tariff scheme.
4.3 Affordability of water and sanitation services
The water users interviewed (9) indicated that they receive water bills over a period of
6 months, however pay a flat rate monthly, even though they are metered. The total
water and sewerage charges consist of standard (per volume of water consumed) and
standing (over certain period of days) rates. The average monthly water and sewerage
bill is £34 (PPP US$ 22) per average household of 4 people (Figure 4-5).
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Figure 4-5 Water consumption (top) and sewerage disposal (bottom) with associated payment
trends of interviewees (n=9) over period of March-July 2008. Note: Interviewee no. 2 is on SoLow
rate. Note: sewerage disposal is based on water use estimate
One of the interviewees is on a SoLow rate (excluding standing charges) and pays an
average of £30 (PPP US$ 20) per month for 18m3 of water and sewerage. In general
the interviewees were satisfied with the prices charged and services provided by
Anglian Water Company. The interviewee on the SoLow rate stated that information
about the low income tariff was very difficult to obtain hence feels the need for
increased transparency about services and rates available. 56% of the interviewees
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were aware of conservation measures and only 18% practised measures such as
rainwater harvesting (building storage tanks) for gardening purposes.
The draft price limits for the period 2010-2015 indicated an average decrease in bills
for Anglian region customers of 8% translating into £32 (PPP US$ 21) (Ofwat, 2009).
4.3.1 Perception of service providers on services
The service providers interviewed (4) indicated that they operate in the driest area of
England and thus strive to balance water conservation with efficient water supply
hence 62% of their service area is metered in conjunction with active promotion (free
meter installation on request) of water savings devices such as shower timers.
Leakage control and maintenance of infrastructure, reportedly forms part of a very
important component of the company operations, and as such the company spends
£15 million (PPP US$ 10 million) annually to achieve their leakage targets. The
results of willingness to pay assessments conducted by the company are positive
(especially their social tariff schemes) and hence do not impact on revenue collection
of the company. The social tariffs are reportedly mostly used by pensioners. The
company interviewees stated that the company is committed to serve the consumers
and thus takes issues of affordability and access to water services very seriously.
4.3.2 Perception of consumer representation on service levels
A high emphasis was placed on balancing supply and demand especially since the
Anglian region is the driest area within England and therefore the CCWater
interviewees mentioned the need for metering and implementation of effective
conservation measures by companies operating in this particular area. The historical
management style of the companies is reportedly changing gradually from
engineering towards management and thus overall the companies’ services are
improving, especially towards consumer relations. This relationship between
company and consumers was further strengthened during the recent drought
(2005/2006), which forced companies to communicate more effectively.
The role of CCWater was described by the interviewees as primarily initiating
discussions that are beneficial for consumers based on the demand and preferred
services. In particular, members aim to build better relationships with consumers and
companies; promote issues of concern such as metering and efficiency (where
appropriate) and get involved in planning (for example town planning) to ensure that
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proactive planning practices take place and that managers anticipate growth during
planning.
Frequently reported complaints to the Council are bill related (metered consumers), in
terms of clarity and over-pricing. Other complaints include drinking water quality,
low pressure of water supply and sewer flooding. Interviewees stated that 50% of
consumers contact CCWater first with a complaint instead of the company. Most
information regarding CCWater and water savings techniques are found on the back
of water bills.
In general two of the CCWater interviewees felt that the price for water in Anglian
region is too expensive and that the Council is working on making it cheaper for
consumers, through negotiations with the company. Interviewees further dismissed
the idea of subsidisation due to its non-sustainability and indicated that various
companies have introduced social tariffs to cater for low income consumers. They
commented on Anglian Water’s SoLow scheme in this regard, indicating that it is
working well. In contrast, a CCWater representative highlighted that profits are
considered “good”, since it is channelled back into infrastructural development and
maintenance, hence improving services levels as well as environmental
improvements. It should also be noted that since 1989, companies have invested £70
billion (PPP US$ 42 billion) in making supply safe and cleaning the environment
(interviewee, England, August 2008).
The flat rate tariff structure was criticised by interviewees and was referred to as “a
cheap way of collecting money”. Hence metering was identified as the best way to
charge and conserve water (including leakage detection) at the same time. In contrast,
another interviewee felt that metering creates a misconception of “paying as much as
you want to use” thus for high income users conservation is not a factor even if supply
is metered. Metering also presents a limitation for large families in low income
categories and therefore the interviewee suggests that careful consideration should go
into the metering option. One interviewee alluded that hesitation from companies to
install meters were primarily due to administrative related costs.
Consumer research in consultation with other stakeholders is also conducted by
CCWater. The biggest issue that CCWater is trying to address is to establish “two-
way communication channel” with companies, and through this way be “part of the
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softer solution to environmental and sustainability”. Furthermore, the majority of the
interviewees indicated that the Council plays a critical role in ensuring that customers
pay a fair price for their services or else facilitates the compensation of funds back to
consumers. The Council members interviewed reflected on their successes achieved
over the years and indicated “returning money to consumers” as the biggest success,
as well as establishing good working relations with companies as the key to success of
their operations, because it shows that companies respect and value CCWater
contributions.
In terms of representation, the interviewees stated that they do not represent specific
groups in society, though the importance of representation is to understand the social
issues and thus represent “what we think” is the best for the consumers “being
consumers ourselves”. The essence of representation therefore according to one
interviewee is “to ask the right questions” and therefore it is essential that the
members have specific skills to serve on the committee.
4.3.3 Perceptions of consumers on services provided
Overall, the water users interviewed mentioned that water and sewerage service
charges are reasonable, though some (3) indicated that the water charges are high and
in some instances they had to postpone payment until funds were available. The great
majority of consumers interviewed were satisfied to pay a flat rate per month, because
it gave them a sense of control and predictably over their budget.
4.4 Price setting process and regulatory tools
The Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) is guided by the Water Industry
Act of 1991, updated to the Water Act of 2003, which is very clear on the roles and
responsibilities of the regulator, including those of the Consumer representation body.
Ofwat’s mission is to protect consumers, while ensuring services are sustainable in
the long term (OFWAT, 2008: 3). With a staff complement of 193 (in 2008)
(OFWAT, 2008: 28), the Office’s core operations are divided into the following key
areas (OFWAT, 2008: 24):
 Legal services
 Network regulation
 Consumer protection
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 Regulatory finance
 Marketing (including competition and enforcement policy)
 Corporate affairs and operations
The office depends on regular information flows, to be used for comparative study
purposes and thus works very closely with industries, but do not impede on
management style of companies as along as it is within the legal framework (arm’s
length regulation). The review process takes into consideration the charging structures
and systems of companies. Ofwat plays a critical role in developing criteria for
pricing structures to avoid “price discrimination and undue preference” and to ensure
that tariffs are related to costs of service provision (Ofwat Interviewee, 2008). The
price review (also known as Asset Management Plan Periods (AMPs)) process has
evolved over the past review cycles to include/emphasise various tools in the quest to
adapt to changing sectoral developments Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3 Evolution of Ofwat regulatory focus and tools over review periods
Price review
period
Regulatory focus Average
Price limits
above
inflation
Major Regulatory tools (price
control mechanisms)
PR 89
(1990-2000)
- Price limit determination 5% - Price caps
PR 94
(1995-2000)
1% - Price caps
- Revenue caps
PR 99
(2000-2005)
- Setting quality framework
- Environmental Improvements
- Prospects for prices (impact on
future consumer bills)
- Incentives for greater efficiency
improvements (rewards for out-
performance)
2% - Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM)
-Dividend Growth Model
(DGM)
- Benchmarking comparison
PR 04
(2005-2010)
- Scope for future efficiency
improvement (‘carrot and stick’
model)
- Environmental improvements
(including protection against
sewer flooding)
- Review of Overall Performance
Assessment (OPA)
4.2% - Aquarius 3
PR 09
(2010-2015)
- Review of competition and
innovation
- Environmental and social costs
- 25 years strategic direction
statements
-4%* - Project Reservoir (holistic data
information system)
- Project Explain
- Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) framework
- Capital expenditure incentive
scheme (CIS) (Correct revenue
over/under recovery)
Note. * price limit is still draft. Source: Ofwat Annual Reports; Price limits:(OFWAT, 2004);
(OFWAT, 1999); (OFWAT, 2008b: 31); (Ofwat, 2009)
The 2004 price review approach was subsequently reviewed at Ofwat’s request by an
independent steering group which concluded that the approach was very complex and
it further highlighted that company proposals included more capital investment
projects than necessary (OFWAT, 2007b: 31), hence there was an attempt to simplify
the tools over the consequent review period. The draft determination average industry
price limits for the 2010-2015 period was 4% (-0.2) less than the companies had
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proposed in their Final Business Plans. This limit will be finalised in November 2009
and will come in to effect from April 2010.
The price setting process (Figure 4-6 and detailed schedule in Appendix G) starts with
companies submitting draft business plan (5 year) proposals to Ofwat (these include
proposed price limits and strategic direction statements with 25 year forecasts). The
process further includes:
 Draft determinations are published, after scrutinising of business plans, for
consultation to companies and other stakeholders
 Representations from stakeholders are done based on draft determinations
 Final determinations are drafted and published after careful consideration of
representations on draft determinations as well as relevant information
Figure 4-6 Key stages in the price review process. Source: (OFWAT, 2008b)
The price limits are determined based on the business plans submitted by the various
companies, which includes the costs of services as well as the revenues to be collected
to finance the business. This process leading up to the final determinations includes
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various stakeholders including Ministers and the economic, quality and environmental
regulators and customer (household and business) representation, in close
collaboration with the companies. The price limit set in the final determinations
considers the following costs that companies face (OFWAT, 2008b):
 Running costs due to taxation, pension, energy and legislative changes
 Activity to maintain the asset network and improve security of supply services
 Further improvements to drinking water quality and environment
 Significant reductions in sewer flooding
 Maintaining the balance between supply and demand
 Enhanced service levels
The process of setting price limits was described by interviewees as normally
delivering an increase in the first year of the proposed period, because it is the first
adjustment for costs over the preceding five years, which can then be phased-out over
the period. The first year’s price limit also includes factors such as climate change
levies and national insurance contributions.
Customers however, would like to have price increases to take place gradually,
however smoothing price limits would mean that bills are higher towards the end of
the five year period, and this would mean costs exceeding revenue, making it more
risky for companies. An additional feature in the process is that it makes provision for
price limits to include supply and demand for water and sewerage services for both
existing and new customers of the companies. Official reports predict that companies
will require a total capital investment of £17 billion (PPP US$ 11 billion) (compared
to the proposed £21 billion (PPP US$ 14 billion) by companies) over the period of
2005-10 to maintain current services levels as well as meet new obligations (OFWAT,
2008b; OFWAT, 2004a: 123).
The companies are assessed on their ability to perform against the cost assumptions
set and the likely delivery of output requirements. The final determinations are based
on careful consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by companies and
their relevant representations in search for improvement in efficiency (Ofwat
interviewee, 2008).
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Financial modelling packages (spreadsheet based) have been developed by Ofwat to
support the UK price-setting processes. The Aquarius 3 model was used for Price
Review 2004 (PR04), and has been modified as ‘Project Reservoir’ for the PR09 price
review. The model in general, is developed as a benchmarking tool assessing relative
performances of water sector companies through determining the ‘allowable
revenues’ for efficient financial sustainability to deliver the required services, without
charging the customers “more than necessary” (Robson, 2006: 4). These efficiency
estimates are based on service specific requirements, tariff basket and financial inputs
(OFWAT, 2009: 7). The tariff basket refers to various charges which are included in
the annual price limits, such as charges for measured and unmeasured water and
sewerage services (OFWAT, 2009: 53).
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Figure 4-7. Financial modelling overview. Source: (OFWAT, 2009: 8)
The financial model calculates the costs of running the business and the expected
turnover, which will determine the revenue required to be raised from the customers
to finance the company functions (OFWAT, 2009: 7). To simplify the financial
modelling process, the CCWater have been advocating to include “what-if” scenarios
as part of a user interface to be able to address immediate concerns of stakeholders,
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however, the request have been refused by Ofwat, with 7 months outstanding (out of
30) before the final price determinations for the PR09 (Franceys 2009).
The price limits calculation (Figure 4-8) includes revenue requirement and revenue
base and is calculated based on output requirements which are equal to operating
expenditure plus expenditure to finance the capital investment programmes plus
return on capital plus tax (OFWAT, 2008b).
Figure 4-8 illustrates simple representation of financial model used to set price limits. Source:
(OFWAT, 2008b: 11)
The equation above of annual price limits is calculated to ensure that companies
obtain the necessary capital to “deliver the improvements required at realistic rates”
(OFWAT, 2007b: 11). The annual average price limit of 4.2%, before inflation (all
prices are increased by the level of inflation automatically, every year), was set for the
period 2005-10. There are limits set for each company and in this case Anglian Water
company had the lowest average price limit of 2.4% while South West Water had the
highest price limit of 6.9% out of the 10 water and sewerage companies. Customers’
bills are directly influenced by the price limits. The current price limit thus implies
that the average household customer will pay approximately £46 (PPP US$ 70), (18%
increase) in contrast to the last price review in 1999, where customers bills decreased
on average due to large efficiency gains (OFWAT, 2004) and reductions in the target
cost of capital.
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A new mechanism, the Capital Expenditure Incentive Scheme (CIS) (OFWAT, 2009:
6) was introduced for the PR09 process, yet another regulatory tool to address the
principal-agent challenge. This approach reduces companies incentives to “inflate”
their figures in the business plans and gives the companies “ownership/accountability
and responsibility to determine the right level of expenditure” hence meaning
simplification of required information from OFWAT. Capital expenditure is identified
as the area where the most information asymmetry takes place during the price setting
process, hence this approach is proposed to reduce this challenge (OFWAT, 2008b:
32-33).
Efficiency is driven by the nature of the incentives as well as comparative
competition within the sector. The efficiency (water and sewerage) of companies is
measured against its operating expenditure and capital maintenance levels (Figure
4-9). The benchmarking process considers using the most appropriate company as a
benchmark against which other companies’ financial performance is measured. In this
regard, Yorkshire (in terms of size and stability) and Wessex was used as benchmark
for water and sewerage efficiency rankings respectively (OFWAT, 2007b: 2,5).
Figure 4-9 Water efficiency benchmarking across companies for period 2006-07. Source:
(OFWAT, 2007b: 4)
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Overall, to promote water efficiency is one of the major aims of water service
delivery companies, therefore related initiatives are expected to be stipulated within
the company long-term water resources plans. Consequently, the economic level of
water efficiency targets are used to determine related incentives for companies
(OFWAT, 2008b: 23-24).
Household bills components (Figure 4-10) are largely made up of operating,
maintenance and capital charges, which reflect the change in bills for the following
year. This is a clear indication of what consumers are paying for in relation to service
quality levels.
Figure 4-10 Drivers of changes in average bills (2007/08 prices). Source(OFWAT, 2008b: 11).
In addition to expectations of enhanced efficiency, the regulator only ‘allowing’ in
price-setting for ever increasing efficiency as related to earlier expenditure,
companies are also incentivised through the ‘Overall Performance Assessment’
(OPA) scoring process with well-performing companies being allowed an uplift of up
to 1% of revenue in the subsequent price review period. The indicators include water
supply; sewerage services; customer services and environmental impacts. The OPA is
currently being reviewed to include qualitative aspects, such as consumer experience
of interaction with companies, ready to be implemented as from 2010 (interviewee,
2008).
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As part of the price-setting process, companies are obliged to include the following
plans and targets in their business plan proposals as a result of cost benefit analysis
approaches (OFWAT, 2008b: 21-24):
 Security of Supply Index (SoSI) as a measure to “guarantee” level of service
outlined in their respective plans
 Water resource management plans including leakage management plans, with
appropriate resource zone leakage targets
 Sewerage service supply/demand plans including plans for new
developments, especially urban developers, which will form part of the water
efficient measures.
 Asset management plans, including quality enhancement programmes for
asset improvements (especially those at risk from surface water flooding),
changes in operational procedures, drinking water quality improvements,
which will be measured through serviceability indicators for all asset facilities
The price-setting process and the particular reporting style is believed to enhance
transparency and understanding of consumers as to what investments they are paying
for and the benefits they gain from it. It also ensures that companies continue to strive
for efficiency through revision of approaches and initiatives based on the demand
(Ofwat interviewee, 2008). Furthermore, all information about the sector is fully
disclosed on internet (public domain), including June returns (financial reports) of
companies; performance indicators and impact of prices on household bills. The
annual reports of the regulator are also available, which is considered a good example
of transparency, whereby salaries of senior staff, ethnic composition of staff and
consultancy service expenses.
4.5 Consumer representation process
The Consumer Council for Water (CCWater) works closely with Ofwat and
companies to ensure their customers that “price limits are no higher than they need to
be to meet the outputs the company has to deliver” (OFWAT, 2004). The CCWater
members interviewed, described history of the council as evolving from Customer
Service Committees (pre 2000) and WaterVoice to CCWater (as known presently).
The evolution of WaterVoice to CCWater was associated with its independence from
Chapter 4: Water pricing processes in England and Zambia
118
Ofwat in 2005. Since then numerous structural and functional changes took place,
which are partly linked to the reduction of regions from 10 to 7, for which CCWater
members are responsible. The various regional committees report to a national
committee which is governed by a Board. Representation on the committees is
selected through response to open public advertisements with a serving term of 4
years, now receiving some limited remuneration. The members normally comprise of
ordinary consumers with specific interests, skills and experiences. CCWater is
financed by the water companies through DEFRA approval, similar to Ofwat’s
funding, which is also supported by a levy on water companies, all of whose costs are
paid by consumers (less than 25p (PPP US$ 0.16) per year).
The principles upon which the Council operates are to represent consumers’ interests
in terms of identifying major concerns of consumers; ensuring that consumers’
complaints are properly dealt with and advising Ofwat on pertinent issues relating to
consumer interests. The Council plays an active role during the price setting process
and are involved in various consultations prior to final determinations. A three-stage
consumer consultation process, which includes consumer research to be included in
strategic direction statements and draft business plans of companies in consultation
with various stakeholders both locally and regionally, takes place to “explore
consumers views” and their willingness to pay for services. This consultation process
is undertaken by Ofwat in conjunction with CCWater and other stakeholders
including Countryside Council for Wales, Defra, DWI, Environment Agency, Natural
England, Water UK and Welsh Assemble Government, for example.
The activities of the Council, as described by interviewees, includes policy reviews,
promotion of affordability (developed qualitative life indicators in this regard) and
networking with various other stakeholders, especially consumers, companies, local
authorities and regulators such as Ofwat, Environment Agency. One interviewee
mentioned that the Council members spend the majority of their time on handling
complaints of customers regarding utility service provision as well as lobbying
government and companies to address specific issues such as:
 Policy
 Affordability
 Water resources
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 Metering
 Climate change
 Price review process and information sharing
 Cost of capital
 Water framework directive
 Debt
 Quality issues
The guaranteed standards scheme (GSS) regulations is also used by CCWater
members as a guide to ensure that customers have access to minimum service
standards, for which they can claim monetary recompense, should a company not
meet set standards. These standards include issues such as response time to
complaints; keeping appointments; minimum pressure levels; interruption of supply
and flooding from sewers (OFWAT, 2008a: 1-8).
Consumer priority issues identified during a study in 2008, indicated concerns about
affordability, while it was found that the majority of consumers takes issues of water
supply sewerage disposal for granted, since quality of service are of high standard and
they indicated they have no need for concern (Corr Willbourn Research and
Development, 2008).
4.5.1 Perception of regulators on regulatory process
As part of the process, the Ofwat interviewee highlighted the revision of June returns
as a major part of the process, which is to determine the financial performance of
companies as a build up to the development of draft business plans which eventually
evolves into final business plans. This process includes various consultations
strategies (meetings, internet chats, workshops) with various stakeholders. The
process is facilitated by guidelines and templates available (constantly being revised)
from the regulator. Various ‘reporters’ (technical audit consultants similar to financial
auditors) are appointed to assist with the audit process of companies, which is
followed by a query process, where companies are exposed to stakeholders to clarify
various issues. The National Environment Programme (NEP), part of the Environment
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Agency also has a huge influence on the business plans of companies. This normally
involves cost benefit analysis, in which transparency is taken very seriously.
Another interviewee described the price-setting process as “information hungry” and
highly computerised. The interviewee claims that the process is done in a very
transparent (especially the data requirements) and predictable manner, with limited
timing and therefore the information sharing process is also very selective. In this
regard, the regulator is constantly reviewing the process to “stay on top of things” and
in fact the 5 year period is also under revision to a probable 6 year period to coincide
with the implementation period of the Water Framework Directive (though this
approach had been rejected at the previous review of pricing periods). The
interviewee mentioned that the process has “grown” over the years and is becoming
“easier” compared to when the regulator first started to operate. Regulatory tools are
reportedly getting more complex to try and incorporate the various changes and
specificities of companies. The current Project Reservoir financial modelling tool is
developed to deal with this problem and it is intended to make reporting easier,
especially in comparison to the Aquarius model.
The network regulation and consumer protection aspects are dealt with in close
collaboration with CCWater, which was described as very good body by all
regulatory interviewees and their involvement is seen as invaluable.
4.5.2 Perception of service providers on regulatory process
The role of the regulator is seen as ensuring the financeability of the water and
sewerage companies by the service providers interviewed. This includes revision of
turnover linked to the costs incurred in meeting the water demand, and determining
the K factor target for the company. The incentive based system makes provision for
out performance of companies relative to the K-factor, however 50% of the
interviewees indicated that there are several trade-offs to be considered within the
system. For example there are conflicts within the price-cap and revenue-cap systems
which contradict with the conservation approach, because “if you are trying to sell
water, how can you tell people to save water and money”. Preparation for price
reviews is a 5 year process, 2 years of which includes preparing the business plan.
One interviewee explained the process such that there are specific forecasts teams
responsible for forecasting plans up to 2035 to determine the investments required to
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ensure that the company continues to meet the efficiency targets based on the
changing demands and challenges such as population growth and climate change,
which is one of the biggest challenges for the company currently.
The price review process from 2004 was reportedly “better” compared to the current
(PR 09) review process. The current process is described as “too complicated and
tedious” in terms of the regulatory tools and information requirements. In particular
the financial model, Aquarius, was rated poorly by all interviewees and its accuracy
was questioned. The interviewees mentioned that the regulator is micro-managing the
companies and this causes general frustration and influences the working relationship
with the regulator. One interviewee further mentioned that the regulator operates on
an assumption that the “company is hiding information from them”, while in fact the
information requested is not available. The interviewees felt that the regulator requires
“too much detail”, which they do not understand the use for. The June returns was the
most frequently cited example in this regard. Another interviewee referred to the
PR09 process as “opaque and too political” and the regulator as “cold and
aggressive”.
The company’s working relationship with the CCWater, was reportedly very good
and is described as a good initiative to ensure efficient services are provided to
consumers. The views of CCWater members are taken very seriously and
interviewees stated that on several occasions the Council’s advice influenced
decision-making processes. Reflecting back on the regulatory process since 1989, the
interviewees agreed that “privatisation was good for increasing efficiency in the water
sector”.
4.5.3 Perception of consumer representatives about regulatory process
One interviewee mentioned that the role of CCWater in the PR09 process is not very
clear and thus needs to be addressed. 50% of the interviewees indicated that there is a
need for stable predictable revenue and hence the need to improve metering coverage.
However another interviewee pointed out those metering made revenues much more
unpredictable, becoming a function of hot and dry or wet and cold summers which is
why the regulator was now introducing a revenue guarantee system. It could be said
that CCWater members are representative of customers to the extent that they do not
always agree. Transparency was seen as a key reason for regulation within the water
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sector, as mentioned by all interviewees, and thus they indicated that CCWater
contributes towards making the process more transparent. Information and results
from CCWater’s activities are mostly available on their web-site, however depending
on the issue; various media (press releases, newspaper articles) are used for awareness
raising and information sharing.
The 2004 price review process was reportedly done wrongly at the expense of
consumers and Council members feel strongly that it is important to get the review
process “right this time” (PR09). Another interviewee mentioned that the regulatory
process was good when it started off, however more recently the “quality is slipping
and unfortunately Ofwat is relying on their good reputation from the past”. Though
the regulatory process was described as being efficient (especially setting
targets/indicators for companies) and “relatively” transparent, one interviewee added
that the regulator is not progressive and is failing to “keep the pace” with companies.
Transparency was particularly questioned by one interviewee, when Ofwat refused to
incorporate “what-if” scenarios as part of the financial modelling process – and
subsequently even refused to model ‘what-if’ questions for CCWater, something they
had been pleased to do for WaterVoice in PR04.
The biggest challenges within the regulatory process, as identified by the consumer
representatives interviewed, are:
 Failure to calculate the cost of capital properly
 Regulatory tools (especially the financial model-Aquarius) are complex and
not working properly.
 Review of capital incentive scheme
 Compulsory metering enforcement
 Review of the Overall Performance Assessment and GSS
The revenue guarantee approach and menu regulation proposals are complimented by
most interviewees, indicating that initiatives are taking place to ensure increased
transparency and efficient service delivery. CCWater does not have access to all
information (some information is considered highly confidential between Ofwat and
companies), and therefore their response to issues are limited to Ofwat outcomes.
However, there is a “no surprises” policy between Ofwat and CCWater in terms of
Chapter 4: Water pricing processes in England and Zambia
123
sharing information and hence the regulator keeps CCWater informed of major issues
(even if it is not detailed). In this regard, the Council does not have any ‘powers’ to
influence the process, and therefore acts only in an advisory capacity. However all
interviewees indicated that more statutory authority would make the Council stronger
and would enable them to speed up certain issues and would thus reduce the
‘personality based characteristic of the Council members’. An alternative view
expressed was that professionalising the Council yet further could turn it into a
parallel regulator. Another interviewee highlighted that CCWater has a huge influence
on the price-setting process and that its power to negotiate and persuade (based on
evidence) is its strongest feature.
Contrary to popular belief, the majority of the interviewees hinted that consumers
should not be represented directly on the committee, since the issues are too complex
for the lay person and would result in a slower and less effective process. Experience
has shown that consumers are generally not interested in other issues apart from their
own, and thus it would limit the Council to deal with a variety of issues. It is
important to be able to balance the issues and address it accordingly and the issue of
representation (and feedback) of such a person might complicate the process. A
complementary viewpoint is that CCWater should see itself as the equivalent of an
ongoing ‘deliberative focus group’, very much being made up of consumers but
consumers who have been ‘educated’ into some of the realities of delivering water
and sanitation services, and who can therefore give a more helpful viewpoint on
behalf of all consumers.
Overall, all interviewees rated the presence of a consumer representation body within
the regulatory process as invaluable in terms of improved transparency and ensuring
that consumers receive the services they pay for. The quality of interaction with other
institutions during the process is described as good, but also highly dependent on the
personalities of the representatives involved. One interviewee felt that CCWater is the
link between the regulator and companies and the consumers and therefore such a
body is needed to keep the connection and interaction. In addition the interviewee
mentioned that companies have indicated that they work better with the CCWater than
with the regulator.
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4.5.4 Consumers perception about regulatory process
Information about CCWater and Ofwat is printed on the back of the bills, however
only 12% of the interviewees knew about these services and what their activities
entail. The rest of the interviewees did not know about it and did not show any
interest as long as they receive the services they pay for; they had no reasons knowing
about these institutions. Furthermore, none of the interviewees needed to make any
complaints (even though they indicated that they do not understand their water bill) to
the water company in the past three years.
Similar to the sentiments of the consumer representation interviewees, the consumer
interviewees (except for one) indicated their non-interest in participating in the price-
setting process, though they took comfort in the fact that there is a level of consumer
representation.
4.6 Zambian case study: Institutions, Roles and Relationships
The Zambian reform process followed a similar pattern to that of England and Wales
and therefore segregation of functions, water policy, provision and regulation were
also key during their reform process (NWASCO, 2004b: 11). The Water Policy of
1994 guided the reform process (particularly the seven sector principles) and resulted
in the promulgation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Act in 1997 (GTZ, 2008: 10).
The seven sector principles are as follows (NWASCO, 2004c: 4):
 “Separation of WRM from WSS
 Separation of regulatory and executive functions within the water supply and
sanitation sector
 Devolution of authority to LAs and private enterprises
 Full cost recovery in the long run
 Human resource development leading to more effective institutions
 Technologies appropriate to local conditions
 Increased funding by Government of Republic of Zambia (GRZ)”
This legal framework in Zambia makes provision for commercialization as well as
private sector participation in the water sector (NWASCO, 2004b: 10) to increase
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efficiency (NWASCO, 2004b: 4) under the auspices of the Ministry of Local
Government and Housing which deals with water supply and sanitation services
(GTZ, 2008: 10).
An independent economic regulator, the National Water Supply and Sanitation
Council (NWASCO) was established and started operations in 2000 (GTZ, 2008: 10;
NWASCO, 2004c: iii), regulating the commercial utilities, private utilities and local
authorities, with economic and quality regulation functions with a strong emphasis on
tariff adjustment reviews and performance monitoring for service provision
sustainability (NWASCO, 2004b: 5). The Zambian regulator has built a successful
reputation of managing with limited resources and investment in infrastructure,
amongst the developing countries as well as the world (Rouse, 2007: 30-31).
Similarly it is noted that “commercialisation and regulation helped to stop the decades
long degradation of WSS and improved service provision in most towns” (NWASCO
and DTF, 2005: 3).
In order to separate policy and regulatory functions, NWASCO reports to parliament
through the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) which is directly
responsible for water supply and sanitation services. The Ministry also appoints the
board members of NWASCO after an institutional nomination process (D'Sousa and
Barmeier, 2006: 2). Initially NWASCO reported to Parliament through Ministry of
Energy and Water Development (MEWD), however based on several oppositions, this
was changed to MLGH. The major conflict was due to the fact that MEWD dealt with
water resources, while MLGH was directly responsible for water supply and therefore
it was deemed most appropriate to have the regulator reporting through the latter
ministry (Government interviewees, 2008).
4.7 Providing water and sanitation services
The resultant effect of the sector reform was that the majority of Local authorities
were transformed into water companies (commercial utilities (CUs)), which are
contributing to provision of services for 92% of the population, while the remaining
local authorities serve 7% and private contributors 1% of the population (NWASCO,
2008: 2). Hence this translates into “33 licensed service providers comprising of 10
CUs, 13 local authorities and 6 privately run schemes” (GTZ, 2008: 10) covering
68.6% of the urban population’s water supply (NWASCO, 2008: 2). The average
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hours of water supply by CUs are reported to be 15 hours in 2007/2008 period, while
LAs provide average water supply for 7 hours with only one town (Mambwe)
reaching 24 hour water supply services (NWASCO, 2008: 39-50). The private
contributors only provide water to their employees and an average water supply
service of 20 hours are noted (NWASCO, 2008: 50-51). The majority of the
commercialised utilities are dependent on external investment, however there are
some that are solely dependent on revenue from their water sales (NWASCO, 2004b:
4).
For the purposes of this study only two CUs, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company
and Kafubu Water and Sewerage Company, were researched to understand the
financial performance, especially in terms of cost allocation and hence the tariff
determination process, within a regulatory framework.
4.7.1 Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company
Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company Limited (LWSC) was established from the
Water and Sewerage Department of Lusaka City Council (LCC) as one of the first
Commercialised Utilities (1988) (LWSC, 2008: i) in Zambia. The company is
registered as a “private-limited-liability, but operates as a parastatal with LCC as the
sole shareholder” guided by a board of directors from both the public and private
sector (LWSC, 2008: 1-3).
The main sources of water supply to Lusaka come from the Kafue River (43%) in
conjunction with boreholes (57%) in the city (LWSC, 2008: 2). LWSC operates in
Lusaka, where 65% of the 2.5 million people live in peri-urban areas. By the end of
2007, the company recorded 51 619 tap connections, and only 13% of the serviced
area has a sewer network (LWSC, 2008: 1, 9). Approximately 49% of Lusaka is
metered.
The company reportedly inherited many problems after transition, which limited them
from meeting their demand. Their biggest challenges were dealing with old,
dilapidated infrastructure coupled with lack of investment, leading to high
unaccounted for water rates. Revenue collection and low tariffs equally adds to the
challenges. Despite these challenges, official reports indicate the company’s mission
as providing “quality water and sanitation services to customers in Lusaka province at
commercially and environmentally sustainable levels” (LWSC, 2008: iii).
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A slight increase can be observed in the company’s operational performance based on
the performance indicators (Table 4-4) over period 2002-2007.
Table 4-4 Major Performance indicators of LWSC over a period of 6 years.
Performance indicator/year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Water Production capacity (‘000m3/day) 210 194 199 212 218 230
Service coverage water (% pop) 79 79 80 80 80 81
Service coverage sewerage (% pop) 12 12 12 12 12 13
No of customers 34, 930 36,263 41,145 45,972 47,705 51,500
Staff/1000 connections 14 14 13 12 11 11
Metering ratio (%) 41 40 38 36 44 48
Non Revenue Water (NRW) % 57 58 56 55 51 51
Collection Ratio (%) 72 74 82 79 82 91
Source: (LWSC, 2008: 7)
Official reports (LWSC, 2008: 7) confirms the interviewees’ view points that low
tariffs and high operating costs are the major contributing factors towards the poor
financial state (Table 4-5) of LWSC. As a result, the company’s liquidity status is
very poor, such that the current assets are not sufficient to cover the current liabilities,
and therefore the need to manage their liabilities as well as non revenue water (rated
as high average of 55%) is inevitable. Senior LWSC officials interviewed predicted
that the current African Development Bank and World Bank loans will drastically
improve the capital structure situation (increasing the gearing ratio) of the company.
However, official reports show that this would still need to supplemented with
approximately US$80 million (PPP US$ 80 million) for the company to meet their
demand (LWSC, 2008: 9).
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Table 4-5 Financial indicators of LWSC for period 2003-2007
Indicator 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Profitability
Return on capital employed (ROCE) [%] 1 -4 -5 -6 -1
Asset turnover ratio 0.31 0.38 0.43 0.64 0.68
Profit margin 5 -10 -12 -10 -2
Liquidity
Current ratio 0.92 1.11 1.81 1.31 1.65
Quick ratio 0.79 0.98 1.52 1.13 1.47
Capital structure
Debt-Equity ratio 9.87 29.19 -11.73 -8.04 -11.46
Debt-Asset ratio 0.82 0.87 0.77 0.76 0.74
Capital gearing [%] 91 97 109 113 110
Efficiency
Collection period (debtor days) 125 125 398 345 248
Accounts receivable turnover 2.9 2.9 0.9 1.1 1.5
Creditor days 189 106 99 118 166
Stock days 28 24 92 58 128
Inventory turnover 13 14.8 3.9 6.3 2.8
Av. Tariff/m3 billed [PPP US$] 1,031
[0.49]
1,127
[0.47]
1,290
[0.48]
1,727
[0.61]
2,029
[0.66]
Av. Costs/m3 billed [PPP US$] 1,364
[0.65]
1,680
[0.70]
1,454
[0.55]
1,903
[0.67]
2,119
[0.70]
Operating and admin costs as a % of billing 129 143 113 110 104
Operating and admin costs coverage by
billing
77 70 89 91 96
Source: (LWSC, 2008: 30)
Based on the financial indicators and interview results, the company is not recovering
costs, and is thus financially not recovering its cost of capital. The interviewees
attributed this aspect to old and deteriorated infrastructure, hence the need for capital
investment. Therefore not only are the tariffs not cost reflective (comparing average
tariff and costs), but also debt collection periods are worsening over time, not
reflecting any progress in that respect. Overall, the interviewees stated that electricity
and human resources contribute to major operational costs of the company. The
planned company strategies, hence reportedly include focus on customers, reliable
water (for example improve from 17 hours to 24 hours per day supply) and sanitation
service provision (including to peri-urban areas), in an effort to increase bill
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collection, based on the assumption that increase quality of service, encourages bill
payment.
In terms of information and financial transparency, the researcher could not obtain
annual reports only business plans from the company. The business plans were very
detailed and the financial ratios of company performance were highlighted very well,
to the extent that the tariffs against costs billed were calculated. The business plans
also included detailed investment plans.
Official reports (NWASCO, 2008) indicate the average LWSC tariffs for domestic
metered consumers at ZMK 6, 000 (PPP US$ 1.82) for 6 m3; ZMK 34, 800 (PPP US$
10.57) for 30 m3; ZMK 79, 800 (PPP US$ 24.24) for 60m3. However, LSWC officials
stated that they operate on a 5 tariff block system. LSWC interviewees further
reported a 60% and 80% recovery rate from the domestic sector and commercial
sector respectively. Approximately 30% of debt owed by government institutions (eg
hospitals, schools, defence and air force) is not recovered and these are the most
problematic group of clients. Disconnections of services serve as a penalty of non-
payment, however this measure does not work well in domestic areas, since people
obtain water from neighbours and thus there is no means of control over non-payment
in this regard. LSWC representatives also mentioned that they have a scheme in place
for those in arrears of their payments, but in general they do not have ‘special’ tariffs
for ‘vulnerable’ customers. They unanimously agreed that it is government’s role to
establish social schemes of those people that cannot afford basic services. LSWC
reportedly allow free water services, for ‘special’ cases such as funerals for example,
as part of their social responsibility.
Furthermore, 30% and 40% of the LWSC water bill for domestic and commercial
industry respectively is charged for sewerage, while 30% of peri-urban areas are
equipped with VIP toilets (Utility interviewees, 2008). LWSC interviewees stated that
they operate on a 30 day collection period with major consumers, and do consider
willingness to pay of their consumers during their consultation meetings.
4.7.2 Kafubu Water and Sewerage Company
Kafubu Water and Sewerage Company (KWSC) is a result of a joint venture amongst
three LAs (Ndola, Luanshya and Masaiti), covering 600 000 population combined
with 48 000 connections. KWSC operates in the Copperbelt Province and thus mainly
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provides water to mining towns (KWSC Interviewee, 2008), hence the reason for this
research to also include this company as part of the study. The company service area
is comprised of both metered and non-metered areas, of which the average hours of
supply is 18 (Figure 4-11). The population of Lusaka and the Copperbelt area makes
up 64% of the Zambian population (NWASCO, 2008: 32).
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Figure 4-11 Maps of Ndola town, illustrating the type of water services available and the respective metering ratios within Kafubu Water and Sewerage
company’s service areas. Source: Kafubu Water Sewerage Company
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Figure 4-12: Maps of Ndola town, illustrating the hours of water supply per day within Kafubu Water and Sewerage company’s service areas
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There is a noticeable trend between hours of supply and metered household areas.
Those with 21-24 hours of service are metered, while non-metered households
(including peri-urban areas) receive between 15 and 18 hours of service. 15 % of the
town is metered according to interviewees.
The domestic tariff structure (Table 4-6), (for those with individual house
connections) adopted in Zambia is the rising block tariff, with three blocks, making
provision for the first 6m3 at the social rate. Post-pay bills are received monthly,
including once-off connection fees and standing fees (Utility interviewees, 2008).
Table 4-6 Tariffs (2008) for metered domestic sector in Ndola, with approved percentage changes
in tariffs over a three year period
Domestic
metered (m3)
Tariffs Approved % change
Current
(ZMK)
Current (PPP US$,
3,292.12, 2008)
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
0-6 1, 100 0.33 20 15 10
7-15 1, 200 0.36 20 15 10
>15 1, 600 0.50 20 15 10
Sewerage % 40 40 40 40 40
Source: (Zulu et al. 2008)
Non-metered household tariffs are classified according to high costs; medium costs;
low costs, stand taps and communal taps (Table 4-7) and pay flat rates. There are also
flat rates for non-domestic, commercial/governmental institutions and industries (Zulu
et al. 2008).
Table 4-7 Current (2008) and approved tariff adjustments for the non-metered domestic sector in
Ndola over period of 3 years
Domestic Tariffs Approved % changes
Current
(ZMK)
Current (PPP US$,
3,292.12, 2008)
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
High Costs 74,060 22.50 20 15 10
Medium costs 38, 800 11.80 20 15 10
Low costs 14, 324 4.35 20 15 10
Stand taps 7, 500 2.30 20 15 10
Communal taps 5,000 1.50 20 15 10
Sewerage % 40 40 40 0 0
Source: (Zulu et al. 2008)
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Water kiosk systems are developed for low income users that cannot afford to have
house connections. The kiosk systems operate on flat rate systems, which are equal or
lower than the social block tariff for a certain volume of water. The non-domestic
industry operates on a single block tariff system, charged at full cost recovery rates.
However there is a limit which they are charged, to maintain the incentive of using the
services of the provider, otherwise the incentive for drilling the borehole becomes
cheaper and thus the provider forfeits an income generating opportunity. The tariffs
for sewerage connections are calculated as a percentage of the water consumed
(KWSC interviewee, 2008).
No financial data (annual reports) could be obtained from KWSC during the research
and the research relied on interviewee information. It transpired from interviews that
one of the reasons why KWSC was making a loss during the period 2002-2005, was
primarily because of ‘excess’ personnel that they had to retain as part of an agreement
with government. At inception of the company in 1998, it inherited 118 staff from
Ndola City Council which they did not need, and for whom government promised to
pay retrenchment packages, however the payment of ZMK 2.1 billion (PPP US$ 74
million) was only received in 2006. The other reasons included non payment of major
clients, including government institutions. Furthermore, it is noted that during 2007,
donations from donors to water and sewerage companies ranged from ZMK 673
million (PPP US$ 0.22 million) to ZMK 1 billion (PPP US$ 3.2 million) (KWSC
officials, 2008).
KWSC reportedly recovers 65% of their debts, with the biggest challenge being
recovering debt from government institutions which constitute for about 15% of their
client base. Two of the interviewees from KWSC, indicated that there is a lot of
political interference with regard to payment of government water bills.
KWSC representatives (30%) mentioned that the company has a high customer focus
and thus puts a lot of effort into awareness raising campaigns, especially with regard
to water conservation measures, payment of water services, sanitation/health
awareness and measures against vandalism of meters. The company works well with
other stakeholders especially WWGs and RDCs as well as the Local Authorities.
Relevant information is reportedly included on the back of the bill to reach metered
consumers.
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4.8 Affordability of Water and Sanitation Services
Official statistics indicate that 53% of Zambian urban population is without access to
clean drinking water and 56% without access to adequate sanitation facilities
(D'Sousa and Barmeier, 2006: 1). Furthermore the newly established (in late 2000s)
commercial utilities struggle to extend their services to low cost urban areas (where
over 60% of the urban population resides), largely due to financial limitations and the
poor condition of the existing network (NWASCO, 2004a: 171). In response to this
challenge, NWASCO developed a Devolution Trust Fund (DTF) (through external
support from the Danish and German Governments) to support providers in extension
of services, specifically to the urban poor (NWASCO, 2004b: 11). However, the fund
is separately managed from the regulator “to avoid conflict of interest” (DTF officer,
2008). The funds from the Trust are reportedly used to establish Kiosk systems in
peri-urban areas, which are managed by the CUs to provide good quality to water
services to the urban poor, and is therefore known in official reports as “the pro-poor
fund”, covering 47% of facilities (low cost technologies) in urban poor areas (GTZ,
2008: 10). The DTF not only provides technical infrastructural design guidelines, but
also management guides for these kiosks, which ensures that national standards are
adhered to and thus quality of water is assured (NWASCO interviewee, 2008). The
basket financing comprises of various donors such as KfW, Danida, the EU and
support from the Zambia government. Similar to the regulator, DTF is operated by
limited number of staff (4) governed by a management committee ‘board’ (NWASCO
interviewee, 2008).
The sources of water for per-urban users varies (Table 4-8), depending mostly on
availability and distance of travel to collect water. Kiosks are reported to be the major
source of water. Kiosks are compared to local shops within informal areas, where
basic goods are sold, including water in 20 litre drums for a fix amount of ZMK 5 000
(PPP US$ 1.50). The most prevalent problems experienced by kiosk users range from
non availability of water, frequent water interruptions to long distances to travel to
collect water. Most low-income users interviewed linked the water interruptions to
electricity cuts. The middle and high-income users interviewed indicated a preference
to drilling their own boreholes and having storage tanks due poor service from
companies and delays in repairs of pipe networks.
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Table 4-8 indicates various sources of water, payment and related problems experienced by peri-
urban consumers in Zambia
Source of water Payment for
services(ZmK)
Payment for
services (PPP US$)
Major problems
Peri-urban Users
Kiosk 5 000 per 20 litre 1.52 Frequent interruptions,
long distances to walk
Standpost/shared tap 5 000 per 20 litre 1.52 Frequent interruptions/
no water available at
intervals
School taps (within school
premises)
free Long distance to walk
Shallow wells free Poor water quality
Low-Income Users
(monthly bill)
In-house taps
200, 000- 400, 000 61-122 Frequent interruptions/
no water available.
Sometimes buy water
from kiosks
Middle-Income Users
(monthly bill)
In-house taps 400, 000 – 600, 000 122-182 Frequent interruptions/
no water available at
intervals, but some have
storage tanks at house
High-Income Users
(monthly bill)
In-house taps
Own boreholes (once-off
payment, including
installation) with average
of two 10 KL storage
tanks
600, 000- 900, 000
40, 500 000
182-273
12, 302
Frequent interruptions/
no water available at
intervals but some have
storage tanks at house
Mostly maintenance-
related and electricity
interruptions
Source: Interviews in Lusaka, 3-12 November 2008. *average between LWSC and KWSC.
The interviewees (37%) indicated that when water is not available, they make use of
the shallow wells, while others (16% from Ndola town) permanently use shallow
wells since the closest kiosk is about an hour walk away. The interviewees in Lusaka
also mentioned that school taps are alternative water sources and is free to access. One
interviewee mentioned that “if not for the distance to collect water from schools, all
people would collect it from there”. The standpost/ shared taps are manned by ‘tap
keepers’, who are selected during workshops held by the Utility companies, and they
operate on tap opening hours similar to kiosk opening hours (6am-11am and 2pm-
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6pm). These ‘tap keepers’ are paid 40% commission on water sales per day by the
service provider.
Photograph 4: Water sources (Kiosk (left) and shared water pump (right) in Ndola and Lusaka
respectively. Source: Author, Zambia. 2008
In addition to kiosks, which are company operated, the urban poor also buy water
from Water Trusts, which are informal water service providers. The Water Trusts
resulted from capacity building oriented projects (including construction of water
supply infrastructure) implemented by CARE International (NGO). These projects
work closely with Resident Development Committees (RDCs), which are community
members elected to manage the water system within a given area, as part of the lowest
level of governance structure of Local Authorities. (CARE interviewee, 2008).
Literature (Kayaga and Kadimba-Mwanamwambwa, 2006: 158) further indicates that
Water Trusts are community managed water suppliers, who primarily supply water
through public standpipes as well as individual household connections. Although the
Trusts seemed to have higher service quality provision, consumer satisfaction and
charging rates compared to services by LWSC, through the Kiosks, the study results
showed that it is not sustainable over the long-term (Kayaga and Kadimba-
Mwanamwambwa, 2006: 160), therefore utility companies should strive to improve
services to all consumers.
4.8.1 Perception of service providers on service levels
According to the providers (both from LSWC and KWSC) interviewed, metering is
one of the best conservation techniques. They stated that their biggest challenge is to
deal with the “water is abundant” attitude of the consumers and therefore their
companies are placing huge emphasis on installing meters as much as possible. Lack
of investment was mentioned by 70% of the interviewed providers as the major
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hampering factor for infrastructural development (including installing meters) and
maintenance and hence attributed to the reason for overall poor service provision.
Sector investment is reportedly administered through government basket funding,
which is based on national priorities (which at the moment seems to be rural water
development), hence the companies has to wait until for government investment
otherwise their “hands are tied.”
Considering the non-payment history for water and sanitation services in Zambia,
Utility interviewees (30%) mentioned that the companies faced many difficulties in
introducing their tariffs. As a result, increments in tariffs were introduced in phases
and hence cost recovering is a long-term goal. In essence the companies follow the
NWASCO guidelines for reporting and accounting for their services, as well as
planning for the future.
The LWSC interviewees consider their block tariff system equivalent to a cross-
subsidy systems (first block serves as social tariff) and thus felt that it worked well.
Similarly, the Kiosk systems were described as a success, especially in terms of
revenue collection, since it operates on a “pay-as-you-go” principle.
Half of KWSC interviewees admitted that they are not effectively recovering costs
due to poor services rendered. Erratic water supply (mainly due to old infrastructure
and irregular electricity supply), no water availability, poor water quality, billing and
late handling of complaints are reportedly the most frequent complaints received from
KWSC consumers.
4.8.2 Perception of consumers on service levels
Most (79%) interviewees mentioned that water service payments are cheap to
reasonable and they all had no problems with paying for water services. All
interviewees from the peri-urban areas indicated that there are no toilet facilities
provided and that they make use of own secluded facilities, which they mentioned are
unhygienic and unsafe.
4.9 Price-setting process and regulatory tools
The priority role of the regulator, NWASCO, is to ensure that consumers are protected
against unfair charges and costs of services provision is covered to guarantee
sustainability. Affordability, especially for the “very poor”, is a major focus for the
Chapter 4: Water pricing processes in England and Zambia
139
regulator (NWASCO interviewee, 2008). NWASCO sets out guidelines for tariff
determination in accordance with the Water Supply and Sanitation Act, No. 28 of
1997, based on the following principles (NWASCO, 2004a: 38-40):
 “Sufficient revenues for the service providers
 Equitable and fair distribution of water
 Efficiency incentives for providers
 Conservation of treated water
 Protection of the environment”
The regulator promotes implementation of the full cost recovery principle, which is at
the heart of all the principles. This implies that all operation, maintenance and
investment costs are recovered, to ensure sustainability (and financial independence),
and access to essential quality services through extension of infrastructure to all areas
(NWASCO interviewee, 2008). However, official reports (NWASCO, 2004a: 39)
indicates that minimum basic water provision is required at approximately 6m3
through a “social price”, after which the full economic price can be charged through
the increasing block tariff system. This system not only allows for financing of
“subsidised prices for basic consumption”, but also makes provision for water
conservation measures. The regulator reportedly urges service providers to become
more efficient in service delivery through making use of “efficiency incentives” to
reduce costs (primarily personnel, energy and reducing unaccounted for water) and
ultimately decreasing prices for service delivery (NWASCO interviewee, 2008). In
this regard, more emphasis is placed on metering and proper billing systems, to enable
consumers to ‘regulate’ their water use in accordance to their affordability levels.
Official reports indicate additional incentive tools used by the regulator such as the
performance oriented incentive scheme (POIS) focusing on performance of human
resources and creating appropriate incentives to ensure staff motivation and
effectiveness (D'Sousa and Barmeier, 2006: 2).
Many of the utilities are reportedly not recovering their costs due to several reasons,
including under-pricing, and this prompted the regulator to adopt the “cost plus
regulation” approach. The NWASCO interviewee described the approach as a two-
step approach, which first ensures that utilities’ operation and maintenance costs and
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eventually “capital replacement” costs are recovered and then it focuses on
“incentives for performance improvements”. This enables the regulator to classify
two types of commercial utilities, those that are below 100% O&M cost recovery rate
and those between 100%-150% O&M cost recovery rate. The approach is
implemented taking the consumers’ ability to pay for services into consideration.
Hence the types of tariff structure developed by utilities depend on the type of
consumer groups. In this regard, official reports indicate (NWASCO, 2004a: 42) that
the majority of domestic consumers in Zambia make use of individual house
connections and water kiosks/public taps. The other consumer groups are comprised
of non-domestic consumers such as industrial, commercial and administration
(including government institutions). However, it is expected that these groups will
decrease with the introduction of meters, which is believed to make the tariff system
simpler (NWASCO interviewees, 2008).
A similar tariff adjustment process as in England is followed in Zambia, starting with
utilities submitting annual company statements, followed by tariff adjustment
proposals (in consultation with all stakeholders) and business plans and ending with
medium strategic plans (5-6 years) to NWASCO (NWACSO interviewee, 2008). See
Appendix F for detailed steps of the tariff adjustment process. The NWASCO official
further explained that as part of the process companies are required to assess their
performance indicators against minimum service level agreements (MSLA). Tariff
adjustment analysis (Figure 4-13) is done through applying a point system to
projected O&M costs of companies. This also takes into consideration the
performance analysis (also point system), which will result in an average tariff,
considering the quantity of consumers billed. This average tariff is further used to
allocate the various tariff categories, specific to company conditions.
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Figure 4-13 Tariff Analysis process in Zambia. Source: (NWASCO, 2004a: 52)
The tariff adjustment procedures form the major part of the regulatory tools (Figure
4-14), used by the regulator. In addition, the NWASCO Information System (NIS) is
reportedly the heart of the system.
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Figure 4-14 Regulatory tools used by NWASCO. Source: (Klawitter and Lang, 2008: 3)
These tools are described in the literature (D'Sousa and Barmeier, 2006: 3) as
enhancing transparency and predictability of the work of the regulator, especially
during the tariff adjustment process. The comparative competition tool is indirectly
used as an efficiency incentive as well as creating competition through benchmarking
service providers against certain performance indicators (D'Sousa and Barmeier,
2006: 4). The annual comparative sector reports (NWASCO, 2004a: 54) indicate that
vast improvements are taking place in terms of the “technical performance” of the
service providers, while the financial performance remains a huge challenge, given
that many companies are still struggling to reach operational costs recovery levels.
The performance indicators are strongly focused on the services levels and cost
recovery of the providers based on a traffic light system (Figure 4-15) with red, amber
and green indications compared to benchmark achievements (NWASCO, 2004b: 6).
The performance of companies are measured against the following indicators
(NWASCO, 2004a: 54) which are also used for benchmarking purposes:
 Metering ratio
 Water quality
 Service hours
 Specific efforts and initiatives to improve efficiency, service or access
 Unaccounted for water
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 Collection efficiency
Overall, LWSC and KWSC are ranked 6th and 4th respectively out of a total of 10,
based on the benchmarking assessment tool used by NWASCO. KWSC is showing
vast improvements in 2008 from being ranked 8th in 2005, failing to meet the criteria
for unaccounted for water (UFW) and metering ratio, while LWSC does not meet
UFW, water service and sanitation coverage as well as staff per 1,000 connections
ratios. Cost recovery remains a challenge for CUs, and it is primarily due to poor (old)
infrastructure (poor maintenance) and lack of commercial orientation (considering the
background of CUs) (NWASCO, 2008: 12).
Figure 4-15 indicates the overall performance of CUs against key performance indicators.
Source: (NWASCO, 2008: 5)
Regulation with an incentive scheme is only recently (September 2008) introduced
and will focus on the internal performance of CUs. CUs are expected to develop
incentive frameworks in consultation with NWASCO, which would facilitate efficient
quality and service provision (especially to the urban poor) (NWASCO and CU
officials interviewed, 2008). NWASCO, reportedly also acts as mediator between
debtors and providers, to encourage punctual payment of debt to contribute to cost
recovery and financial sustainability of providers. In return for services rendered and
to keep water sector sustainable, NWASCO is financed by utility levies of 2%, which
contributes to an 85% cost recovery rate for the regulator.
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NWASCO also forms part of the sectoral committee of the African Forum for Utility
Regulators (AFUR), which serves as regional platform to share and learn best
practices across the continent. According to one interviewee, the idea of regulator for
water sector is ‘fairly new’ and with increasing awareness, the demand for sharing
information is developing and spreading fast across the region. Furthermore, the
regulator has good support from donor community, especially GTZ, which also forms
part of the Board as well as offering advisory services accordingly.
Access to up-to-date information about sector performance and development is made
available on the internet including NWASCO annual reports, indicating their financial
status. However, the financial data were understandably not as detailed as the England
regulator.
4.10 Consumer representation process
The activities of the regulator include a high degree of stakeholder involvement,
which is evident through the board representation (including government institutions,
private sector and other agencies) as well as direct links to local community
representatives through the Water Watch Groups (WWG). This group was established
by NWASCO, consisting of voluntary community members, to act as an information
link to consumers (focus on urban poor), which are believed to enhance the regulatory
process in conjunction with NWASCO (WWG member interviewed, 2008). Based on
an interview with the WWG member in Lusaka, the process of establishment
(pioneered in 2002, by NWASCO) was not as smooth as illustrated in reports and
other information. The process was described as lengthy (2 years) and difficult to
convince providers of the benefits of a consumer representative body. The WWGs are
primarily established to facilitate consumer complaints process between consumers
and service providers. It is reported that consumers are actively involved in the tariff
adjustment process, through compulsory consultative meetings held by providers prior
to tariff adjustment proposals (WWG member interviewed, 2008).
Community governance structures (Figure 4-16) are two-fold and comprise of WWG
members who are linked to CUs and Ward Development Committees, which are
linked to local authorities. According to the WWG member interviewed there is a
good working relationship between the two committees and active sharing of
information is taking place.
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Figure 4-16 Shows peri-urban community governance structures and their interactions with
other institutions. Source: Author’s synthesis of interviews in Lusaka, 3-12 November 2008
The services of Water Trusts are not regulated by NWASCO and therefore (opinion of
an interviewee) face several challenges with regards to tariff determination, especially
regarding individual connections. Water Trusts are currently operating in 6
settlements in Lusaka namely Kanyama, Chipata, Chibolya, Chaisa, Chazanga and
Garden, with Care International (NGO) playing a crucial facilitation role in their
establishment process.
Lusaka WWG is comprised of 13 members dispersed across 33 wards (locations). The
major role as described by the interviewee includes:
 Advocate the rights of people to the utilities (vice versa),
 Act as a link between customers, utilities and regulator,
 Deal with customer complaints and ensure that is dealt with in accordance
with NWASCO guidelines (Figure 4-17).
The group primarily deals with peri-urban consumers who are making use of water
kiosks (pay as you go); stand posts/shared taps and other alternative sources to collect
their water. The other domestic consumers’ deals directly with the service providers
based on bills received (post monthly payments). The interviewed WWG
representative explained that in 2006, the other regulators (telecommunication and
energy), joined NWASCO’s initiative and the concept of WWGs were expanded to
form Consumer Watch Groups (CWGs), which were to focus on all three sector issues
and not only water. The regulators jointly sponsored an office for the use of CWGs
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and are also sharing the administrative and logistical costs incurred by members. The
interviewed WWG member indicated that this was a good initiative; because it would
further legitimise their existence as well as enable consumers to know where to table
their complaints (because previously people had to wait until the members get to their
area or go to the members houses). The Group activities are guided by various annual
area specific plans (budgeted) and schedules subjected to approval by regulators
(Interviewee, November 2008, Zambia).
Figure 4-17 illustrate consumer complaints procedure followed by WWGs. Source: (NWASCO,
2007: 6)
There are several interactions between WWGs and service providers after a complaint
has been launched. Only after a certain time period of disagreements with regard to
complaints handling is the complaint forwarded to the regulator, who will then take
the necessary steps to address the issue. The interviewed WWG member indicated
that once a complaint reaches the regulator, the issue is solved; due to high efficiency
level of the regulator (in this case specific reference was made to the director of
NWASCO). Official statistics (NWASCO, 2008: 26) indicate that in 2008, 69,328
complaints were received of which 71% were successfully handled. The rest of the
complaints are investment related and thus will take longer to address.
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4.10.1 Perception of Regulator on regulatory process
The interviewees from the regulator’s office indicated that the regulatory process is
implemented based on the guidelines and the legal framework in place. The Act
stipulates their working arrangements and operations. The interviewees further
mentioned that the following ‘independence’ criteria are very clear (in the Act) hence
the perceived success of the regulatory process:
 Decision-making power
 Financial independence
 Recruitment of personnel
During the start up phase of the regulator, financial sustainability was not clear since
they depended heavily on donor funding and government input. However, since 2006,
they are financially independent and operate from the 2% CU levies. One interviewee
mentioned that though Government appoints two Board representatives, the
operations of the regulator are not affected or politically influenced (as the perception
of others might be). The biggest challenge the regulator faces is reportedly to avoid
regulatory capture and therefore one of the NWASCO interviewees felt that having a
governing Board neutralises the situation. Overall, all interviewees agreed that the
regulatory process requires a high degree of objectivity. In this regard, reference was
made to the recent price hikes during an election year, which is a sign of the degree of
independence the regulator has and therefore proves that the price-setting process is
relatively detached from politicians. The interviewee further elaborated that the
presence of a regulator in the sector ensures that people do not relate the tariff
adjustment process to the political situation, which places emphasis/importance on the
transparency principles of the regulator. In addition, one of the benefits of having a
regulator “is having the comforting idea that prices are reviewed through an
acceptable and creditable (respectable) system that both people and companies can
trust”; other benefits include ensuring all interests are met and being accountable
(justifying) for the process.
The guidelines are constantly reviewed in consultation with the relevant stakeholders
to ensure that they understand the process and the purpose of the information. In this
sense the regulator tries to share as much information as possible in their attempt at
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being transparent (NWASCO interviewee, 2008). Furthermore, the regulator has the
challenge of setting quality standards and performance indicators given the poor state
of CU infrastructure in Zambia, hence the emphasis placed on the tariff adjustment
regulatory tool so as to ensure that operating and maintenance costs are recovered to
reinvest in the infrastructure and improve services (including to peri-urban areas). In
this regard, the regulator is trying to encourage meter installation as much as possible
to encourage not only payment for services, but also conservation measures and
effective measurement of non-revenue water. The NWASCO interviewees agreed that
the biggest challenges of CUs are investment funding-related and therefore are highly
dependent on external grants and loans. These are currently mobilised by government
through a system of priority criteria as part of the National Urban Water and
Sanitation Programme (NUWSSP). Another NWASCO interviewee mentioned that
another challenge for CUs is their ineffective governing structures (boards), because
the interviewee believes that Board members of CUs lack a sense of commercial
(business) orientation, and this filters down to management of the companies. Hence
the regulator is placing a stronger emphasis on the corporate governance regulatory
tool and capacity building for CUs.
The personnel of the regulator is reportedly ‘thin on the ground’ and therefore they
have to be very effective to deliver the best services, however it also limits them in
certain operations, especially company specific inspections. These are only done once
a year and in some cases they solicit part-time inspectors comprising of professionals
working in the water sector to assist in the exercise.
One of the NWASCO interviewees mentioned that so far the regulator is struggling to
keep up to pace with the sanitation demands, and they are encouraging CUs to
prioritise these as much as water supply. Sustainable options are encouraged to form
part of the business plans of CUs in line with the broader objective of achieving
governments’ Vision 2030 plans. The regulator takes issues of affordability very
seriously, according to interviewees, and therefore the tariff setting process includes
CUs to determine the affordability levels in consultation with consumers before
setting tariffs. The interviewees indicated that there is a good working relationship
with other regulators and there are numerous opportunities to share information and
develop solutions to problems.
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4.10.2 Perception of Government officials on the regulatory process
The water reform process was described by interviewed government officials as “not
easy”. They pointed out the importance of the history behind access to water in
Zambia, which was free and gradually changed to being an economic good. This had
vast financial and social implications, both for consumers and providers; therefore the
need for a regulator was highlighted and was subsequently introduced. The hardest
aspect of the reform process, according to one government interviewee, was changing
the mentality of people, and it took a lot of effort from the MLGH to sensitise people
with regard to transforming LAs into CUs. Traditional and cultural aspects also had a
strong influence on planning and development of the water sector during that phase.
Furthermore, the CUs were challenged to consider the income structure of the
consumers while looking at their ability (financial and human) to deliver water and
sanitation services based on the demand.
The reform processes of Zambia and Uganda reportedly coincided and therefore the
two countries learnt a lot from each other during the process. In this regard, much
improvement is noticeable in the water sector till date (November 2008). The major
driver for change was to achieve effectiveness hence the establishment of CUs and the
regulator. Initially the CUs had difficulties in accepting to pay (levies) to maintain the
regulator, however it is believed (by interviewee) that they can now appreciate the
work of the regulator and thus see value for their money.
Two of the interviewees felt strongly that privatising water utilities can work only if
relevant investment plans and funding are available to implement the required
activities, otherwise investment funds has to be sourced from donors or government.
Overall they mentioned that the Zambian water sector is benefiting a lot from the
donor community, for example through DTF, and that the presence of a regulator
makes it easier (gives them confidence) for support from the international community.
The donor funds are channelled through MLGH as a ‘basket fund’ to companies
where it is needed (based on accepted proposals). This system was introduced to
coordinate the funds specifically for the water sector and consequently the
government applies for grants and loans on behalf of companies, indicating
commitment from government (usually required to add certain percentage of funds or
pay back if funds are not utilised), thus encouraging further donations. In essence
these funds are earmarked for CUs to extend their services to areas such as the peri-
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urban. Various elements are taken into consideration during the funding allocation
process, for example, the state of infrastructure, geography of service area, as well as
the regulator’s assessment. The interviewee further alluded that in general, during the
national budget planning, the water sector receives little attention because it has been
proven that they (water sector) find it difficult to quantify their needs and therefore
unable to define realistic investments and as such other sectors with clear plans and
budget gets budget allocations.
Two government officials hinted that there are no subsidies per se for companies or
consumers as part of a social grant, however there are some funds disbursed to
companies as part of the NUWSSP, to serve as counter funding in times of need for
companies. In general the notion of subsidies is not supported because it is believed to
be unsustainable. One interviewee mentioned that the water services should not be
treated any different from other services and that the principle of “you don’t go in the
shop if you do not have money, unless you are a thief” (making reference to illegal
connections) should always apply.
“The regulator is doing a good job” was the most common response to what the
interviewed government officials think of the regulator and the related process. The
regulatory process is seen as independent with strong support from Government
where necessary. In this case, the role of the government was compared to that of “big
brother” in the sense that they take on a neutral role between regulators and
companies. “Water is the business of the state and therefore it is difficult to divorce
the tasks”, however government gives the regulator freedom to operate, though they
appoint two members on the Board, they do not consider government as interfering in
the affairs of the regulator unless specifically requested to do so (for example in cases
of withdrawal of licences).
Government depends on the regulator for information and thus feels that the regulator
is very transparent (scored 5 out of 5) and it makes the decision making process
easier. Furthermore, one interviewee mentioned that the regulator makes use of a
‘bottom-up information feeding approach’ (for example using WWGs as
whistleblowers), which gives all stakeholders a sense of ownership and empowerment
over the resources and services provided.
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In general there is a good working relationship between government and the
respective regulators. These include Environment Council, Water Board (government
body responsible for abstraction and water resources licences), energy and
communication and transport authority as well as NWASCO. All these regulators are
seen to work towards implementation of government policies and more specifically
the water related ones are working towards achieving the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). Currently, government is conducting a study to estimate the costs and
plans of meeting these goals. In this regard, the interviewees mentioned that the
process is “still young” and would eventually expand to include rural areas. One
interviewee mentioned that the strength of the regulator lies in its independence
(financially and in decision making) and this improves the process and service
conditions (aiming for universal service coverage) and subsequently ensures that
quality standards are adhered to.
4.10.3 Perception of service providers on regulatory process
The regulatory process is described as ‘improving’ compared to its inception phase,
by 50% of the service provider interviewees. However, the terms used to describe the
regulator in the process included “over-regulation” and “interfering with company
management operations”. The major reasons for this was reportedly due to unclear
roles and responsibilities and lack of technical staff, which leads to poor
understanding of company operations. “The regulator needs more hands-on people
before they can get hands-on”. One interviewee further mentioned that the regulator
undermines company management, because “they feel like they have the power to just
walk in and do what they want” and therefore effective communication measures
should be developed further, otherwise they strongly felt that the regulator hampers
(“stumbling block”) progress of the company. They further stated that “the regulator
needs to have a better understanding of the utilities before enforcing punitive
measures” (LWSC interviewees, 2008).
Furthermore, the utility interviewees indicated that some of the regulatory tools are
not applicable to the company and need to be tailored for each company, because
company operation conditions are different. For example, some information is
cumbersome and the interviewees do not understand what it is used for. They also felt
that the regulatory system is “imported” and is therefore “out of touch with what is
happening on the ground”. In this case more flexibility is required. The majority of
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the interviewees (60%) mentioned that the benchmarking assessment does not take
into account the different conditions (scope and scale) in which companies operate
and thus needs revision. The regulator needs to “compare like with like”.
On the positive side, the regulator is reportedly impartial (especially from political
interference) with regard to tariff determination process and facilitates/guides the
process quite well (Utility interviewees, 2008). The major advantages of having a
regulator in place are seen by 60% of the interviewees as:
 ensuring improvement of services (upholding quality standards)
 establishing framework of operation and service provision
 protection of consumers interests
 conflict resolution (especially between government and service providers)
All service provider interviewees expressed their excitement about the ‘regulation by
incentive’ initiative that has been introduced. There was unanimous satisfaction
amongst all interviewees about the enforcement and monitoring tools and so far no
companies opposed the claims from the regulator. The regulator was also described as
very resourceful in terms of sharing information and transparent (received an average
score of 4 out of 5). However 40% of the interviewees felt that the regulator should
be instrumental in mobilising funds for the utilities (since lack of investment is the
biggest problem in the water sector) as well as stronger support to providers in debt
recovery efforts from consumers (especially government). Only two interviewees
from both Utilities felt that there are no direct benefits from having a regulator in
place and it is an issue that still needs to be addressed. In contrast, the rest of the
interviewees mentioned that the regulator makes a huge difference in the system
compared to the previous system, where water and sanitation services were provided
by Local Authorities. The efficiency gains are visible. The interviewees further stated
that the only problem with the transition from LAs to CUs was that it was done
without capital investment.
The regulator further has a good reputation in stakeholders’ engagement (including
with consumer groups) including providing/identifying relevant training (Utilities
interviewees, 2008). For example, they initiated the Public Relations Officers and
Chief Executive Officers platforms that takes place every quarter, and forms a
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platform of discussion and learning from each other. For example, the billing system
of KWSC has been a seen as a good example, from which other utilities can benefit.
Other issues of discussion at the fora, include interpretation of the Water Act and its
implementation thereof.
4.10.4 Perception of consumer representatives about regulatory process
Initially all WWG activities were regarded as suspicious and the reactions from
providers were very ‘aggressive’. Thus the providers were very hesitant to provide
information to the group members and cooperation was very poor. The benefits of
having such a group only became apparent after several workshops and meetings, and
since 2004, the providers make active use of the consumer group to spread
information to the consumers (especially during tariff adjustment consultations). In
that sense, acceptance and recognition of their existence was important to carry out
their duties.
In general the opinion of the consumer representatives about the regulatory process
was very good especially the monitoring of progress in peri-urban areas and the
annual reports are very valuable and of good quality. The interviewee feels that the
NWASCO director was described as very reliable and “is not influenced by company
or government politics” when handling cases. He further stated that “all cases receive
equal priority after reaching the regulator” (WWG Interviewee, 2008). The benefit of
having a regulator is reportedly to ensure the rights of beneficiaries are not violated in
a negative way by the service providers and vice versa. The WWG interviewee
further stated that a lot of improvement (because of the regulator) can be seen within
the water sector and this also serves as an additional incentive to be part of the
consumer representative body. However, the interviewee also recommended that the
board selection of NWASCO by the Ministry needs to be reviewed, since it might
give the impression of political interference. Another NGO interviewee indicated
concern about the non-inclusion of community service providers (Water Trusts) in the
regulatory process and feels that this limits the opportunities for motivating and
encouraging community participation in alternative service provision. The interviewee
further suggested that “mechanisms should be put in place to reward CUs that
effectively support community based service providers as a way of encouraging the
CU role in peri-urban areas”. Furthermore, the regulator is seen to interfere with CU
operations, especially with regards to their role through DTF, which gives the
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“impression that they are indirectly controlling the CUs both on operational policies
and support to community based service providers leaving very little room for
innovation”. In some cases the regulator is seen to overstep the boundaries with
regards to developing sanitation policies, which is the mandate of the MLGH.
4.10.5 Perception of consumers regarding the regulatory process
A sizeable majority (74%) of interviewed consumers did not know about WWGs or
NWASCO and therefore could not comment on their efficiency; however they all
agreed that they needed such bodies to “fight” for them.
4.11 Chapter summary
The regulatory processes in England and Zambia are well established and operating to
the satisfaction of the majority of the interviewees. There are a few similarities
between the two country processes as indicated through the perceptions of the
stakeholders. Both regulatory processes are strongly guided by their respective
legislation, which clearly stipulates roles and responsibilities, including procedures
and enforcement tools, which makes the regulators fairly independent and ‘successful’
to a large extent. However, there are several challenges highlighted that need
improvement and consideration within the price-setting processes respectively.
Though a regulatory process is in place, service delivery and efficiency cannot be
guaranteed. The processes are perceived to be transparent and accountable for the
stakeholders involved. Utilities mainly described the process as being ‘over-regulated’
and too much information expectations from the regulators. The utilities in Zambia
performed poorly in financial terms, primarily due to the lack of infrastructural
investment and maintenance of a deteriorated state of service networks. In contrast,
the English water utility focuses on improving innovation to address climate change
challenges and also includes subsidies for their ‘vulnerable’ consumers. The consumer
representation processes as part of the regulatory process, were seen as very valuable
and improves transparency within the system. Interestingly, the consumers of both
case countries, were not aware of the processes, though many were satisfied with the
services provided and payment for services were considered as reasonable and
affordable for the majority of consumers.
The experiences from the two cases, further highlights the complex process of
decision-making and balancing the four major conflicts (authority, cognitive, value
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and interest) as indicated in the literature. Hence the importance of accurate
information (especially financial and operating statistics) and transparency required in
price-setting processes to address principal-agent challenges within regulatory
frameworks cannot be overemphasised.
“Learn from the ‘mistakes’ of others”. John Luther
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Chapter 5: Namibia: a water-stressed country with a
highly skewed income distribution
This chapter provides results from the fieldwork conducted in Namibia, in terms of
the relevant policies to price-setting process; resource and service availability; costs of
service provision; affordability of services and the perceptions of stakeholders about a
proposed regulatory system in Namibia for the water sector, all within the context of
the principal-agent challenge. The results presented in this chapter were obtained from
semi-structured interviews as well as secondary data and reports. The interview data
reflect the perceptions of a total number of 109 individuals representing 18
organisations interviewed over the periods April-June 2007 and October-December
2008.
5.1 Institutions, Roles and Relationships
The Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry (MAWF) and Ministry of Regional
Local Government and Housing and Rural Development (MRLGHRD) are the
primary government institutions dealing with the price-setting process in the water
sector. These ministries’ hierarchy devolves to the level of divisions responsible for
specific functions, while taking the overall coordination roles (Figure 5-1). During the
fieldwork, it was difficult to determine which divisions are specifically responsible for
the tariff-setting process, since it appears that all divisions have a role to play, to some
extent. Coordination between divisions and directorates is missing to a level where
internally the roles are not clear as to which division is responsible for which aspect.
The sanitation function was recently (last year) moved from the Ministry of Health
and Social Services in recognition of the strong link between water and sanitation
issues. However, the emphasis is more on rural sanitation than on urban sanitation. In
response to this need, a Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) committee, with a special
focus on water and sanitation, has been established by the City of Windhoek,
consisting of various City departments (sustainable development, community
development, environment, health, bulk water and solid waste), and it is mainly
responsible for equitable water and sanitation for Windhoek residents, with special
emphasis on informal settlement areas. Within informal settlements, the City, through
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WATSAN, facilitates a process of establishing community organisations, which
consist of community leaders/chairpersons, vice-chairpersons, treasurers, secretaries
and additional members, with the exact composition depending on the specific
community. The community organisations are formed to represent the consumers
living within a certain settlement area (mostly where communal services are in place)
and to ensure that the municipal bills (in many cases only water bills) are paid and
other needs of the community are addressed adequately, through regular meetings and
feedback session with either the community or City officials. The committee members
are elected every two years. Similarly there is a Rates and Tax payers association,
which represents formal households in the central business district on various issues,
including water and sanitation services. However, the research found that social
welfare services were treated separately, in the Ministry of Health and Social
Services, from the issues of water and the research observed little to no coordination
between these ministries with regard to water and sanitation services and price-setting
processes.
Figure 5-1 Institutional hierarchy of water sector principal ministries and service providers. Note:
There are several other institutions in-directly involved in the urban water price-setting process, but for the purposes of the study,
only the major players are highlighted in illustration. Source: Researcher’s synthesis from information gathered.
For the purposes of this investigation, the various roles and responsibilities in the
water sector were divided into categories directly linked to price-setting, service
provision and monitoring. Table 5-1 indicates the various institutions that are directly
Chapter 5: Namibia: a water stressed country with a highly skewed income distribution
158
involved in urban water sector management, in particular price-setting and related
activities, according to stakeholder perceptions gained from the interviews.
Table 5-1 Perceived institutional activities and responsibilities in the urban water sector
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Ministry of Agriculture,
Water and Forestry (MAWF)
-Department of Water
Affairs
X X I I
Ministry of Regional and
Local Government and
Housing and Rural
Development (MRLGHRD)
X I
NamWater
(Bulk Water)
O I X X X X
Local Authorities I X X X X
Communities/Consumers
(Community Management
committees)
O I O
Non-governmental
organisations (NGOs)
I O O
Private sector O O
Regional Councils I
Key: Perceived responsible (X), Perceived Involvement (I), Perceived Interest (O). Source: Matrix
adapted from Franceys, (2006). Contents from results obtained in April-June 2007, Windhoek,
Namibia.
Table 5-1 indicates that the providers are involved in self-regulation, since they are
primarily setting their own tariffs, monitoring themselves as well as assessing their
own performance. The various ministries shown are legally responsible for the
indicated activities, though from the interviews a sense of involvement was revealed
instead. For example, the interviews revealed a widespread perception that the local
authority tariffs are always approved by the government as proposed, without enquiry
or investigation from the responsible ministry. Many of the people interviewed
attributed this to the fact that the local authority contributes 5% of their income to
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sustain the Regional Councillor’s operations, a financial tie which is thought to result
in the tariffs never being questioned. This was often the reason given to explain why
no provision (or no special arrangements) is made to supply the urban poor with water
and sanitation services. Interviewees felt that it was the responsibility of the
Government to subsidise those who cannot afford to pay for these services.
Government officials, on the other hand, often felt that the local authority is
responsible for subsidising urban poor “since they make so much profit from water
supply services”.
Non Governmental Organisations are primarily involved in capacity building and
awareness raising initiatives, however those NGO members interviewed (22%) noted
that they have never been involved in the price-setting process and only have input to
general water conservation and management activities. They all mentioned that it
would be ideal to participate in price-setting.
Regional Councillors are political officials appointed to govern various constituencies
(ten) within Windhoek, by ensuring that living condition standards (most specifically
social welfare) are upheld and that the needs of residents are catered for respectively.
The Regional councillor responsibilities and involvement were perceived differently
by various stakeholders, ranging from political interests to no involvement or
interaction with consumers on water related issues. Similarly, the role of the private
sector in water and sanitation and more specifically the price-setting process was
perceived to be very limited or non-existent by the majority of interviewees (76% out
of 74).
Overall, no clear perceived linkages between the various institutions and organisations
in the interview results were observed. It seems that the organisations involved
operate in isolation and exchange information only on a need-to-know basis. Many of
the interviewees in the provider category (59% out of 18) mentioned that the lack of
communication might be due to a lack of clear price-setting policies or guidelines.
Stakeholder involvement was deemed very important for understanding and
transparency of the tariff determination process. The rest were of the opinion that the
tariff-setting process is very technical and need not to include all stakeholders;
suggesting that the involved organisations should select representatives which they
feel are most suitable to determine these tariffs.
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5.2 Providing water and sanitation services
The water supply and distribution function in Namibia is sensitive, in the sense that it
is done in two-parts. Firstly by the bulk water supplier, NamWater to the Local
Authorities (municipalities) (Figure 5-2), Village Councils, Mines and Industries and
private consumers and secondly, these recipients further supplies water to the end
users, where applicable. Currently there are 244 bulk water supply points which are
located in 10 areas and 3 regions (DWA, 2007). This study is focused only on the
Central region; thus it mainly makes reference to Khomas water supply region, since
that is the origin of city of Windhoek’s water supply. The City of Windhoek
(municipality) is responsible for water supply and sewerage disposal to Windhoek,
with a population of 250 000 residents (Du Pisani, 2006:80).
Figure 5-2 Bulk water supply sources to Windhoek. Note: NGWRP- New Goreangab Water
Reclamation Plant; OGWRP-Old Goreangab Water Reclamation Plant. Source: (Van der Merwe,
2000 as cited by Lahnsteiner and Lempert, 2007:442)
Windhoek’s available water resources (NamWater, boreholes and reclamation) totals
22.2 Mm3 per annum, based on 95% reliability from dams (Van der Merwe, 1998:10-
3). Figure 5-2 is an indication of the distribution of these resources to consumers. As
a result of regular droughts, reuse of municipal waste water was found to be the best
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alternative source of water to meet the City’s growing demand. In this regard,
Namibia’s wastewater treatment is renowned for its treatment plant and is used an
exemplary model for many countries. Public acceptance for drinking reclaimed water
is high based on well designed education programmes and indication of good quality
water with no evidence of health related impacts. It is further reported that the Cities’
population takes pride in being known as the only City making use of direct potable
water reuse worldwide (Lahnsteiner and Lempert, 2007:447).
5.2.1 NamWater
NamWater is expected by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry to account
for costs at each of their schemes, so that any tariff adjustment can be approved. The
government officials interviewed from the MAWF (33% of 9) revealed that due to the
inability of NamWater to calculate their costs per scheme in a transparent manner, the
2007/2008 tariff adjustment proposal for a 10% increase across all schemes has not
yet been approved.
NamWater was given the infrastructure (much of it reportedly to be more than 50
years old) at book value and the replacement value of assets amounted to
approximately N$ 3-4 Billion (PPP US$ 1-1.4 Billion) at the time of the transfer from
the Government to the company. Government is the main shareholder of NamWater,
and does not require payment of dividends or tax (Government interviewee, April
2007). An interviewee from NamWater further mentioned that when NamWater took
over bulk water supply operations from Government the tariff was far below any cost-
recovery level, which severely affected the viability of the company (Figure 5-7).
Hence they have been subsidised by government, with N$ 20 Million (PPP US$ 7
Million) given over a 5 year period.
In order to understand the financial position of the bulk water supplier as it relate to
possible tariffs for bulk water supplied to the City of Windhoek as distributor, the
researcher collected the annual financial statements of NamWater for analysis. This
process was not straightforward as the financial statements were not readily available.
The researcher was able to collect Annual Reports of 1998-2006, and has been
informed that reports from 2007 and 2008 have yet to be published and made
available in the public domain. The Company web-site does not provide much
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information on cost elements of providing the service, and needless to say, on the
price charged for the services.
The financial performance of the main service provider was then assessed to
investigate the costs involved in providing water and sanitation services and
consequently to consider the extent to which tariff determination is based upon
financial analysis are subsequently the affordability of services to consumers at all
levels, especially the urban poor. Costs estimates and prices are converted to 2008
real values with a US dollar figure given (at Purchasing Power Parity, (PPP US$))
given for international readers. A summary of the financial statements can be seen in
Appendix H.
A common measure of efficiency of a company is the debt collection period as a share
of annual revenue. In this regard, in 2005, the NamWater reported 62% doubtful
recovery of debt, with only 29% certain recovery, out of a total outstanding debt of
N$ 111.6 million (PPP US$ 26 million) (Figure 5-3) (NamWater, 2005: 15).
Mines and Industries
10%
Private consumers
7%Municipalities
19%
Councils
39%
RW committees
16%
Ministries
9%
Figure 5-3 Total outstanding debt of N$111.6 million (PPP US$ 26 million) distributed according
to customer type. Source: (NamWater, 2005: 15).
However, calculations of collection ratios indicated a different picture, for that same
year (2005). The average debt collection ratio (Figure 5-4) shows an improvement in
2005/6, reducing significantly from 90 days to 50 days. A possible explanation is that
recovery from local authorities was high, as opposed to government institutions,
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which even if they do not pay their bills cannot be denied access to services. These
include government institutions such as health and defence related for example.
Though there is a gap between the debtors and creditors collection period, it indicates
that the credit rating of NamWater is relatively good, following the trend of debtor’s
payments.
Figure 5-4 NamWater’s debtor and creditor collection ratios. . Top dotted line (top) represent the
generally accepted standard for creditors days, while bottom (blue) represents the acceptable
standard for debtor days. Source: Author’s calculations from Annual Reports
NamWater reportedly have no debt management policy in place yet (they are
supposedly in the process of drafting one), hence there are no enforcement
mechanisms in place for payment of water services provided. This forms a major
contributing factor as to why NamWater is currently facing significant problems with
debt recovery; hence their need to make use of a scheme based cross-subsidisation
policy, to subsidise those schemes where payment is not forthcoming (NamWater
interviewee, April 2007).
The operating ratio (Figure 5-5) further indicates that the operating expenses exceed
the income; however, the company is still able to recover its operating costs from
annual revenue, but is not recovering capital costs. In this respect, the company is not
making full use of their fixed assets and indicates a concern for capacity utilisation.
Operating costs increased in 2004, reportedly due to major maintenance projects, for
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example the rehabilitation of the Ombalantu scheme and the building of the pipeline
bypass on the Windhoek-Von Bach scheme. It is not clear whether these investments
should be seen as capital maintenance funded through depreciation rather than as
operating costs. A clear indication of the challenges of price-setting. If these, and
other similar investments, were stripped out of the operating costs the resulting return
on capital can be seen in Figure 5-7.
Figure 5-5 Operating and Fixed Assets turnover ratios. Dotted lines indicate generally accepted
levels below which the operator recovers both operating and capital costs. Source: Author’s
calculations from Annual Reports.
Closer investigation reveals that the biggest ambiguity of the financial data lies with
the operating expenses. The costs items, such as administrative expenses and other
operational expenses are not explained or differentiated in financial notes.
Furthermore, as from 2002, the operating expenses were labelled as ‘expenses’, in
addition to administrative and other operational expenses. Furthermore, no entries for
the cost of sales were done from 2002, hence the researcher assumes that these
‘expenses’ item could be used interchangeably for costs of sales.
The trend of fixed assets, converted to 2008 real values, shows a general decline,
indicating that the company is not investing in that regard. However the revenue
generated (considering the fixed asset turnover ratio in Figure 5-5) is enough to
indicate a positive fixed asset trend. Also noteworthy (from other further calculations)
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is the decline in long-term liabilities, indicating perhaps an excess of cash return
which is being used to avoid on-going borrowing to finance this capital intensive
business.
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Figure 5-6 Trend of Gross and Net profit margins of NamWater over period of years. Source:
Author’s calculations from Annual reports.
In general the profitability ratios show considerable fluctuations across the various
years, with significant losses in 2002 and 2004, followed by a steady recovery in
2005. Profitability ratios (Net Profit Margins, Figure 5-6 and Return on Capital
Employed (ROCE), Figure 5-7), were calculated to understand the viability of the
company. In this regard, the company targets a significant profitability ratio of 12% as
part of their corporate strategic goals (NamWater, 2005: 4). However, they were not
able to meet this target until the 2006/2007 financial year. The ratios follow similar
trends, though raises different causes of concern. The calculated Net profit margin
indicates the financial sustainability of operations, reflecting the ability of the
company to maintain service quality levels. On the other hand, the ROCE, reflects the
financial stability of the company, which raises the concern of tariffs not being cost-
reflective and therefore there is need for capital management to be able to recover
capital costs as well as operation costs.
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Figure 5-7 Profitability ratio- Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) of NamWater over a period
of 9 years. The dotted lines represent a generally accepted cost of capital for lower-income
economies of between 6-8%. Source: Author’s calculations from Annual reports.
Further calculations show a decrease in operation, maintenance costs capital charges
which could explain some of the concerns expressed by government officials about
maintaining the system. It may equally indicate the use of historical accounting
procedures for a capital intensive business when current cost accounting needs to be
used to ensure an appropriate level of capital charges that is capital maintenance
charges/depreciation. This would also take inflationary changes into account.
The major cost components (Figure 5-8) of the water supply budget (excluding
overhead costs) were reportedly depreciation, indicating NamWater’s commitment to
long-term infrastructure sustainability, and electricity-related costs. This was
confirmed with financial calculations, although not as high as reported during the
interviews. Calculations indicate depreciation as a component of costs at 25% for
2006. The difference in figures could be attributed to different reporting periods (2006
and 2008).
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Figure 5-8 Cost components of NamWater (Bulk Water Supplier) water supply budget
(excluding overhead costs). Source: (Matros-Goreses and Franceys, 2008: 351)
From the interviews, the biggest concerns expressed by government officials
overseeing the tariff-setting process were lack of transparency and clarity of
depreciation charges (as a major cost element). Furthermore, the government
stakeholders indicated that it is not clear what the depreciation costs are used for since
replacement or capital maintenance costs are not corresponding accordingly.
The NamWater tariffs are basically determined by using a cost allocation model.
These cost components are prepared through a computerised software; System
Application Process (SAP) (ever since 2005), which records costs and revenue for
different supply schemes. The costs are normally divided into direct costs, overheads
and indirect costs, according to the SAP programme. Cross-subsidisation across
schemes is used to ensure all schemes are financed appropriately to deliver the
required services. Profits (if made at all) are reportedly spent on maintenance of
infrastructure and the purification process. In this regard, a section of the NamWater
Act was cited, which indicates that the company is allowed to make profits (contrary
to popular belief and the opinion of government officials): “the corporation shall be
entitled to capitalise such portion of its profits….for financing of future capital
works”….. “establish and operate…reserve funds…” (Government Gazette 1997: 21).
It is a normal process for such an entity to use retained earnings to finance future
investment, often being cheaper in the long-run than borrowing. However, the price-
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setting process has to ensure that this is undertaken with proportionality such that this
generation’s consumers are not over-paying for the next generation’s consumption.
This is one of the major challenges of price-setting.
In this context, a major issue highlighted by government officials is that they fail to
understand why NamWater is unable to indicate how the company calculates its
tariffs. The tariff calculation of NamWater has been different for every tariff
submitted for approval to the MAWF since its inception. Official records (DWA,
2007) show that in 1998, tariffs were calculated based on full cost-recovery,
complemented with subsidies from the Government. The tariff calculations for
subsequent years are unknown to Government officials, which is why no tariff
approvals have been agreed recently and reportedly will not be agreed until issues
such as these are sorted out (Government interviewee, October 2008, Windhoek). The
‘principal’ is saying that the ‘agent’ has to explain more of its workings.
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Figure 5-9 National bulk water tariff % increases over past years in comparison to inflation rate
changes. Source: author’s analysis of (DWA, 2007) and Government Gazettes, June 1998- March
2005.
To indicate, the affordability levels of the tariffs (keeping in mind that these are bulk
water tariffs, which are used for the first block of the tariff structure of the City of
Windhoek), it was compared with inflation rate changes, based on the NamWater
strategic framework which stipulates that the target for achieving affordability is that
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is should be benchmarked with inflation. There is no correlation between the two
parameters, though it gives an indication that the tariffs were above inflation, which
raises concerns in terms of affordability issues. Further analysis of the price increases
over the past decade indicate that there has been an overall price rise of 16%
(Appendix I) relative to a consumer price index value of inflation of 5% (CBS, 2007).
This could be a reflection of the skewed income distribution and hence indicates that
government should consider subsidisation as part of public service obligations.
Subsidisation in this case can be done through encouraging differentiated tariff
charges per locations (since locations are based on income levels), however first the
tariff calculations should be clarified.
Information required for any external check or assessment of tariff calculations
(specifically the quantity of water quantity) could not always be obtained from the
annual reports, except for 2005, 2006 years.
For those years approximate tariffs were calculated based upon various cost elements
and the total revenue required compared with water supplied (Table 5-2).
Table 5-2 NamWater Tariff calculations based on cost elements for 2005 and 2006.
Cost elements 2005 2006
Operating expenses [PPP
US$’000]
47, 501 51, 798
Depreciation charges [PPP
US$’000]
18, 395 17, 412
Cost of capital [12 % of Net
investment]
33, 207 33, 475
Total Revenue Requirement [add
all above ]
99, 103 102, 685
Potable Water supplied [m3’ 000] 70, 001 67, 280
Tariff 1, 42 1, 53
Note: Equation used for tariff calculation: Tariff = [OPEX+ depreciation + capital costs + tax]/Volume
water supplied. Source: Author’s calculations.
The tariffs calculated for these years using this methodology were in close correlation
with the average tariffs being charged, as obtained from official gazetted information
(which were PPP US$ 1,20 and 1, 27 for 2005 and 2006 respectively. This indicates
that information is available to derive at approximate tariffs, hence the problem could
be with the accuracy of tariff equations or the specific cost elements used for the
calculations. Further calculations and interpretation of financial notes from annual
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reports indicate that cost of capital is primarily on interest paid on operations rather
that on fixed assets, since they inherited the majority of fixed assets from government.
A further observation is made that, as NamWater is a bulk water supplier, no
allowance has been made for leakage as any leakage in transmission mains tends to be
very visible and quickly fixed. This assumption has to be further investigated.
In response to the lack of clarity in the tariff calculations, NamWater interviewees
mentioned that the NamWater Act is does not specifically define ‘full cost-recovery’
and hence that term is open to various interpretations. Their interpretation includes a
wide range of issues and is based on historical cost calculations. Water is reportedly,
treated as a political issue and there is a misconception of water supply costs, which is
why the tariff for 2007/2008 has not yet been approved.
In 2008, according to a NamWater interviewee, the company was granted an
inflationary increase of 6.9% in April; however due to poor communication, this
information was not shared with the company until September 2008, and in this
regard, government paid N$26 million (PPP US$5 million) to the company to make
up for the loss. Tariffs have still not been increased to the requested average of 8%
(12% urban areas and 6% in rural), pending the approval of a study seconded by
government (committee on tariff determination in consultation with private
consultants) on principles and methodology to calculate costs and tariffs by
NamWater.
In addition, during interviews with NamWater officials, reference was made to a
strategic business plan (in the drafting stage) for the next five years, which would
include 5 year projections of tariffs as well as benchmarking processes for comparison
with other SADC countries. Indicators will be used for performance management
using a balanced score card with objectives, measures, targets and initiatives. The
cornerstones are people learning (human resource); estimated water consumption
(which includes compliance, unaccounted for water, sales meters (accuracy of
meters); scheduled maintenance (total maintenance); compliance water quality
maintenance (bacteriological), customer satisfaction (bulk customer agreement) and
days of collecting outstanding payments.
The type of information required (based on consumer and consumer representatives
interviews) to make the price-setting more transparent is focused mainly on
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operational expenses and capital charges. The research found this area to be the most
fussy, unclear and inconsistently presented in the financial statements. Further
calculations from the financials also indicated an inverse relationship between
employee numbers and salaries expenses. The biggest challenge for the researcher
was to get an idea on domestic costs of services, since the accounts provided included
all sectors (mining, irrigation and potable water supply). The research also recognises
that national accounting procedures are followed for annual reporting, which does not
allow accounting separation (only revenue was differentiated per sectors, but not for
costs); however it is critical to have annual reports that enable consumers to
understand (easily) how tariffs are calculated. Hence, the information required in
context of proportion to expenses of service provision includes:
 Salaries of senior management (as well as board member allowances)
 Impact of services on household bills (average) in comparison to inflation
 Unaccounted for water in comparison to volumes of water produced and
consumed
 Tariff calculations and tariffs in comparison to costs, to indicate the
relationship in terms of full cost recovery.
Other non-financial information, but equally important for consumers to know
includes:
 Roles (related qualifications) of board members (including
election/nomination procedures)
 Company staff composition
It should be noted that this level of detailed company information (and much more) is
available and accessible to the public in England. This level of information was
reportedly available from Zambian companies, but could not be accessed during the
fieldwork or any follow-up attempts. Access to this level of financial information has
to be the starting point for any external stakeholder understanding of the
reasonableness, or otherwise, of water tariffs.
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5.2.2 City of Windhoek services
As already described, NamWater supplies bulk water to the City of Windhoek for
distribution to customers. The city council of Windhoek is responsible for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the distribution system along with
associated billing.
The water charging system, used by the City of Windhoek, is based on an increasing
block tariff (City officials, 2008), (Table 5-3). The system was described as consisting
of a basic charge depending on the diameter of the meter inlet, as well as a volumetric
charge which is added according to usage. The first block of the tariff system is
charged at the NamWater bulk water tariff with no distribution costs added. The City
is therefore subsidising this first 6 m3 per month of water to domestic consumers, a
valuable subsidy particularly to low-income users). The third block is referred to as
the penal block, targeting the high water consumption users, and is basically the block
that is used to recover costs from basic charges not paid for by other customers. Thus
it provides the majority of the cross-subsidisation amongst consumers. However this
block is also the conservation block which serves to encourage users to use less water.
In addition, a one-off connection fee is charged, which applies to all water users,
except for low-income users accessing water through pre-paid meters.
The commercial and industrial tariff (non-domestic) water users are charged a flat rate
as well as a percentage, an additional charge which is used as a cross-subsidisation
tool. The low-income domestic water users are charged a flat tariff (with no basic
charges) for communal taps. All taps (including communal taps) are metered, and the
City is currently using pre-paid water meters in some informal areas and is
considering extending this system more widely (based on requests from the residents)
mainly due to delays or non-payment for water services. Currently the piloted pre-
paid meters are adapted from the Netherlands (tag meter system). The challenge with
these meters is maintenance, which needs to be addressed before the system can be
fully implemented. The estimated cost for pre-paid meters for the City, according to
an interviewed City official, is approximately N$ 2500 (PPP US$ 585) per tap.
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Table 5-3 Tariff structure with tariffs charged over the years.
Tariff structure Tariff (N$) per Kilolitre [PPP US$]
Domestic (m3) 2002/
03
2003/
04
2004/
05
2005/
06
2006/
07
2007/
08
2008
/09
0-6 3.97
[0.92]
4.17
[0.97]
4.75
[1.11]
5.22
[1.22]
5.75
[1.27]
6.27
[1.31]
6.27
[1.21]
6-45 6.61
[1.53]
6.94
[1.62]
7.91
[1.84]
8.70
[2.04]
9.57
[2.12]
10.43
[2.17]
10.43
[2.01]
>45 12.17
[2.81]
12.78
[3.00]
14.57
[3.40]
16.02
[3.75]
17.62
[3.91]
19.21
[4.00]
19.21
[3.71]
Non-domestic* 12.73
[2.65]
12.73
[2.46]
Communal water points 6.61
[1.53]
6.94
[1.62]
7.91
[1.84]
8.70
[2.04]
9.57
[2.12]
10.43
[2.17]
10.43
[2.01]
* figures include VAT. Source: Tariff Booklets, 2002-2008 of City of Windhoek.
The tariff structure makes provision for “times of limited availability” of water where
the volume of water allowed for in each block is reduced, charged at the same tariff.
According to one City official, the tariffs are not beneficial to the urban poor, in the
sense that they are paying more per cubic meter of water, because the poor use very
limited volumes of water. The interviewee further mentioned that, ideally, the first
10% of water should be given free as basic services; however the city has to recover
its costs and therefore is not in a position to subsidise water to the domestic sector. “It
should be government responsibility”, he noted.
The main sources of income for municipalities are rates and taxes, electricity and
water services. Water constituted 21% of the City’s income in 2006. However, with
the introduction (in 2002) of Regional Electricity Districts (REDs), income from
electricity was lost. This means that, reportedly, water prices will have to increase to
make up for the gap in income (City official, 2008).
Financial analysis could not be undertaken for the City of Windhoek’s water
distribution costs for this research, since it was impossible to obtain financial
statements for water specific activities only. The financial statements that could be
obtained include for all municipal services with no breakdowns for the various
sectors. The researcher’s approach was to investigate from a civil society point of
view and thus if it is not possible to determine relevant information at this level, then
it will also not be possible for any member of the public to access these figures and to
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understand the costs of water supply. Hence it is not at all clear how the City
determines their water tariffs.
Nevertheless, interviewees from the City (22% of 13) indicated that the City of
Windhoek is operating on a 90% recovery rate based on the capital charge from basic
charges. Another interviewee indicated that the City is recovering 103% of its debt
collection (possible through recovering past outstanding debts). Approximately 42%
of the customers are reportedly paying at 120 day recovery rate but in more affluent
areas payment is recovered within 30 days. The official view (DWA, 2006) is that
“Windhoek’s water revenues are reported to have exceeded their supply costs by 11%,
with an average user charge per m3 of N$7.34 (PPP US$ 1.84) and costs of N$6.59
(PPP US$ 1.65) in 2001/02”. As a consequence, according to (DWA, 2006)
households pay 23% more than the cost of their water to make provision for subsidies
to some manufacturing and service industries as well as low-income households.
These figures could not be confirmed during interviews. The researcher was given the
sense that it was ‘classified’ information. To be subsidising manufacturing and service
industries, in addition to low-income consumers, would be a significant departure
from normal practice.
The City is also responsible for sewerage services, and uses a tariff system that is
based on the size of land occupied (Table 5-4). There is a flat rate system that applies
to low-income area occupants and those making use of communal toilets in informal
areas of the city, who are not paying for these services yet.
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Table 5-4 Sewerage tariffs charged over the years.
Tariff structure Tariff (N$)
Domestic (erf size) 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008 /09
<400m2 46.74
[10.90]
- 44.99
[9.98]
50.39
[10.50]
56.84
[10.97]
>400m2<899m2 56.08
[13.07]
- 53.99
[11.97]
60.47
[12.60]
68.21
[13.17]
>899m2 59.20
[13.80]
- 64.77
[14.36]
72.54
[15.11]
81.83
[15.70]
With swimming bath +1m - 68.38
[15.16]
76.59
[16.00]
86.39
[16.68]
Low-income areas (Katutura) 5.76
[1.34]
- 6.66
[1.48]
7.46
[1.55]
8.41
[1.62]
Note: Figures for 2005/06 were unobtainable. Source: Tariff booklets, City of Windhoek.
The same information requirements as outlined for NamWater apply to the City of
Windhoek. This level of information is even more critical for the City to reveal, since
they directly supply the services to consumers. The research found that NamWater
information was easier to access than the municipal information, indicating the need
for higher level of transparency for the municipal price-setting process. A newspaper
article (25 July 2009), stated that the City of Windhoek increased their tariffs, while
NamWater had no tariff increment since 2006. The proposed increments tariffs were
indicated as follows: low-income households, 11.85%, middle-income 12.04% and
high-income 11.58%. This indicates the need for more transparent price-setting
system to justify tariff calculations and hence enhance consumer trust in service
providers.
5.3 Affordability of water and sanitation services
Unemployment was described by community committee members as a huge problem
prevalent in informal settlements in Windhoek. Domestic and industry-related work
forms major part of the income source for these residents. For example, the average
monthly income is N$ 300-500 (PPP US$ 63-104) and N$ 500-1500 (PPP US$ 104-
313) (Table 5-5) for informal areas visited, placing them within development level 1
and 2 of the Upgrading and Development strategy of the City of Windhoek (Table
1-1) accordingly. The leadership committee members interviewed (66% out of 18)
confirmed that it was difficult to obtain payment for water services from all the
residents and that they have huge outstanding debts with the municipality.
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In areas with high debt the community development officers from the City of
Windhoek facilitate the process of identifying an amount payable per month to
incorporate the arrears payments as well. In general, the communities interviewed are
paying between N$ 20-39 (PPP US$ 3.86-7.53) per household per month
(Freedomland A, Havana and Greenwell Matonga) for their water bill. The
interviewees explained that the arrears are mostly due to relocation of some members
away from the area and thus the bill remains high, with fewer people to pay for it. For
example, the arrears bill in Freedomland A used to be N$ 22 000 (PPP US$ 5,125),
shared between about 150 households at average N$25 (PPP US$ 6) monthly
payments but has decreased to about N$ 9000 (PPP US$ 2,108) over a period of 2
years (2005-2007). There are other expenses that are also deducted before the water
bill is paid such as N$ 200 (PPP US$ 42) for the treasurer to collect fees; N$ 200
(PPP US$ 42) for the community leader to clean toilets and N$ 25.30 (PPP US$ 5.27)
for receipt book.
There is a strong sense of support within the community and thus if some members of
the community cannot afford to pay they make arrangements with the leadership to
pay either in kind or by doing odd jobs in the area. In this regard, the leadership
hardly denies people access for water, because of non-payment. For control and
saving purposes, the water points are open between 08:00-13:00 and 16:00-19:00. An
estimate of 25 litres per day per household is collected for general domestic purposes,
while those selling the local beer collect up to 8 times per day. In extreme cases where
the community members do not pay for their contributions towards the water bill (by
the 15th of every month), water gets cut-off until payment is received by the
community committee. The community in Freedomland A has reportedly had their
water cut off at least 6 times since Independence (1990).
The community leadership structure feels that it is unfair to those who pay, when the
water gets cut-off, therefore they prefer the pre-paid meter system (which the
municipality claims they can only get once their arrears are cleared). For example in
Havana they have only 2 communal taps for supply to 219 households, supplemented
by pre-paid taps next to every toilet (77 toilets, of which 33 are flush toilets). This
gives an opportunity for those that do not want to share communal bills to buy their
own water with the pre-paid cards. However, there is no control over the system and
some people use both the communal and pre-paid taps depending on availability of
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funds. The community leader predicted that the communal taps will gradually fade
out, so people will start getting used to idea of pre-paid taps (Photograph 5). Pre-paid
meters were identified as the best option for informal areas by most people (even
though some complained about the frequent breakage of some of the pre-paid taps).
However, this majority opinion changed in 2008 (second visit), since the majority of
taps were not in working condition at that time. One community leader indicated that
prepaid meters require high security (against vandalism) and thus they are not
advisable in certain areas.
Photograph 5 Communal tap with water borne toilets (left). People collecting water from a
prepaid meter (right). Source: R. Franceys. Windhoek, 2007
It was toilet facilities (the lack thereof) that most people mentioned to be a problem.
The community is currently not paying for toilets, but they were informed by City
officials that once relocation process is done, that it will become part of the lease fees.
In Havana people are already allocated land and are paying a lease payment of N$ 29
(PPP US$ 6) per month per household in addition to the water bill. Many (78 %)
people interviewed prefer the flush toilets because they feel the dry latrines require
too much maintenance and work. Similarly, the Namibian government is promoting
waterborne sewers, which, in the opinion of NGO representatives interviewed, are not
feasible in a water scarce country such as Namibia and which send the wrong signal to
consumers. In fact, they reckon that “dry toilets are the answer for informal areas,
especially since people cannot even afford to pay their water bills”. In this regard, the
Habitat Research and Development Centre in Namibia is currently investigating
various options of toilets for low-income groups. There are 6 different types that are
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being tested (in various parts of Namibia), including Jo-Jo; enviro-loos, composting
loos, urine diverter, vacuum systems and Otji-toilet (named derived from a town in
Namibia where these were first piloted, Otjiwarongo). The pilot projects are in
different stages and no results are yet available, however the enviro-loo and VIPs are
mostly used in Windhoek. The enviro-loo is most preferred; if designed and built
properly it only needs cleaning once a year.
The estimated costs (according to interviewee) of these dry systems vary from N$
1,000-4,000 (PPP US$ 208-833) per facility. The City of Windhoek has estimated (as
part of a long term solution) that the cost of installing waterborne sewers would be N$
8,200 (PPP US$ 1,708) per unit. Appendix J indicate the costs implications for
installing these systems, with either 5 or 10 households sharing a facility, based on the
toilet need currently evident in informal areas. The current budgeted amount for
toilets according to the Upgrading and Development strategy is a meagre amount of
N$ 100,000 (PPP US$ 20,833) for the city for a year, which needs to be reviewed if
proper sanitation standards are to be followed in these areas (WATSAN, 2007).
The perceptions from high-income users were that of ignorance. The interviewees in
some cases indicated that they do not know how much they are paying for services,
but indicated that they were satisfied with “high” quality of services. The middle-
income group had the opposite opinion in terms of price, and indicated that the bills
are too high.
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Table 5-5 Prices of water and sanitation services in various visited informal settlements and income levels (after tax deductions) in Windhoek
Area Number of
respondents
Services available Average Income
level(N$)
Average Income level
(PPP US$
Average Price(N$) for
water bills
Average Price (PPP
US$) for water bills
Low-income
Greenwell Matonga C 14 Communal taps and Shared flush toilets 700 135 25-35 5-7
Okahandja Park A 5 Communal taps and Shared flush toilets 1, 000 193 30 6
7de laan 4 Communal taps and Shared flush toilets 1, 000 193 78* 15
Kapuka A 2 Communal taps and Bush 800 154 20 4
Onyika 2 6 Communal taps and Bush 800 154 15-20 3-4
Freedom land A 3 Communal taps and Shared VIPs 1,500 290 20-39 4-8
Havana Proper 2 Communal taps, Pre-paid meters, Shared VIPs,
Shared flush toilets
1,000 193 20-39 4-8
Build-together group:
New Hope, Dipasen,
Tulipamwe
7 Taps in yards and Toilets (waterborne) in yards 1,500 290 35 7
Middle income
Khomasdal (Extension 8) 3 Full in house services 3, 500 676 200-250 39-48
Katutura (luxury hill) 1 Full in house services 6, 000 1, 158 200-250 39-48
Dorado Park 2 Full in house services 8, 000 1, 544 200-350 39-68
Cimbebasia 2 Full in house services 6,000 1, 158 200-300 39-58
Acacia 2 Full in house services 15, 000 2, 896 300-350 58-68
High income
Suiderhoff 2 Full in house services 20, 000 3, 861 350-400 68-77
Kleine Kuppe 1 Full in house services 25, 000 4, 826 400-500 77-97
Eros 1 Full in house services 20, 000 3, 861 300-400 58-77
Source: Interviews conducted in April-June 2007 and October-December 2008, Windhoek, Namibia. *this figure includes rates and taxes.
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In informal areas, the taps and toilets share the same meter and thus the water bill
includes water used for flushing of toilet as well (if excreta disposal is waterborne).
The majority (65%) of residents interviewed in informal areas indicated their
contentment with services provided, and added that in most cases these services are
much better (24 hours, 7 days a week) compared to where they originally came from
(mostly rural northern areas in Namibia). However there were the odd few (17%) that
mentioned that they prefer taps in their yards and not communal facilities. Overall
people understood the reasons for payment for services and thus also indicated that
the prices were reasonable, though 33% of the committee members interviewed
thought that water services are too expensive.
Another government official indicated that government does not have appropriate
subsidy mechanisms in place to support ‘vulnerable’ groups that cannot afford basic
services. However various studies are being undertaken (2008/2009) to address these
issues as well as to develop corresponding subsidy (urban and rural) policies. The
challenge highlighted by the interviewee is to define ‘vulnerable classes’ and
mechanisms for access to subsidies. Service provider and government interviewees
(55%) were sceptical towards any emphasis on the urban poor, because they felt that
people are selective when it comes to payment for certain services, in the sense that
the majority of the ‘urban poor’ can afford to have cell phones, and abuse alcohol
which is much more expensive than water services - however when it comes to
payment for water services, they need to be considered urban poor. In this sense the
interviewees did not support the notion of subsidies or special rates for the urban poor.
There needs to be a clear definition for the urban poor, before considering any
additional support for such groups, over and above the existing block tariff system.
Indicative client proportions in Windhoek are 35%, 45% and 20% (Author self-
calculations) for low-, middle- and high-income groups respectively; hence this can
be used as an indication of subsidy allocation based on the income of consumers and
the general standard of living. This would facilitate the process of subsidy target
group identification.
Some of the interviewed City officials (44%) also felt that people in general can
afford to pay for water and sanitation services. In many cases of non-payment, they
expressed the view that there is a “mindset” that militates against payment according
to which such services are seen as “a free gift from God”. The City officials also
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mentioned that there is a public participation process followed whereby people can
decide which type of services they can afford, therefore people should take
responsibility and pay and maintain the selected services.
5.4 The Price-setting process
The price-setting process was generally known to all the providers interviewed and
even to a few stakeholders from other types of institutions (57% out of 18). There are
two separate processes taking place as mentioned by the people interviewed. The first
part of the process (Figure 5-10) starts with the bulk water supplier, NamWater, which
proposes tariff adjustments on an annual basis to the Ministry of Agriculture, Water
and Forestry.
Figure 5-10 Describes the price-setting process and the various institutions involved. The tick
arrows are the focus process areas of this study and will be investigated in detail.
MAWF=Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry; MLGHRD=Ministry of Local
Government and Housing and Rural Development. Source: (Matros-Goreses and Franceys, 2008:
349)
MAWF, then reviews (a working group or committee is normally established in this
regard) the tariffs and provided that all relevant information is in order (for example
all financial information reflecting costs per schemes, operating and maintenance
expenditure, capital costs), the Minister tables the request for tariff adjustment and
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sends it to the Cabinet for approval. Once it is approved by Cabinet, as normally
happens, the tariffs are published in the Gazette, whereupon they become official for
that financial year. NamWater informs their clients of the approved tariffs, who in
turn review their own tariffs (second part of the process) and submit tariff adjustment
recommendations to the Ministry of Local Government and Housing and Rural
Development. A similar process takes place whereby the Minister, after reviews,
submits the tariffs of local authorities to the Cabinet, which results in the publication
in the Government Gazette, once approved. The local authorities are also obliged to
inform their clients about tariff adjustments where applicable.
5.4.1 Perception of Government officials on the price-setting process
Even though this process is in place, all of the Government officials interviewed
mentioned that to date there was no significant monitoring of the price-setting
process. It was only in 2007 that closer attention was given to the tariffs proposed by
NamWater and that resulted in the proposed tariff adjustments for 2007/2008 financial
year to remain unapproved at the time of writing. One interviewee mentioned that
there are no performance indicators against which monitoring or enforcement can be
implemented. The government interviewee described the tariff-setting process as
“complete chaos”, saying that the government is in a process of developing national
guidelines in an attempt to control the tariffs in the country. Another government
interviewee mentioned that it is difficult to manage in a situation where the Water
Resources Management Act has not yet commenced. The official also commented
that there is a Central Governance Agency in place, within the Office of the Prime
Minister, which in actual fact should be responsible for implementing governance
principles. It was confirmed that this Agency does in fact exist (as from 2003) but it is
not yet in operation, since it is waiting on implementation of the State-Owned
Enterprises Governance Act, which provides it with operational guidelines.
According to one interviewee, the bulk water provider lacks any fundamental
principles for tariff determination. The official pointed out that the recently developed
WSASP (2008) focuses on such principles, including defining full-cost recovery. The
interviewee further mentioned that the bulk water supplier needs to clarify overhead
costs allocation, and to differentiate between scheme costs abstracted from different
sources (ground and surface water). These deficiencies add to the reasons why tariffs
have not been approved since 2007. The biggest challenge faced with regard to tariff
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determination, as identified by another interviewee, is that the cost of supply per
scheme of the bulk water supplier is unknown; therefore full-cost recovery levels
cannot be known. If this is true, then there is no basis upon which the tariff approval
can proceed.
5.4.2 Perception of service providers on price-setting process
In the case of the City of Windhoek, the majority of City officials interviewed (55%)
felt that the process of submitting tariff adjustments to the Ministry is just a formality,
and pointed out that the Ministry have in fact never declined any of the proposed
tariffs. Thus the process is a bit of a sham, and it is the Municipal Council that has the
final deciding power. It is, however, not clear what the funds provided by City to
Regional Council are being used for, since the Regional Council is not obliged to
report on this usage. There was an anonymous feeling amongst the NamWater
officials that the price-setting process is highly politicised and hence prevents the
company from operating at financially sustainable levels, while demanding quality
affordable services.
5.4.3 Perception of consumer representatives and users on price-setting
process and services
The interviewed committee members are of the opinion that people are generally
willing to pay for the services (there are extreme cases of people that cannot afford
these services), because these services (water and sanitation) are basic services that
they cannot live without.
Representatives from NGOs interviewed (22% out of 18) mentioned that clear
policies regarding support and assistance to the urban poor should be developed both
from the City of Windhoek and the Government. Once these principles are agreed
upon, then the technicality regarding tariffs and prices can be determined. The
interviewee further suggested that the block tariff system should start at different
levels for different income level consumers. Similarly, one of the recommendations
from the Development and upgrading strategy indicates that support would be sought
from Government to assist (subsidise) those people living development levels 0-1, in
line with the National Housing Policy. In this respect the interviewee indicated that
water services should not be rendered for free and that special rates should be
available for those that cannot afford services. Furthermore, the interviewee was
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adamant that “water is a human right” which is interchangeably linked to the “right to
life and to dignity” such that enforcement mechanisms in the attempt to recover costs
for these services should be done with these in mind. The current repossession of
houses (from the poor), as result of defaulting payment for municipal bills are against
these internationally recognised principles.
As a solution to ensure universal water access, one interviewee suggested that
payment for water services (equivalent to other services such as defence (police) and
health) should be fused into the tax system, such that the funds can be recovered, but
that it should be paid for indirectly. In general, interviewees indicated that there is a
well spread perception that the municipality is making huge profits from municipal
services. One interviewee’s view was that “the price of water is measurable by the
cars of senior management of both water service providers, meaning that people are
paying too much for water”. As such, there is an urgent need for transparency in how
the increasing block tariffs are determined, as well as the issue of affordability, both
of which were brought up consistently during interviews with representatives and
users.
This issue of ‘cars’ also brings out the important point, little referred to elsewhere,
that tariff-setting is not simply a ‘cost plus’ exercise but also needs to incorporate
appropriate drivers and/or incentives for future efficiency gains on behalf of
customers. This point will be considered further with regard to future possible
regulatory roles.
Low-income water users (76% out of 29) indicated that they would not like to be
involved in the process but would like to be represented by the current community
committees, which they claim are doing a good job at keeping them informed and
updated with regard to status of municipal services. The middle and higher-income
groups on the other hand, felt that simplicity in water bills would assist in
understanding the process better.
5.5 The Need for a regulator
Reasons and explanations from respondents indicate a relatively well-managed system
for delivering of water and sanitation services to all urban consumers. However, it is
also clear that government, responsible for policy and tariff-setting, have limited input
(and insight) to the tariff-setting process whilst consumers (and civil society
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representatives) have no involvement whatsoever. With the hypothesis that some form
of regulator would be beneficial, particularly where there appears to be such a large
gap between the principal and its agents, the need for a regulator for the water sector
was assessed through a combination of methods during this study. These included
focus group discussions, face-to-face interviews and a workshop. In cases where
interviewees mentioned an intervention by “a third party” or “regulator-type” entity,
these parties were defined and their potential roles further explored. In this case,
perceived roles ranged from “someone needs to make sure the prices are right and that
companies are not making a profit” to “avoiding political interferences” (Table 5-6).
Table 5-6 perceived role of a regulator from various interviewees
Interviewee types Proposed Role
Consumer representatives
(including consumers)
- Ensure that prices are affordable and consider those that cannot pay
- Ensure that providers are not overcharging consumers and making
profits from poor people
Other institutions/NGOs - Ensure that people know (“and can trust the system”) what they are
paying for (ensure transparent system)
Service providers - Ensure process of tariff determination is done accurately and that full
cost recovery principles can be followed
- Avoid political interferences during price adjustments
-Would play an important role in debt recovery, especially from
government institutions
Government officials - Implement the Act and ensure cost recovery principles are adhered to
- Hold service providers accountable for pricing and performance levels
Note: proposed roles were summarised according to interviewee types. Source: Interviewees during
April-June 2007 and October-December 2008, Windhoek, Namibia
This exercise was primarily undertaken to create a common understanding of what a
regulator is and what its role might be during the interview sessions. Overall most
people had the basic idea that it should be an institution or person that monitors the
price-setting process to ensure that justice prevails (in terms of fair (affordability) and
equitable (including urban poor) and sustainable (financially, resource-based).
Reflecting on the current water sector situation (hence the question “where are we
now”), with regard to the price-setting process, interviewees were very pessimistic,
such that they admitted that the process needs improvement, however mentioning that
establishing a regulator might not be the best or only way to improve the process.
Other interviewees (20%) indicated that the price is driven by politicians and as such
they dictate the tariff-setting (they can overrule justifications for increments
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requested, thus leaving LAs, for example, to find other sources of income to bridge
the gap of not covering full costs) and therefore “it is not easy to divorce political
interferences with the price-setting process”.
The government officials explained that an ad-hoc committee is formed annually to
address issues of tariff determination prompted by bulk water supplier requests. The
biggest challenges facing the water sector currently are lack of written information,
guidelines and standards (performance indicators). Recently, the WSASP (2008) was
approved by cabinet which stipulates principles of tariff determination that can guide
the process, as well as reinforcement of the need for a regulator for the water sector.
Several studies are on-going to improve the price-setting process, such as
development of a tariff methodology for the bulk water supplier and government
water services subsidy policy for urban and rural areas. However, the implementation
of the findings of such studies and policies can only be done through a “regulator”
type institution (interviewees, December 2008).
Basic utility regulation is so far only implemented for the electricity sector in
Namibia, and during the interviews it was recommended that the water sector could
benefit from experiences from the establishment of an independent regulator for
electricity (Appendix K). The Electricity Control Board (ECB) interviewees stated
that the starting point for establishing a regulator is to strengthen the legislative
framework, in which case they referred to the current Water Resources Management
Act as “weak and toothless”. Some of the interviewees (33%) did not agree with
establishment of any utility regulator and were not convinced by the value (as
explained by electricity regulator interviewees) that the ECB brings to the process and
in this sense questioned the transparency of the regulatory body.
5.5.1 What would it take to establish a regulator?
In general the interviewees were very optimistic about the idea of a ‘regulator-type’
institution (interviewees were sceptical to use the word regulator) and the majority
(65%) were in favour for it (Figure 5-11). Government officials made reference to the
Namibia Water Resources Management Review recommendations that indicated that
a Regulator (similar to that of the UK (OfWAT)) is needed, however since the
regulations for the Water Resources Management Act is not drafted (due to capacity
constraints), this has been neglected, but pointed out that Government is still in favour
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of the idea of a regulator for the water sector. A NamWater official also highlighted
that provision for the establishment of a regulator was made during the early stages of
the establishment of NamWater (as early as 1995) as well as in the Water Resources
Management Act (2004) and in this sense sees it as beneficial for the company,
because it would enable them to start operating on full cost recovery (as they should).
Another interviewee also made reference to the State Owned Enterprises Governance
Act, which also makes provision for a regulator to be in place. Other reasons included
lack of expertise in this field in which case a regulatory body would be able to analyse
the financial situation of providers and provide expert advice, especially regarding
tariff determination.
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Figure 5-11 Perceptions of respondents on introduction of regulator for water and sanitation
services in Namibia. Source: (Matros-Goreses and Franceys, 2008: 352)
Transparency was the most obvious motivation, for establishing a regulator given by
the interviewees, elaborating that Namibia has a ‘democracy deficit’ and this might be
a way of making the price-setting process more understandable (people need to know
what their money is used for) and therefore change the perceptions of the public
towards payment for water and sanitation services. Another obvious reason mentioned
is to avoid perceived political interference in tariff determination. The benefits of
having such a system in place were predicted to include prices determined on
affordability levels of the end users and a suitable subsidy system established to
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benefit the urban domestic sector. However, the interviewees further mentioned a few
conditions on which a regulatory system can work in Namibia (Matros-Goreses and
Franceys, 2008: 352):
 It needs to be composed of very knowledgeable people with integrity
 It has to be independent and free from political influence
 It must have enforcement principles based on operational performance
indicators (eg introduce fines if indicators are not met)
 The system should be practical and sustainable (considering dry climate and
costs of delivering water over long distances) avoiding “copying” European
standards in Namibia.
5.5.2 How could the success of a regulator be ensured?
The interviewees unanimously agreed that establishing a ‘regulator-type’ institution is
not an easy process and the institutional positioning (Table 5-7) plays a critical role
during this process. The following expectations from such as body were raised:
 Developing enforceable standards, guidelines and agreements with Local
Authorities and NamWater
 Performance assessments (strongly emphasise on non revenue water losses) of
LAs across the country
 Training and capacity-building (especially financial management and
accounting) across stakeholders to enable adherence to standards and
guidelines
There were split views amongst interviewees with regards to the detail of the Water
Management Act in terms of clarity of roles and responsibilities of the regulator (as
suggested by ECB interviewees). The argument was that the Act is a guide and it is
the regulations following the Act that need to have the details clarified. Furthermore,
it was highlighted that the Act is currently under review (since 2006-2008), which
makes the discussion very timely and important. The challenge of implementing the
Act was attributed primarily to lack of capacity (especially at LA level) and
misinterpretation of the principles in the Act which was also listed as issues for the
‘regulator-type’ body to focus on. Another interviewee mentioned that irrespective of
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the institutional positioning of the regulator, the Act should guide the process and thus
it is up to decision makers to strengthen the Act, so as to provide clear mandate for
such a body.
The incentives for service providers to ‘buy into’ the idea of having a ‘regulator’ were
not obvious according to interviewees, since they felt that the current governance
systems (of having institutional Boards) sufficient to deal with price-setting issues and
having a separate institution to deal with regulatory issues will be “over regulation”.
One interviewee felt that any regulatory body would be appointed by government,
which will not defuse the politics and thus the price-setting process will not be any
different from the current situation. The presence of a regulator was associated with
price increments, which was not deemed advantageous towards the urban poor. This
perception was mainly influenced by the current electricity regulation system and thus
“if the water sector should be caught in a similar system, that there will be chaos”
(City official, December 2008).
Table 5-7 Institutional position of potential regulator for water sector as selected by different
stakeholders.
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Notes: n=22, interviews (including workshop) October-December 2008, Windhoek, Namibia
Logistically government (and financially i.e salaries of staff already paid for) was
indicated according by some interviewees as being in the best position to take the lead
in the process of establishing a regulatory institution. Government already has the
legal mandate to implement policies, so it will avoid confusion among consumers. It
was suggested that a dedicated division (within Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry (DWAF)) focusing on the development of price-setting procedures and
guidelines (including various other aspects) be established, with appropriate training
and capacity (and clear responsibilities) offered to qualified staff.
The difficulty of regulating LAs, in the case of having a regulator within DWAF was
posed, since it is the MLGHRD instead of MWAF who is responsible for operation of
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LAs (this was the same reason used to have an independent body instead). Another
challenge for the proposed regulator that was discussed, was how to deal with water
related information only for LAs, since they include a range of services (remunerative
and non-remunerative).
The water regulator idea reportedly has similarities with the environmental
commissioner as stipulated in the Environmental Management Act (2007), who is
given powers by the Ministry to select a panel of experts to conduct specific duties. In
this regard, the panel of experts option is thought to better for the water sector, since
there is only one bulk water supplier with 15 local authorities to deal with. It is also
envisaged that the experts would not be required on a permanent basis, in which sense
a secretariat (government based) could deal with administrative issues. Based on this
argument, another option was discussed: Initial expert panel within government and
phase-out eventually to independent agency. The experts can be used to build the
foundation of procedures and terms of references for what needs to be done. Once this
is firmly in place and the necessary human and financial resources are obtained, the
agency moved towards some level of independence. However, external monitoring
was suggested to play crucial role in the process. The reason why expert panels are
proposed while government acts as secretariat is to avoid the normal “government
working and thinking style”, that is to influence within the process. Interviewees felt
strongly that forces and resources should be pooled to create commitment and
ownership over the process.
The option of merging a water regulator with the ECB was severely declined by
interviewed municipal officers. The argument was that it will become a “power” issue
between the two sectors, which will impact badly on consumers. Therefore
interviewees stated that “it is two separate types of services, and it operates in
different ways and therefore it should be kept separate”. Opposing arguments
indicated that an optimal option would be a merger, because ECB is an independent
institution already, with process guidelines, procedures and standards, which can be
tailored to the water sector. The opinion here was “it is better not to re-invent the
wheel”. These interviewees did not agree with the emphasis on political interference,
since the latter argument is that “as long as the Act clearly stipulates the role of the
Ministers (of both water and electricity industry) in the process, the politics are
avoidable”.
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The issue of cross-subsidies within the water sector should also be strongly addressed
and assessed in term of sustainability, given the Namibian conditions. One of the
interviewees further explained that legally NamWater is a company, and therefore
should be treated as such and the issue of profit-making be clarified in that context,
thus service standards and enforcement mechanisms can be set accordingly.
A neutral body (Ofwat type) would have severe financial implications (linked to
independence and functionality), and therefore will take longer to establish and hence
this option was not strongly considered.
Other interviewees (13%) were not convinced that establishing a regulator is the best
option. They indicated that “some sort of regulation is needed”, but it is not obvious
that establishing a regulator is the answer; in the absence of cost benefit analysis it is
difficult to select the institutional positioning of the proposed regulator. Certain LAs
already operate as businesses and focus on financial sustainability as well as
providing quality services, and thus do not require a regulator to determine price
limits for them, since they operate on simple principles of “what goes in (costs) and
what comes out (price)” and therefore “there is nothing to regulate”. The boards of
service providers are there to make sure business principles are adhered to and thus
having a regulator will be duplicating and complicating existing structures and
systems. In this regard, the City official stated that “the idea of having an economic
regulator is good in principle, but is not suitable for Namibian conditions. The current
system should be strengthened to incorporate the necessary principles” (City official,
December 2008).
The major drivers behind the urge to have a regulator were identified as transparency
and accountability by the interviewees. It was further indicated that accountability
takes into account identifiable indicators which is necessary to improve the current
process. In this regard, the sentiment was “if you cannot measure it, how can you
manage it?” and thus responsibility of such a system has to be directed to “someone”.
In this respect, the interviewees rated the level of transparency (Table 5-8) required to
improve the current price-setting system.
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Table 5-8 Level of transparency required by interviewees to improve the price-setting process.
Level of
transparency
None Roles and
responsibilities
(institutional
set-up)
Costs of
operation and
maintenance
information
(eg. Annual
reports)
Tariff
calculations and
future
projections/
Investment
options (eg.
Business/strategic
plans)
All
information
(detailed) in
public domain
Scores ●●●● ● ●●●● ●●●●●●
Notes: n=15, interviews October-December 2008 (excluding workshop), Windhoek, Namibia
Interviewees mentioned the benefits of the identified transparency levels primarily as
understanding the motive behind certain procedures and the consequent results, thus
making the entire process easier (and better), especially with regard to payment for
services. One of the identified challenges of achieving relevant transparency levels
was to improve and maintain good electronic data systems for ease of access and
monitoring of service levels. These functions require strong coordination by a central
institution, with effective information dissemination ability. The system should be
consistent, yet flexible and simple, so that consumers also understand the process. In
this regard, the desired consumer involvement (Table 5-9) was further identified as
having a need for consumer representation during the price-setting process.
Representation was highlighted as one of the biggest challenges when it comes to
consumer involvement and interviewees emphasised the need to have clear roles and
responsibilities, as well as procedures (indicators) in place, to keep representatives
accountable.
Table 5-9 Indication of consumer involvement required within the price-setting process
Consumer
involvement
levels
No
involvement
Manipulation
(community
committees)
Consultation
(public
meetings)
Placation
(consumer
representatives)
Delegated
Power
(influence of
stakeholders
on process)
Scores ●●●● ●●●●●●●●● ●●●●●●
Notes: n=19, Source: consumer involvement levels adopted from Arnstein ladder (Rouse, 2007: 82);
interviews October- December 2008, Windhoek, Namibia (excluding workshop).
One interviewee felt that people vote for who they feel can represent their interests
well; therefore it should also be a participatory process. In fact the interviewee
indicated that the entire process of establishing a regulator should be treated as a
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‘democratic election’ (for example after capable candidates has been short listed and
public debates) where the public have the opportunity to select the director of any
regulatory body, since the regulator would be representing consumer issues. Overall
the results indicate that accountability through transparent information sharing and
consumer involvement are considered to be the key elements for ensuring the
‘success’ of a ‘regulator type’ institution in Namibia, particularly given its scarce
resource and highly-skewed income distribution challenges.
5.6 Chapter summary
Namibia’s water sector is well managed and the provision of water and sanitation is
above average compared to other lower-income countries. To ensure that this state of
quality is maintained (and improved), in the midst of extremely unequal conditions, in
terms water resource availability and income distribution, relevant institutional
development initiatives are required. In general, a state of confusion prevails over the
roles and responsibilities of various water sector institutions with regard to price-
setting process. The price-setting process in Namibia is currently undertaken in an
apparently haphazard manner with no official records of the process being available.
Crucial information regarding the break-down of the costs of service provision are not
readily available (bulk and local authority level), due either to mismanagement or lack
of appropriate skills and knowledge. In this regard, financial transparency is a huge
challenge given the fact that water prices are set at two separate levels with two
different accounting systems, both of which effectively hide specific costs related to
water supply in particular areas.
The results indicate that it is not possible for a civil servant, let alone a representative
of civil society, to understand how prices are set from the financial information in the
public domain. Hence it is clear that a more transparent information system about
supply costs and pricing calculations would assist in allowing independent assessment
of the efficiency of water providers (both bulk and local authority level), especially
where resources are limited. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess the affordability
levels of low-income users, since access to services are priority based. There is strong
sense of understanding of why basic services are priced (but not how) as well as a
strong sense of willingness to pay. The major stakeholders in the water sector include
government, service providers and users, which have conflicting interests with regard
to water and sanitation services. In this regard, it is proposed that a regulatory type
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body be established to balance these interests and to facilitate information sharing
imperative for a transparent and sustainable price-setting process.
“If the rhythm of the drum beat changes,
the dance step must adapt”
Kossi, Burkina Faso as cited by Berg,2007
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Chapter 6: A framework for the price-setting process
This chapter addresses a cross-country case analysis, reflecting mainly on the price-
setting processes and water and sanitation services with related perceptions of
stakeholders in England, Zambia and Namibia (Chapters 4 and 5). Based on these
results and other literature, this chapter includes further detail on the proposed options
for the price-setting process in Namibia in terms of policy, institutional and
implementation of a proposed regulatory framework through specified set of
questions and criteria identified through literature.
The results are discussed within the context of the principal-agent theory, which
highlights the need for transparency and stakeholder involvement to reduce challenges
of information asymmetry. This is particularly important given the Namibian
challenges of setting prices at two levels (bulk and retail water service provision),
within highly skewed income distribution and water scarce conditions.
6.1 Provision of Water and Sanitation Services
Water provision in Namibia is undertaken by a parastatal company operating public
assets, while in England and Zambia the majority of operators are private and
commercial respectively, though the latter country has partly public governing bodies
of which local authorities are major shareholders. Therefore the management style of
the service providers is different. In Namibia, for example, based on interviews, the
challenge of service providers are water scarcity and finding new water sources to
meet the demand, while in Zambia their biggest challenge is dealing with
deteriorating infrastructure and in England it is population growth and coping with
climate change effects. Furthermore, the most remarkable similarity observed across
the service providers is that of dealing with issues of affordability and differential
(quality) services to meet the demand of a wide range of consumers within different
social classes and hence consequently the challenge of recovering costs. In that
regard, the providers are not compared to each other, but merely referred to for the
purpose of describing country situations, and drawing lessons for the Namibian
challenges within the price-setting process.
Financial data was primarily used to assess the financial performance of service
providers in the selected countries. The financial information reflects the efficiency of
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the providers’ operations. Regulators require audited financial statements to assess the
performance of providers, hence expect complete financial transparency from the
providers. Selected financial ratios (author’s calculations) were used to analyse the
financial performance of the case country companies (Table 6-1).
Table 6-1 Financial elements (2006) to describe water providers in selected countries
Finance elements (2006)* England
(Anglian Water)
Zambia
(Lusaka Water
and Sewerage
Company)
Namibia
(City of
Windhoek)
Major service Water and
wastewater
services
Water and
wastewater
services
Municipal
services
including water
and wastewater
No of customers 4.2 million 2.5 million 200 000
Average tariffs [PPP US$/m3] 2.24 1.29 2.11
Average bill [PPP US$]^ 58 15.96 67.57
Financial performance
Turnover [PPP$’m] 599 49 176
Operating profit [PPP US$’m] 232 (4) (6.76)
Operating efficiency
Non-revenue water [%] 29 51 33
Debt collection period (days) 102 345 75
Service coverage [%] 100 65 88
Average Hours of supply 24 18 24
Note: *2006 elements were selected because it represents the latest figures obtained from all countries.
^ Figures do not include communal services. Sources: Annual reports of service providers; Zambian
financial performance figures: (World Bank, 2006: 78).
The tariffs charged in Namibia are comparable with England tariffs; however it is
considered high compared to southern African countries as confirmed through the
literature (Gumbo, 2004: 1228). This is primarily due to the water scarcity challenge
and the willingness of Government to charge viable tariffs. In general the research
concludes that the service provided by the municipality in Namibia is considered good
in comparison to LWSC and thus the problem is more of a procedural nature (in terms
of tariff determination) rather than quality of service.
The biggest problems with regard to financial data from service providers were
interpretation and understanding, and therefore it was not clear how tariffs are
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calculated for the local authority and the bulk water supplier in Namibia. It was
further clear that the Namibian price-setting process of the water sector is politically
managed though administratively driven and that there is no common understanding
and interpretation of full cost recovery principles. There is no mechanism to challenge
the administrative demand for cost plus (at whatever level of cost-reflectivity) tariffs.
LWSC is currently not meeting appropriate financial targets for viability, primarily
due to a lack of infrastructural maintenance, reflected in the appalling unaccounted for
water numbers as well as high debt recovery costs. Anglian Water’s financial
statements were also difficult to understand because the company forms part of the
Anglian Group and some of the financial information did not differentiate between the
Group and the company. However, company information was more easily accessible
from public information available from the regulator, Ofwat. Furthermore, Anglian
Water is performing well financially and this can be seen in their high customer
satisfaction rates for service delivery though some would challenge the level of
profitability that the regulator has allowed and incentivised Anglian to outperform.
6.1.1 Perceptions of stakeholders on water and sanitation services
In Namibia (interviewed informal area residents), access to water was regarded as
third priority after the need for registered ‘erf’ (land) and electricity. Furthermore,
payment for water and sanitation services was not generally a problem, it was the
priorities of consumers that made affordability for services difficult to assess. In this
sense, defining eligibility (and design) for subsidies proved to be a major challenge
for government officials as part of the price-setting process. The issue of priority
assessment is important both at considering consumer’s behaviour and attitudes
towards the services, but also on the side of providers and decision makers. The
perceptions of stakeholder groups of water and sanitation services (Table 6-2), are
very diverse given the different country conditions. Sanitation services in urban poor
settlements are found to be significantly neglected in both Zambia and Namibia.
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Table 6-2 perceptions of stakeholder groups with regard to status of water and sanitation services
delivered in England, Zambia and Namibia
Stakeholder
groups
England Zambia Namibia
Government -High dependence on
donor funds
- Poor water services
(improving)
-Poor infrastructural
maintenance
(depreciation charges
unclear)
-Unclear tariff
determination
Providers - High consumer
satisfaction rates
- Services cater for poor
residence
-Block tariff (including
social tariff) system works
well
-Lack of infrastructural
investment is major reason
for poor services
- History of non-payment
culture
-Slow debt recovery major
concern for full cost
recovery
-Scarce water-focus on
conservation measures
-Flat rate for communal
services (subsidised)
-History of non-
payment culture
-Vandalism
(maintenance) of
communal water points
-Slow debt recovery
major concern for full
cost recovery
Consumer
representatives
-Improving services
(especially consumer
relations)
- Metering needed for
fair billing
-Kiosk system working
well
-Good services
-Good communication
with municipal officers
-Debt recovery for
communal services
Consumers -Good services (hardly
ever problems) with
reasonable charges
-Unclear bills
-Prefer paying flat rate as
oppose to metered bills
-Intermittent services
-Long distances to collect
water
- Poor water quality
-Unclear bills
- No toilet facilities-health
implications
-High debt (arrears
communal accounts)
-Pre-paid meters
preferred (although
mostly out of working
order)
-Water cut-off due to
unpaid communal bills
is unfair to those that
pay.
-No toilet facilities-
health implications
Source: Interviewees during fieldwork (Namibia: April-June 2007 and October-December 2008;
Zambia: November 2008; England: July-August 2008)
Namibia and Zambia share a common history or culture of non-payment for water and
sanitation services leading to difficulties in debt recovery by providers. The kiosk
system is seen as “pay as you go” system that works well in Zambia and it instils the
culture of accepting that water is like any other good (which you can get from the
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kiosk) that you have to pay for. On the contrary, informal area residents in Namibia
prefer pre-paid meters as a fair system in communal water service conditions;
however the challenge faced by providers is in maintaining these systems. The
providers in Namibia and Zambia also share a similar opinion that subsidies form part
of the first block of the tariff system for basic services, however additional subsidies
for the urban poor falls under the social responsibility of government. In England, the
social responsibility is with the providers to ensure that they are financially
sustainable as well as making sure that their low-income customers are provided with
good quality services (through, for example, the WaterSure scheme). The major
complaint of consumers in all countries against service providers is that the billing
system is unclear. Hence based on interview results the following issues are deduced
with regard to providing water and sanitation services (especially with a focus on the
urban poor):
 Adequate revenue generation is crucial for infrastructural maintenance and
quality service provision, hence the importance of proper structure of tariff
determination strategies
 Subsidy needs and target beneficiaries require clarification and definition
since consumer needs are priority based and the general assumption is that
services are affordable to all, including urban poor
 Adequate debt recovery procedures have to be in place to ensure
sustainability
 Consumer involvement (interest) in the price-setting process depends on
consumer satisfaction of service provision.
Overall from the results, consumer representation is found to add significant value to
the price-setting process in terms of increase transparency and interpretation of related
information.
6.2 Price-setting processes
The price-setting processes are very country specific and thus are not directly
comparable; however general process related issues are highlighted from the research,
which could inform the process in Namibia, given country challenges. compares the
institutional arrangements across England, Zambia and Namibia to illustrate the
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differences that exists in these countries (Table 6-3) in order to sketch the context
against which lessons are drawn from the former countries .
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Table 6-3 Comparison of water sector institutional arrangements across England, Zambia and Namibia
Institutional arrangements England Zambia Namibia
Water sector Reform 1989-Privatisation process following the 1974 reorganisation when all
Local Authorities were absorbed into regional water authorities.
1993- Commercialisation process- Local Authorities were
entrusted with all water and sanitation services provision
1998- Namibia Water Resources Management
Review team facilitated process
Legal framework Water Industry Act, 1991 updated to Water Act, 2003 Water and Sanitation Act, 1997 Water Resources Management Act, 2004
Responsible Government
entity
Department of Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Ministry of Local Government and Housing and Ministry of
Energy and Water Development
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)-
Ministry of Water, Agriculture and Forestry and
Ministry of Local Government and Housing and
Rural Development
Regulator status Independent regulator, non-ministerial department, Water Services
Regulatory Authority (OFWAT)
Autonomous regulator, National Water Supply and
Sanitation Council, started operations in 2000
DWAF, setting/approving tariffs through ad-hoc
committee
Regulatory tools used -Incentive Based Regulation derived from five-yearly price reviews
-Overall Performance Assessment (OPA)
- Monitoring Performance indicators
- Incentive Based Regulation introduced 2008
Not in place
Performance indicators -Levels of service
-Security of supply and efficient use of water
-Financial performance and expenditure
-Water and sewerage service unit costs and relative efficiency
-Water and sanitation service coverage
-Hours of supply
-Staff per 1000 connections
-Collection efficiency
-O&M coverage collection
NamWater
Introduced in 2007:
-financial performance
-Employee productivity
-customer/
stakeholder satisfaction
CoW
- Not
accessed
Consumer representation -Independent Consumer Council for Water (CCW) since 2006, out of
Ofwat’s Customer Services Committees
- Water Watch Groups (WWG), semi-autonomous to
NWASCO
Community Committees supported by Local
Authorities
Water suppliers status 10 water and sewerage companies
12 water only companies
23 Local Authorities
51 Commercial Utilities
10 Private utilities
1 Bulk Water Supplier (since 1997)
14 Local Authorities
Regulator Sustainability 193 staff (2008)
Less than 0.2% of industry turnover
16 Staff (2008)
2% of levy on service provider’s turnover
Not in place, currently Government regulated/ self-
regulation
Incentives to serve the urban
poor
Vulnerable charges Scheme (‘WaterSure’), complemented by service
provider ‘Charitable Trusts’
Devolution Trust Fund (DTF) (through external support
from the Danish and German Governments) establish Kiosk
systems in peri-urban areas
No subsidies or support for urban poor
Source: Franceys and Gerlach, 2008; NWASCO, 2004; MAWRD, 2000; Interview results April-June 2007; July-August 2008 and October-December 2008.
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The English and Zambian processes are very similar, in the sense that Local/Regional
Authorities were transformed into private utilities and are regulated by independent
economic regulators, while the Namibian system is based on a public system through local
authorities. The Water Act of Namibia makes provision for a “regulatory board” however it
has not yet been implemented, since 2004 due to lack of relative capacity, political support
and will. The consumer representation bodies in England represents all consumers, while
in Zambia and Namibia, they only represent those consumers in the peri-urban areas. The
rest of the consumers deal with the service provider directly. The greater majority of
consumers in all countries indicate ignorance towards the price-setting processes taking
place, which strengthens the point that consumers are not particularly interested in the
price-setting process; unless they experience service related problems or very sudden price
rises.
6.2.1 Price-setting priorities of regulators
The priorities set by regulators (or government) are country and demand specific; however
various similarities could be drawn from the research (Figure 6-1).
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Regulation by incentive scheme
Water quality
Service hours
Unaccounted for water
Infrastructural investments
Cross-subsidies (ensuring services to urban poor)
Tariff determination principles and procedures
Performance indicators
Credit control systems
Legal framework Revision
Pricing for conservation
Climate Change adaptation
Long term (25 year) strategic plans
Capex planning incentive (CIS)
CBA on all investments
Customer research
Sewer flooding
Affordability
Full cost
recovery
Debt recovery
(especially
from Government
Metering
Efficiency
improvements
Competition
(benchmarking)
England Zambia
Namibia
Figure 6-1 Regulator priorities (most urgent-in bold) and respective similarities faced in England,
Zambia and Namibia. Source: Author’s analysis based on interview results
Many of the challenges highlighted by regulators are in fact service provider challenges,
which regulators need to, monitor and ensure that they are implemented according to
standards and procedures. It can thus be seen from the interview results that all
regulators/governments are mostly concerned with reaching an acceptable level of cost
recovery of service providers to be able to deliver the desired and affordable services to
consumers. Full cost recovery (however defined) is at the heart of regulation, after which
the focus changes to efficiency improvement, as in the case of England. In the Zambian
context full cost recovery refers to recovery of cost of operation and maintenance as well as
cost of investments of water and sanitation services (NWASCO, 2004a: 38). Based on the
literature (Rogers et al., 2002: 3), full cost recovery refers to the combination of full supply,
economic (opportunity and economic externalities) as well as environmental externality
costs. In that sense, it is understood that the definition of full cost recovery used in Zambia
and Namibia refers mainly to the full supply costs instead of full costs (which include
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economic and environmental externalities). England and Wales believe that the requirement
to achieve the Water Framework Directive will deliver an acceptable level of economic
externality.
Effective sector regulation approach consists of three strategies; identification of priorities;
building the foundation for effective regulation and establishing the full scope of regulation
(Figure 6-2) (DWAF, 2008: 8). In this case, England and Zambia are operating on a full
scope of effective regulation. Namibia can be classified under the second stage of effective
regulation; however the research indicates that these foundation blocks can ideally be
achieved under coordination of a regulatory body (irrespective of institutional positioning).
Figure 6-2 the case study country status against the effective regulation strategy approach. Ref:
Adapted from (DWAF, 2008: 8).
In this regard, the literature (DWAF, 2008: 8) highlights four regulatory domains under
which effective regulation can operate:
 Social regulation (universal access to services)
 Water resources and Environmental regulation (wastewater discharges, licences)
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 Public Health Regulation (drinking water quality and safe removal of household
wastes)
 Economic regulation (tariffs, contracts, service quality, price and incentives)
These are indicative of sustainable development pillars, with the addition of public health
highlighting the important link between the water and health sector. For purposes of
coordination of the full scope of the regulation stage, this research further identifies a
further domain, called “governance regulation”, which could be considered the
coordination of all regulators (whether it is separate entities or one unit with separate
domains as units within). This is suggested to be the ultimate tool for transparency to
address concerns of “who regulates the regulator” as the role of an independent public
body, equivalent to an ‘Ombudsman’ or Competition Commission in England, to conduct
in-depth enquiries into regulation within the context of policy implementation and
monitoring. In the case of water sector, the governance regulator would measure
performance of regulators, against effective governance criteria, with the most important
being transparency through access to accurate information and stakeholder involvement.
6.2.2 Perceptions of stakeholders on price-setting process
In the fieldwork, tariff determination as part of the role of regulators, was seen to be one of
the major activities within the price-setting process and hence transparency and
accountability within these processes were deemed most important for interviewees from
all countries concerned. Transparency is mostly needed to boost the understanding and
willingness to pay of consumers for relevant services. Political influence was highlighted as
one of the biggest hindrances to derail the process from charging full costs, therefore
compromising financial sustainability of service providers. Another challenge identified
was limited information (especially financial) available within the system to enable
decision-makers to make informed decisions with regard to price-setting process. The
boards of regulators and of service providers are considered as governance structures and as
such the interests (representation) of board members (seen as governing structures) are
questioned and this could influence credibility of price-setting process, especially the
presence/role of government officials on such boards.
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Table 6-4 Comparison of perceptions of stakeholder groups across the study countries on price-setting processes
Stakeholder groups England Zambia Namibia
Regulator -information intensive highly computerised system
-very transparent and adaptive to changes
-complex tools (in process of simplifying)
-good working relationship with other regulators, service providers and
CCW
-high degree of objectivity and transparency
-independent and free from political interference
- basic and simple guidelines for providers to follow
- good working relationship with regulators, providers and
WWGs.
- Not in place
Government Not interviewed -independent process; -efficient improving process
-transparent and informative process to facilitate decision
making processes
-bottom-up information feeding approach
-ad hoc process, no operational
guidelines (monitoring or enforcement
mechanisms) in place
-tariff determination procedure unclear
-no performance indicators
Providers -complex and information intensive (detailed) process
- micro-management of companies (over-regulation)
- process political and non-transparent
-micro-management of companies (over-regulation)
-unclear role and responsibilities
- lack technical expertise
- certain tools for regulation inapplicable to companies
-too much information requirements ; - independent process; -
good urban poor focus
-non existent and non-transparent process
- high degree of political interferences
Consumer
representatives
- efficient process
-good working relationship with regulator and service providers
-CCW have negotiation and persuasion power to influence process
(requires more statutory power)
- process is ‘relatively’ transparent- no access to financial model- ‘what-
if’ scenarios refused
-regulatory tools are too complex and needs revision
- high degree of transparency, accountability and stakeholder
involvement
- interference in service providers and government activities
- unaware of detailed process
- understand reasons for payment for
services
-good relationship (good information
flow) with local authority
-insensitive to urban poor needs and
capacities
Consumers - unaware of the process
- not interested to participate in process (in favour of representation)
-unaware of the process
- in favour of representation
-unaware of the process
-interested to participate in process
Source: Interviewees during fieldwork (Namibia: April-June 2007 and October-December 2008; Zambia: November 2008; England: July-August 2008)
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There are similarities amongst stakeholder group responses across the three countries
regarding the price-setting processes. The regulators perceive the process to be highly
transparent with very minimal interference from government, while service providers and
consumer representatives indicated a degree of political interference in the process.
Overall consumers did not show much interest in the process and were more concerned
about the services they received, though the Namibian consumers indicated interest to be
involved in the process. Consumer representation for Zambia and Namibia is on a
volunteer basis while in England they are now (since 2006) paid allowances for their
services, hence there is a noticeable difference in levels of competence and selection
procedures (which influence operational styles) in these countries. The Zambian and
Namibian representatives are more localised (elected and work closely with community)
and based on reputation and trust amongst the community, whereas the English
representation is based on skills and experiences in specific areas (positions advertised
with appointments based primarily on professional competence). Community structures
are in place in Namibia to create a sense of ownership and responsibility amongst
informal area residents, as well as representing community on relevant issues, however,
the structure has no decision-making power and is only used as an information channel
between the community and City officials. In this regard, the English consumer body has
more influence on official procedural and decision making processes, though no statutory
powers exist either. Based on these results, the following key issues are deduced for
price-setting processes:
 The perceptions of stakeholders depends on their involvement (and experiences)
and knowledge in the process, hence should be taken very subjectively
 The price-setting process is complex and needs to take into consideration various
opinions (adapt to changes and demands) and thus should be very goal oriented
 Expectations and target stakeholders (beneficiaries) of the price-setting process
needs to be clarified continually
 The efficiency of the price-setting process was based on robust system (guidelines
and procedures) in place
 The price-setting process is at some level personality based which influences the
operations and relationships of regulators with their various stakeholders.
Chapter 6: A Framework for the price-setting processes
208
6.3 Conceptual framework: Application of theory
This research builds its foundation on theories of regulation which apply to utilities in
general. There are two prominent theories in this context: positive or normative theories
of regulation. The positive theory addresses why regulation is required, while the latter
deals with how regulation occurs, which relates to the regulatory process issues such as
obtaining credible and accurate information to identify performance standards, price
structures and incentives for economic efficiency (Jamison et al., 2004: 217). The
research is thus focused within the normative theory of regulation, specifically focusing
on minimising the costs of information asymmetry through establishing regulatory
processes. This results in directly applying the principal-agent theory in the context of
regulatory governance within the water sector, in which case the government is the
principal, the agent being the service providers. However, realising that more
stakeholders are involved, the study also draws on interest group theory (Jamison et al.,
2004: 217), taking into consideration the interests of consumers and other organisations.
There are four issues as summarised from literature (Wheelen and Hunger, 2002. 30;
Mallin, 2007: 12; Brealey et al., 2006: 299) to be considered when dealing with principal-
agent problems. These include:
 Process (process of developing business plans and procedures)
 Information (access to accurate information)
 Incentives (ensuring that appropriate rewarding systems are identified)
 Performance measurement (measuring means of rewards through monitoring)
Asymmetry with respect to objectives and information are the biggest problems faced
between principal-agent relationships. In this case, the agent has an advantage over the
principal due to access to more detailed information. In this case, regulation is suggested
as a monitoring tool to minimise the identified problems, such as lack of financial
transparency, as indicated from the research results. The key thus for the proposed
institutions such as independent regulators are to ensure that companies perform well, the
interests (often conflicting) from key stakeholders namely, consumers,
shareholders/investors, board of directors and management are synchronised (balanced)
for sustainability of the sector.
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Managing or resolving the relationship (interests) between ‘principals’ and ‘agents’
involves the application of agency theory, (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Wheelen and
Hunger, 2002.: 30; Mallin, 2007: 12) in the sense that procedures can be developed for
two reasons to primarily mitigate the informational disadvantages faced by politicians
dealing with agents. This is in line with the lessons learnt from case studies (England and
Zambia) which include ensuring that roles and responsibilities are clarified and that the
appropriate mandate is given to “regulatory body” to address the water sector problems as
well as ensuring common interpretation and understanding of the legal framework. The
essence of the study thus revolves around information sharing (including participation of
consumers to ensure their issues are represented and considered during decision making
processes) in the quest of improving transparency (especially financial) within the price-
setting process. Gathering sufficient and accurate information forms one of the biggest
tasks of regulators to address the information asymmetry challenge between principal-
agent relationships (Table 6-5), as transpired from interview results. For example, many
of the utility interviewees indicated a sense of “over-regulation” from the regulators in
England and Zambia in terms of intensive information requirements. In this regard, the
purpose (objective) of gathering information needs to be clearly defined and understood
by all stakeholders so as to address specific problems in the system.
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Table 6-5 Principal-Agent relationships and related information asymmetry challenges identified
within study
Principal Agent Information
asymmetry
challenge
Role of regulator to address
challenge
Government Regulators Transparency
requirements (as
part of regulatory
principles) and
expectations in
line with
stakeholder
interests
-Standard setting
-Regulating prices and
service quality
-Providing policy advice
-Settling disputes
-Clear identification of
responsibilities and
procedures
Government Service Providers -Financial and
operating
statistics
-Monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms
-Monitoring competition
Regulators Service Providers -Price and non-
price issues
-Assess performance of
provider (ability to operate
efficiently)
-Assess financial condition of
provider
-Assess market demand
-Monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms
Service Providers Customers -Willingness and
ability to pay
(addressing
affordability) and
ability to pay
(income levels)
-Open and accountable
regulatory processes
-Mechanisms of feedback and
information sharing
-Consumer representation
(handling complaints)
Source: Author’s analysis of results
Research results indicate that there are various types of information asymmetry
challenges from all stakeholders, hence the need for a regulator to make the system more
transparent. This need for transparency is even more necessary in a country like Namibia,
which faces three levels of extremes; separate levels water service provision, skewed
income distribution and water scarcity. In this regard, the information requirements of a
regulator are defined by its role and responsibilities as well as specific country conditions.
The results also indicate that major consequence of information asymmetry is financial
distress for operator (mainly due to political influence on pricing aspects) and as a
consequence inefficiency and poor quality of service. These findings are in line with
findings by (Jamison et al.) (2004:215) who further states that the capacity of the
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regulator also plays a crucial role in addressing information asymmetries within principal-
agent relationships in order to determine “informational requirements; obtaining and
managing information; data quality assessment; reporting information and ensuring
public access to information”.
Result analysis highlights that though stakeholder interests’ are different; they all share a
central need for sustainability of the water sector. Hence the research suggests that it is
the key role of the regulator to steer the sector towards this common goal. Therefore the
need for effective information sharing and understanding the underlying benefits cannot
be over-emphasised. Based on the research findings, the types of information required in
a price-setting process (and its related benefits) are highlighted (Table 6-6).
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Table 6-6 Type of information and related purpose and benefits targeted at specific stakeholder
groups
Type of information Target groups Purpose Benefits of information
Public information Consumers Transparency Enhance and improve customers
understanding and
awareness/perceptions towards
payment and conservation of
water services. It also allows
customers to put pressure on
service providers to uphold
service standards
Social information Consumers and
Government
Sector performance
(sustainability)
Includes holistic picture of the
sector, including coverage,
access for the poor, water
resource availability to make
informed water use/investment
decisions.
Managerial information Service providers
and Regulators
Accuracy and
Reliability
Keeping a (centralised)
comprehensive information
systems- database (including
historical data) enables managers
to know what to measure and
manage for future development.
This is essential for inclusion in
business plans. Clear definitions
for targets are important. Logical
data collection (procedures),
verification processes (and
analysis) need to be in place for
effective information flow
within organisation.
Financial and
operational information
Regulators Financial
transparency-
Realistic price
This will enable service
providers to be held accountable
for performance of services
Evaluation information Service providers,
Regulators and
Government
Improved
performance
National evaluation of services,
based on combination of social,
financial and operational
information. This would also
assist in shaping sector priorities
and objectives
Source: Author’s analysis of results
In general, the results conclude that transparency (as a result of information sharing and
analysis) as implemented through regulators improves confidence of both consumers and
providers in the system and indirectly results in improved performance of companies.
However, further results indicate that simplicity (and targeted/specific) in regulatory
information requirements would result in improved price-setting processes. The
perceptions of stakeholders, as found during the fieldwork, are formed based on the
information received, and since the medium of information translation and analysis is
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missing in Namibia, the price-setting process was seen as “chaotic and disorganised”,
while in the countries where regulators were established the process was rated transparent
and effective to a certain degree. The incentives of sharing information thus can
summarise as:
 Mitigating information asymmetries
 Addressing institutional challenges (transparency and information flow (internal
and externally)
 Identifying sector trends and priorities
 Improving sector performance (beneficial for all stakeholders)
6.4 Proposed options for regulation in Namibia
Evidence from England and Zambia illustrates the role of economic regulation. Results
from Namibia provide evidence of weakness in legislative framework, clarity on roles
and responsibilities and lack of financial transparency, which are clear examples of the
principal-agent challenge. To overcome this, it is clear that a ‘body’ or institution of some
kind is needed and will help clarify the price-setting processes. There is also a clear need
to document the process and develop guidelines following a consistent system. The first
focus for this process (based on research findings) is to review (finalise the process) the
Act (especially the regulatory section) and make it as clear and specific as possible.
Strengthening of the legislative framework was mentioned as a driving force behind the
electricity regulator development process in Namibia and thus this is strongly
recommended (by research findings and interviewees) for the water sector. The results
also indicate that transparency and accountability principles are required to improve the
price-setting process, irrespective of the institutional positioning of a regulator. Currently
skilled capacity in this field is lacking and therefore it is imperative that thorough
research is undertaken to provide a system that is fully adaptable and practical given the
Namibian conditions.
6.4.1 Addressing policy gaps
The legislative framework of England, Zambia and Namibia (Table 6-7) were reflected
upon in terms of its institutional provisions and price-setting related clauses for water and
sanitation services. Reflecting on the legislation of England and Zambia, there is a
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significant difference especially with regard to details of the price-setting process and the
role of the water service providers compared to the Namibian Act. The Water Act, 2003
for England and Wales is very detailed on the roles and functions of the regulator and the
consumer representation bodies and includes the type of information required and shared
to consumers and the relevant authorities involved. There are further performance
standards that are linked to the remuneration of the directors of companies, which are
assessed by the water regulator as well. The English Act also requires all specified
decisions made by the regular to be in the form of public notices and it specifies the
relationship between other regulators; Secretary of State, Assembly, Environment Agency
and Water Service Regulation Authority, in terms of cooperation, exchange of
information and consistency of procedures.
The Zambian Water and Sanitation Act, 1997, was also found to be very clear and
detailed with regard to functions and powers of the Regulator as well as the water
suppliers. It does however, not make explicit provision for consumer representation,
though strong bodies (WWG) are in place and working well according to interview
results.
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Table 6-7 Legal frameworks guiding the water sectors in England, Zambia and Namibia
Policy items England
(Water Act, 2003 updating the Water Industry Act, 1991)
Zambia
(Water Supply and Sanitation Act, no.28 of 1997)
Namibia
Water Resources Management Act, no. 24 of 2004)
Provision for Regulator Establishment of corporate body called Water Services
Regulation Authority
Establishment of corporate body called NWASCO Establishment of Water Regulatory Board proposed to
consist of 5 persons
General functions -Protect interest of consumers
-Develop standards of performance for water and sewerage
services
-Ensure functions of utility companies are executed properly
-Ensure that companies “secure reasonable returns on their
capital” to finance their activities
- Promote effective competition
-Provide guidance on social and environmental matters
-Provide standards of performance in relating to water supply
and sewerage services
-Advisory capacity to government, local authorities
and utilities
- Licence utilities
-Develop sector guidelines (including complaints
handling procedures)
-Establish and enforce standards
-Disseminate information to consumers
-Control pricing in water supply and effluent disposal
-Provide “quality independent assessments of water
pricing proposals by water utilities and suppliers”
-Determine maximum charges, fees and tariffs of water
supply, licences for water abstraction and use, permits
for effluent discharge and disposal.
Powers -“Promote economy and efficiency on part of companies”
-Ensure no preference or discrimination against companies
during fixing charges
-Operate within principles of best regulatory practice
-Enforce financial penalties of companies
-Ensure service delivery in compliance to Act
-Access to information to monitor utility
performance
Not explicitly mentioned
Institutional support -Enforcement authority
-Competition commission
-Technical advisory committee (board) -May establish committees to perform various
functions
Financial capacity -Payment from companies to cover costs of the Authority, CCW
and Secretary of State, Assembly
-“Funded by moneys appropriated by Parliament”
-Licence fees, grants/donations, loans
-“Funded by moneys appropriated by Parliament”
Duties of water providers -General duties of water undertakers (including duties of bulk
water suppliers) to “maintain an efficient and economical system
of water services”
-Financial conditions and compliance of providers
-Functions of water supply and sanitation utilities to
“provide efficient, affordable and sustainable water
supply or sanitation service”
-Licence conditions and compliance
-Functions of any water supplier to “ensure adequacy,
affordability, reliability of water supply”
-No specific duties of providers are indicated
Consumer representation -Establishment of Consumer Council for Water and committees
with advisory role and detailed functions
Not explicitly mentioned Not explicitly mentioned
Source: Author’s synthesis of Water Act, 2003-England; Water supply and sanitation Act, 1997-Zambia and Water Resources Management Act, 2004-Namibia
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Similarly, the Water Resources Management Act, 2004 of Namibia makes provision for the
Water Regulatory Board which is primarily responsible for tariff assessments, while setting
performance standards and monitoring of service providers are delegated to the Minister of
Agriculture, Water and Forestry. This Act was found to be vague (as indicated during
fieldwork) in terms of functions of the water suppliers (though the NamWater Act and
Local Authorities Act are in place in this regard), in compliance with licence conditions. A
major gap in the Namibian legislation (Water Resources Management Act) is that there are
no clear enforcement mechanisms outlined and hence as a result there is no clear
monitoring or performance assessments of urban water and sanitation service provision.
Based on this analysis, the research agrees with interviewees with regard to the fact the
Namibia Water Act needs to be strengthened in the areas of the functions and powers of the
‘proposed’ regulator and hence a review is justified (which is ongoing since 2007).
Furthermore, consensus of all stakeholders on policy principles is highlighted as an
important basis (and provides focus) for the price-setting related policies. The research is in
further agreement with official reports (GTZ, 2008: 13) on common policy principles
shared amongst other African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia
includes the following:
 Separation of policy and coordination roles from operation or service provision
roles
 Separation of water resource management from water supply and sanitation
 Decentralisation to regional or local government level
 Full cost recovery especially for urban areas
 “Participatory approach” including all stakeholders, especially women
 Continuous public financing towards the sector
Development of procedures, data collection, analysis and distribution is highlighted as the
strength of price-setting processes, supported by appropriate legislation. Results indicate
that effective communication and stakeholder involvement is necessary from early stages of
the price-setting process, however the process should not underestimate the strength of
political support within the process. This was particularly evident from the Zambian price-
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setting process and their initial experiences during the formation of the regulatory
framework.
6.4.2 Level of institutional positioning
It is clear from the results that the institutional roles and responsibilities are unclear and
there is uncertainty in terms of the activities and responsibilities of certain players in the
Namibia water sector, both on vertical and horizontal scale. The tested options for potential
institutional positioning were further categorised according to a modelling framework
process into preliminary, basic, intermediate and advance frameworks accordingly (Figure
6-3).
Figure 6-3: Process for selecting modelling framework for institutional positioning of potential
regulator in Namibian context. Source: (Adapted from UKWIR, 2001: 42).
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The modelling framework suggests that there are 8 basic guide questions that leads to
selection of specific frameworks, which in the case of Namibia resulted in 6 options (based
on literature review and interview results) available for selection. The framework questions
were developed based on issues that were highlighted during the fieldwork as basis for
current price-setting situation and future projections of the process. The intermediate
framework options are identified by the research as the most appropriate frameworks for
Namibia, even though the majority of the interviewees’ preferred the basic framework
which represents the current situation, where government, Department of Water Affairs
(DWA), regulates the tariff determination process in Namibia. The primary reason was lack
of technical capacity (which was also the reason as to why the current section about
regulation within the Water Management Act, 2004, has not yet been implemented) as well
as logistical and financial implications (making use of current staff within the government
office). However, the advantages and disadvantages of these options (Table 6-8) based on
interview results, justifies the selection option to suit the Namibian price-setting process,
considering the one of the water sector objectives of “appropriate and transparent water
service charges” (MAWF, 2007: 9).
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Table 6-8 Advantages and disadvantages of various framework options for service providers
Framework options Advantages Disadvantages
Preliminary
No Regulation No advantage perceived -Providers ‘profiteering’ of consumers
-Poor quality of services
-No transparency
Basic
Government Department -Administrative and logistically convenient
-Legal powers- can exert more compliance
-Political interference
-Lack of separation between policy and
operations
-Limitations imposed by financial and
cost structures
-Lack of separate and transparent
accounting
-Lack of transparency (no direct public
participation)
- Resistance to change
- Overstaffing
-Low productivity and staff motivation
(limited incentives and responsibility)
Intermediate Government
Department phasing out
towards Independent
body
-Administrative and logistically convenient
- Legal powers- can exert more compliance
- No clear time frame for phasing out
- Lack of transparency
- Political interference
Expert Panels - Increased Transparency
- Focused targets; - Increased objectivity
- Increased credibility; - Experts used when needed
-International networks
- Continuity and representation issues
- Limited authority in terms of decision
making
Advanced
Independent
- Independent decision making power
- transparency of budgets and accounts (Published
targets and decisions)
- Effective monitoring and public reporting of
required deliverables
- Objectivity; - Credibility (knowledgeable team)
- Benchmarking
- Lack of finances to operate
(Dependence on donors or service
providers)
- Complex system of regulatory tools
and implementation
Multi-utility (merger with
ECB)
-Financial incentives
(means of preventing water income being used for
other purposes)
- Work towards full cost recovery
- Separate from policy and operations
-Lack of operational autonomy
- No clear separation of sectors
Source: Author’s analysis
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The primary reasons for having a regulatory body were identified from the research as
transparency and accountability. Transparency is considered a function of accountability.
However research results have indicated that it is possible to achieve accountability with
low transparency. Hence, the options of institutional positioning were further measured
against these two elements (on a scale of 0-5) (Figure 6-4) to see how much these options
would be able to fulfil these requirements.
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Figure 6-4 Illustrates the levels of transparency and accountability attributed to the various
institutional positions of potential regulator. Source: Author’s analysis from interviewees, n=24 (including
England and Zambian perceptions on transparency).
Accountability was described as the measure that is desirable, but which is influenced by
the level of transparency. In essence many interviewees indicated that the more transparent
institutions operations are, the more accountable such an institution is for their actions. In
this regard, a government department was rated as the opposite, such that they are less
transparent, though they could be seen as being more accountable, since they “make the
rules”. In this sense, accountability was linked to decision-making power as well, which is
why expert panels were thought to be very transparent, but less accountable, for the reason
that the experts are appointed by government and are seen as not having sufficient power to
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make decisions. Most interviewees found it difficult to rank the option ‘Government
phasing out towards independent body’, since it was unsure of how it would work and thus
both transparency and accountability would be unsure, until it is known “what it is phasing
out into”. The multi-utility body (merger between water and energy utilities) and an
independent body were both seen as very accountable and transparent. The interviewees in
England and Zambia were also asked to rank their regulators in terms of transparency and it
scored 4 and 5 respectively on average, thus corresponding to the Namibian indication.
Though Multi-utility bodies were regarded so highly (based on the assumption that the
necessary guidelines and tools are already in place and are used), many interviewees did not
favour this option primarily due to sensitivity of water resources being both social and
economic resources as opposed to energy. On the contrary, some interviewees from
England and Zambia indicated that more information requirements are making the system
more complex and hence blurs transparency, and thus information requirements should be
kept simple.
Based on the results it is further suggested that the institutional positioning of a potential
regulator for Namibia be placed within the Intermediate framework, but to combine the two
options within this framework, thus resulting in an hybrid solution between establishing
expert panel within government, which would eventually be phased out towards an
independent body.
In essence, research findings indicated that the water sector characteristics warrant ‘some
form of regulation’ irrespective of the type (private or public) of service provider. The
overall role of regulator, based on results from country experiences of England and Zambia
are defined as:
 Protecting customers against high prices and services of inferior quality
 Ensuring the financial viability of the service provider
 Ensuring transparency and comparative competition in the sector
Further lessons, specifically from the Zambian experience that could be highlighted as
essential for the improvement of the Namibian process includes ensuring high political
commitment and strong coordination across various ministries to ensure effective
participation from all sectors, in this case, water, health and environmental in particular.
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The challenges of establishing regulatory bodies are summarised based on interview results
into three categories of independence (Table 6-9).
Table 6-9 Categories of independence that is needed when establishing regulatory bodies
Category of independence Example
Structural - recruitment of competent personnel (from public
and private sector) based on market related
incentives and performance assessments to avoid
‘promoting seniority above competence syndrome’.
- essential skills required are finance, IT,
engineering, economics and management
Functional - establishing mechanisms of decision- making
processes, separate from short-term political
influences
- establishing regulatory processes and tools are
time-consuming and needs constant updating to
adapt to global changes
- establish active stakeholder involvement in
decision-making process
Financial - securing self-financing sources
Source: Author’s analysis from results
Interviewees from regulators, especially in Zambia, mentioned that financial independence
is very important and significantly influences decision-making power. Furthermore, the
development of regulatory tools (standards, guidelines, information systems, comparative
reporting and tariff adjustment procedures) were recommended to be done by the regulator
staff, rather than making use of ‘consultants’ to increase understanding and implementation
capacity. This is in line with GTZ (2008:24) recommendations which also further states that
issues such as “cultural sensitivity” should be taken into consideration when making use of
external (international) expertise, for example. The water sector reform requires a shift
towards performance management (especially drawing from experience in the private
sector/commercially oriented background) as opposed to the ‘business as usual’ attitude.
Results further indicated that the regulatory process is highly dependent on the strength and
influence (as well as personalities) of the individuals involved, which presents a challenge
in terms of reputation of the regulator, which shape the perceptions of stakeholders and
hence influences the credibility of the system. Overall, to overcome, this challenge, the
research agrees with reports (Bartle and Vass, 2005: 46; Tremolet, 2006: 2) that all
stakeholders should have a sense of ownership over the process to ensure effective
participation and implementation. Proper attention (and time) should also be given to
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developing sustainable facilities/approaches to cater for the urban poor; therefore it has to
be specifically stated in all major policies, strategies and legislation.
6.4.3 Proposed implementation of regulation and governance criteria
It is clear from the results that issues of transparency, fairness, affordability, access to good
quality services and participation are common issues across stakeholders. Various areas of
interest (Table 6-10) are in conflict between stakeholders, for example consumers want
improved services at the lowest price, while providers need to recover all their costs in
providing such services under extreme conditions while at same time government would
like universal access to water services for free, without subsidising those that cannot afford.
Hence, the research proposes that these challenges are best addressed by establishing
regulatory body (ideally independent) to “balance” these various conflicting issues. In this
regard, the role of an independent regulator would be to ensure that appropriately charged
service delivery meets the quality requirements to ensure sustainability of service. This is
even more pertinent in a water scarce and income skewed country, such as Namibia.
Independent regulation constitutes a balance between the legal mandate, resources and
operating principles. One without the other is not ruled out; however it is most likely to
affect the performance of the sector as well as the creditability and legitimacy of the
institution. This being said, it is recognised (based on results) that political interests are, in
almost all cases inevitable, thus it is the ‘art of regulation’ to know the boundaries of such
pressure influences.
In addition, literature (Rouse, 2007: 25; Bartle and Vass, 2005: 15-18; van Baston, 2007: 5)
indicates that in many cases local government is responsible for water services, and
therefore sets the prices through an internal process (self-regulation), however due to large
budget allocation system (for mixed services) the process is often not transparent. The
challenge remains that water supply is necessarily run as a monopoly service where market
signals relating to service levels against price cannot operate. However well-managed,
producer interests always tend to overwhelm consumer interests for the lowest reasonable
prices.
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Table 6-10: Stakeholder interests and challenges and the proposed role of a regulator
Stakeholders Interests/issues Challenges Proposed regulator’s role to address challenges
- Access to information, to understand bills, payment and service options
available
- Negative perception against providers
- Awareness raising/ proper
representation
- Transparency
Establish Customer representation body (informed) to assess
consumer complaints (procedures in place to measure consumer
satisfaction)
- Lower prices for Improved services (affordability/willingness to pay)
- Involvement technology choices (eg. Sewerage/pre-paid water meter
preferred)
- Appropriate technology
selection
Ensure effective public consultation and information
dissemination process takes place
Consumers
- Special rates for urban poor required - Identification and criteria of
those in need (needs assessment)
Subsidies directed at the poor to provide assistance on access
charges, and either low-tariff pre-payment meters or means
tested direct support on water bill payments
Financial sustainability
- expanding their revenue base
- develop new tariff structure
- reduction of non core assets
- Acquiring relevant information
(especially financial)
- Transparency
- Timely (advance schedule) price adjustment application
process/mechanism in place
- Information requirements and analysis guidelines (cost
declaration procedures)
- Identify Performance indicators
Full cost recovery (high debts)
- improving debtors management and collection of revenue
Enforceable sanctions (both for providers and consumers)
Good quality service delivery Service deterioration Monitoring of service levels- benchmarking
Operation performance
- efficiency improvement
- expanding water network
-replace worn out infrastructure
-revised structures (introduce business development and revenue sections)
Service deterioration Asset management plan monitoring procedures/guidelines
Finding alternative water sources
- develop and implement water master plan
Water resource depletion Water conservation and management initiatives
Providers (Bulk
and Local)
Maintaining water quality
-follow Namibian guidelines for evaluation of drinking water for human
Health implications Quality standard monitoring
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Stakeholders Interests/issues Challenges Proposed regulator’s role to address challenges
consumption (based on WHO standards)
Legal framework implementation Institutional development and
Capacity building required
- Review, update and implement legal framework
- Role and responsibility clarification/identification in process
Access to water for all-political front-more votes Political will - Engage with all stakeholders and information sharing
Non-existent tariff development procedure Capacity building - Review tariff structure/rates and
- Establish procedures/guidelines for process
Government
Unclear public subsidies - Dependency syndrome
- Untargeted beneficiaries
- Fairness
- Transparency
- Review subsidy capacity and sustainability across all sectors
(participatory)
- Investigate cross-subsidisation procedure/sustainability
- Solicit external support
Source: Interest issues and challenges raised during interviews conducted in April-June 2007 and October-December 2008, Windhoek, Namibia. Proposed regulator’s role
was taken from experiences from other countries, especially England (interviews during July 2008) and Zambian (interviews during November 2008) regulatory system.
Chapter 6: A framework for price-setting processes
226
Steady policy regulations should be developed to ensure that mechanisms are in place to
make the transition from ‘Government to Independent regulator’ (as proposed by
interviewees) over a specific time frame. Figure 6-5 is an attempt (based on experiences
from England and Zambia) to predict the Namibian process towards phasing out.
Review and
commence Water Act
Establish consumer
involvement process
Source funding for
operations
Subsidy schemes
defined
Phase out towards
independent body
Assessment of
provider capacities
Public
consultation
Establish regulatory
procedures and tools
2009 201520132011
Recruitment of staff
Investigation for
appropriate accounting
model (including
accounting separation
methods)
Figure 6-5 Proposed timeline for implementation of immediate regulatory framework in Namibia.
Source: Author’s analysis based on results.
The interview results indicate that the process of establishing a regulatory framework is
timely and iterative, and thus the research estimates that it will take approximately 6 years
to set the initial foundation towards a regulatory body in Namibia. However, the
implementation of the proposed regulatory framework options requires operating principles
as a condition for ‘good regulation’. Therefore, the regulatory framework options were
tested against commonly advocated principles summarised (Table 6-11) from literature
(Berg, 2000; (BRC, 2005); Stern and Holder, 1999) to identify the principle requirements
for implementation in Namibia.
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Table 6-11 Regulation principles measured against the proposed regulatory frameworks
Regulation principles Preliminary
Framework
Basic
Framework
Intermediate
Framework
Advanced
Framework
communication (information to
stakeholders on a timely and
accessible basis)^
- - - x
consultation (participation of
stakeholders in meetings)^
- x x x
Consistency^* - - - x
Predictability^ - - x x
Flexibility^ - x x -
independence ^’ (autonomy in that
decisions are free from political
influence)
- - - x
effectiveness and efficiency^ - - x x
Accountability^*’ - - x x
Transparency^* - - x x
Proportionality* - - - x
Targeting* - x x x
Clarity of roles’ - - x x
Securing adequate resources^ - - - x
Quality of staff^ - - x x
Source: (Berg, 2000) ^; (BRC, 2005)*; (Stern and Holder, 1999)’
In the Namibian context it is recommended that the establishment of a regulator should be
based on six primary elements: 1) clarity of roles; 2) autonomy; 3) accountability; 4)
securing adequate financial resources, which should reflect ‘financial sustainability’; 5)
independence (i.e autonomy free from political influences)’ and, based on fieldwork
experiences, 6) ‘quality’ of the staff employed. So far, the ideal scenarios of good
regulation were identified, however in practice all the ‘right’ elements are not present,
which makes the task of independent regulators very complicated, yet not impossible.
In summary, the following lessons were directly deduced from the three (England and
Zambia) country case studies (including the Electricity sector of Namibia):
 Develop sound objectives, policies (including clear roles and responsibilities) and
guidelines including the need for adequate cost recovery for sustainability
 Ensure effective public consultation and information dissemination takes place
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 Monitor compliance (including system extension and increased access targets) by
service providers
 Establish agreed process for setting tariffs and standards (defined key performance
indicators required)
 External support to pay for the start-up costs of regulator (or similar body) is critical
 Local water committees (consumer representatives) to provide the focus for public
participation
 Empower regulators (or equivalent bodies) to hold service providers to account for
delivering efficient and affordable services to the poor
 Give priority to the needs of the poor in public investment and service provision
strategies for water and sanitation
Finally, there are various types of regulation (Table 6-12) depending on sector objectives
which influences the model of regulation that is implemented to suit the specific needs of a
country.
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Table 6-12 types of regulation available and countries where it is implemented
Type of Regulation Description Example
Structural* -Contribute to better organisation
and clarification of roles of
various institutions in accordance
with legal framework.
-Direct monitoring of holistic
process
-Indirect control over operators
Portugal, Sweden,
Behavioural* - Concerned with behaviour of
operators to ensure service
quality
Portugal; Netherlands, Canada,
USA
Economic* -Function of behavioural
regulation
- Monitoring economic and
financial feasibility (includes
evaluation of operator’s
investments to “ensure long term
service and short, medium and
long-term maintenance of service
levels)
-Monitors operator’s
performance
-Promotion of competition
(benchmarking)
England, Scotland, Wales
Portugal; Zambia, Australia,
Canada
Incentive-based^ -Controls the overall price level
(rate of return; price-cap;
revenue-cap and benchmarking
(yardstick)) of operators
England
Source: *(Alegre et al., 2006: 82-84); ^(Jamison et al., 2004)
Fieldwork results from England suggested strongly that economic regulation assumes that
social interests are included in the investment plans or policies of the operators and this
indirectly caters for social welfare of the consumer base. There is a thin line between
behavioural and economic regulation and thus the major difference is the detail in which
the latter is implemented. However, various country conditions requires various regulation
types, for example, a country with infrastructural challenges, requires behavioural
regulation, whereas countries with “more dynamic technology” might opt for structural
regulation instead (Alegre et al., 2006: 84-85). In this case, the research proposes that
Namibia focus on structural regulation, so as to avoid issues such as ‘over-regulation’ as
mentioned in the other case countries. This type of regulation is also selected, due to the
size (one bulk water supplier) and nature (local authorities) of the water sector in Namibia.
Chapter 6: A framework for price-setting processes
230
Finally, the research identifies the following major regulatory tools are recommended as
‘stepping stones’ to achieve transparency in the Namibian process, based on England and
Zambia experiences:
 Financial model5: There is a clear need for a shared financial model between the
providers and regulators to ensure that all relevant information is captured in one
system to come up with an appropriate tariff. In this regard, the research suggests
separate, yet linked models (spreadsheets) for bulk and municipal services- for bulk
water services, accounting separation for domestic, mining and irrigation services
and for municipal services. Accounting separation of water services from other
municipal services is also advised, to clearly understand the costs involved for water
and sanitation services. Hence this process will address the separate pricing
processes (double principal-agent challenges that exist on bulk and retail price
determination levels) in Namibia, and thus will indicate how prices of bulk and
retail levels are interlinked. Furthermore, the research suggests an inclusion of tariff
basket approach as part of the financial model, as per the England case. The tariff
basket allows for tariffs to include different customer income levels per service
levels as well give an indication of how tariffs can be shared out across customers of
different income levels (basis for cross-subsidy calculations). Although a financial
model could not be developed during the research period (due to limited access to
relevant data), the research strongly advocates for a financial model – similar
(matching the financial revenue and revenue from tariff baskets) to that being used
by the Water Industry Commission of Scotland. This model is perceived as simpler
than Aquarius combines financial and customer base information in one single file.
(Illustrated in Appendix K) to enable providers and the proposed regulator to do
basic tariff calculations. Based on literature (Gunatilake et al., 2008: 12; OFWAT,
2008b: 11), the model should be designed to calculate required revenue with the
appropriate regulatory framework, using the basic formula of:
Operating costs (OPEX) + Taxes + depreciation + capital costs (allowed return)
5 The suggestion is mostly based on England’s financial model, Aquarius, which was studied by the
researcher during fieldwork period as a result of June returns submitted by companies to Ofwat.
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 Cost of capital for state owned enterprises: is a contentious issue (especially in
England, for private companies) and thus the research suggests that it be defined in
the Namibian context as well as the appropriate profitability levels. The
internationally accepted level of profitably is at 6-8%, however, the research, based
on fieldwork experience, recommend that an appropriate cost of capital level be
developed for state owned enterprises, from which full cost recovery can then be
defined.
 Tariff structure: To address affordability of water and sanitation services, the
research supports the Walker reviews (Walker, 2009: 51) in terms of application of
fairness principles, of which the increasing tariff blocks is a good reflection. This
tariff structure should thus be used to further indicate the ability of higher income
users to subsidise those that cannot afford, hence customer income profile (based on
skewed income distribution) should be reflected in the tariff structure. Furthermore,
clear indicators to measure affordability should be developed, to facilitate the role of
the regulator to set achievable standards. Such indicators could include coverage,
cost of new connections and waiting time and procedures for new connections.
 Incentives for efficiency: Based on the fieldwork results, especially from the
regulatory process in Zambia, the research suggests that the proposed regulator
places a strong emphasis on identifying incentives for NamWater and municipalities
to improve service efficiency, especially due to the nature of state-owned service
providers and in the absence of competition. Efficiency gains in Zambia focuses on
issues such as reduction of major costs items, such as personnel and energy costs,
but also high emphasis is placed on reduction of non-revenue water levels. As such,
performance analysis forms part of setting a tariff. Similarly, the research
recommends that improvement of service providers serve as incentives for the
company to eventually reduce costs of providing an existing service level, which
will translate into quality services at lower prices for consumers. The research
further supports a similar (traffic light approach with key performance indicators in
Zambia) benchmarking regulatory tool to assess performance of service providers.
 Consumer involvement: The importance of consumer involvement cannot be
overemphasised as a result of the fieldwork in England and Zambia. Hence in this
regard, the research recommends the establishment of a consumer body, which is a
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combination of the consumer representation found in England (skilled interested)
and Zambia (community elected). In this regard, the research envisages a consumer
representation body that is consists of a combination of skilled experts (that knows
the technical details of the process) and community committee members as
facilitated by the City of Windhoek. At National level, a Board is suggested, with
regional committees consisting of not more than 10 members, with a dedicated
number of staff (approximately 15) in office. Though results indicated that the
interests of low-income users were mostly represented, the body should concentrate
on all income level consumers. The body should be entrusted with legal mandate to
represent consumers and should have advisory powers to support the proposed
regulator. The committee should be research oriented, guided by indicators similar
to the Overall Performance Assessment (OPA) undertaken in England, with an
allocated budget and allowances for members as incentives to ensure consumer
consumer’s rights are protected.
The research strongly advocate that the water and sanitation service function remains
within service delivery functions of local authorities, however accounting separation is
highly recommended, such that the costs for service provision is clear and not part of the
cross-subsidisation across services within the municipality. Furthermore, the research
recognises that regulation cannot be done without having a financial model in place and
hence forms a major part of the implementation of a regulatory framework. The research
also recognise the fact that a gradual approach is required (hence the recommendation for
structural regulatory framework) for tariff setting in Namibia, such that the initial stage
should be to set tariffs to achieve cost recovery of operation and maintenance; followed by
recovery of capital charges and eventually reaching full cost recovery (including economic
and environmental costs) as indicated by (Rogers et al., 1998: 7). However, before that
stage is reached, additional measures such as improved governance, institutional
development (especially a regulator) and service quality is required to take into account
willingness (and ability) to pay as indicated in Figure 2-4 (Gunatilake et al., 2008: 24)
given appropriate consumer involvement and information sharing mechanisms are in place
to address relevant principal-agent challenges.
Different from the England case study, the research suggests that given the Namibian
political environment, the proposed regulator would not initially start off as independent,
meaning to set the prices, but would play a very strong advisory role to the Minister. The
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regulator would ensure that the final tariffs are based on clear regulatory principles;
however the Minister would have the final decision over tariff approvals.
6.5 Chapter summary
Overall, transparency is very important to improve the price-setting process, provided the
information is available (and reliable) and expectations, roles and responsibilities are
developed inline with sector objectives. The notion of recovering full costs mostly refers to
full supply cost as opposed to full cost (which includes economic and environmental
externalities) and hence needs to be understood in that context. In applying regulation
theories the study suggests that institutional development forms part of the solution to
address the problems facing the water sector in Namibia, which to a large extent is due to
information asymmetry from the service providers (both bulk and local providers).
The research further develops a modelling framework for regulation options that can be
applied in general. In this case, establishing a hybrid regulatory body (consisting of a
combination between government and independent expert panels) within an intermediate
framework is identified by research to improve the price-setting process. Given the specific
country conditions and the status of water sector in Namibia, the research further suggest
that structural regulation is best suited, to keep the process as simple as possible. The
research also further suggests an additional domain: governance regulation as part of the
effective regulation approach, as the role of government to “regulate the regulator”. Though
subsidies are seen as unsustainable, it is inevitable in a highly skewed income country like
Namibia and therefore it has to be imbedded in policies and should form part of the price-
setting process to ensure that the urban poor can afford these basic services. Finally, the
research identifies crucial operating principles specific for the price-setting process in
Namibia, consisting of 1) clarity of roles; 2) autonomy; 3) accountability; 4) securing
adequate financial resources; 5) independence (i.e autonomy free from political influences)’
and 6) ‘quality’ of the staff employed. Regulatory tools, especially the development of a
shared financial model are identified as key to the regulatory framework, to ensure that the
identified principles are implemented efficiently. In essence, accountability through
transparency (effective information sharing and stakeholder involvement) is identified by
the study to address the principal-agent challenges faced within Namibia, especially given
the extreme conditions of Namibia.
“Because things are the way they are, things will not stay the way they are”- Bertold Brecht
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications
This chapter presents the major conclusions of the research, drawing from both literature
and results from the fieldwork conducted in England, Zambia and Namibia (focus of study).
This chapter will make ultimate conclusions about the research hypothesis, problem and the
investigated objectives. It further highlights the implications of the research on theory and
policy and practice for the major water sector stakeholders. The major limitations to the
research are indicated, reflecting on alternative options of conducting the research, which
may have been more beneficial for obtaining the thesis objectives. Finally further research
implications and opportunities are highlighted
7.1 Conclusions about the research proposition
Reflecting on the proposition of the study:
Access to information and stakeholder involvement is required for a sustainable urban
water and sanitation price-setting process, especially in a water scarce and skewed
income distribution country,
the researcher finds the research statement true, such that it is presently not possible for a
civil servant, or civil society, to understand how prices are set from the financial
information available from service providers or responsible government institutions, in the
public domain. Hence it is clear that a more transparent information system about supply
costs and pricing calculations would assist in allowing independent assessment of the
efficiency of water providers (both bulk and local authority level), especially where
resources are limited, a point categorically confirmed by fieldwork respondents.
The regulatory processes in England and Zambia presented important insights through
which the research could draw conclusions that can be related to improve the Namibian
price-setting experiences. These conclusions include identifying clear roles and
responsibilities for the water sector stakeholders (guided by very specific and detailed
legislative frameworks). Expectations from such stakeholders should be clarified and
publicised such that there are no misconceptions and misguided perceptions from involved
stakeholders. Clear procedures, guidelines and enforcement (and incentives) mechanisms
makes the regulatory process for sustainable price-setting more transparent, consistent and
predictable, which are elements very important for legitimate institutional frameworks.
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7.2 Conclusions about the research problem
Namibia, like other lower-income countries, is prone to the challenges of catering for the
growing water and sanitation requirements placed on water utilities and governments.
However, Namibia’s situation is more sensitive in the sense that it operates within extreme
unequal conditions, both in terms of water availability (access) and income distribution.
Further it is faced with a multiple relations of principal-agent challenges, of which
information asymmetry within the water sector is present from all stakeholders. In the midst
of these challenges lies the problem of improper accountability for price-setting for urban
water and sanitation services, which is undertaken by two levels of service providers (bulk
and retail), which magnifies the problem of financial transparency (reporting on capital,
operating and maintenance costs involved) and hence attributes to improper pricing and
cost-recovery. Though Namibia’s water sector is providing a relatively good service, in
comparison to other countries in the region, it makes it even more pertinent to address these
principal-agent relationships to ensure that utilities are able to maintain, repair and expand
their systems, avoiding any deterioration of the quality of water and sanitation services.
Furthermore, the need for users to understand the process of “putting a price on water”,
given the scarce resource, is very important to be sufficiently used as means to solve the
problem of cost recovery and wastage. The research problem was addressed through a set
of objectives, through which specific conclusions were drawn. The conclusions per
objectives are as follows:
 Identify specific lessons/experiences from price-setting processes in selected
counties, England and Zambia, to suggest improvements to the Namibian price-
setting process
Independent economic regulators improve both efficiency of service deliver and
transparency and hence accountability of service providers, though it does not guarantee
affordability or debt recovery from consumers. Consumer representation bodies in support
of the regulatory process play a crucial role in ensuring that consumers’ views are well
represented and that they do not pay higher than necessary for good quality services. Hence
information asymmetry can be reduced by having well defined regulatory frameworks in
place; however it should also be recognised that financial regulatory tools could over-
complicate the process and hence a major lesson from these countries is to keep the tools as
simple as possible.
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 Understand the current price review process in Namibia, within the legal framework
in terms of its capacity to deliver water and sanitation services to urban consumers
(particularly the urban poor)
The current price-setting process in Namibia is characterised by lack of information
(access), financial transparency with no information database or procedures for tariff
determination in place. Hence the process needs improvement as well as stakeholder
involvement to facilitate common understanding of the process. The legal framework needs
to be more detailed and specific on the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders.
Furthermore, it is clear that the proposed regulatory board needs to be implemented as one
of the solutions to address the challenges of the price-setting process. The issues of political
interests will be addressed through having clear guidelines and procedures as well as clear
Act on the role of government within the regulatory framework.
 Determine the affordability levels of water and sanitation services for urban poor in
Namibia and the potential role of cross-subsidisation amongst domestic water users.
Affordability is a function of priority preferences over access to water services. A level of
information asymmetry also exists on the part of consumers, such that their income levels
are not known and thus information to support a targeted sustainable and transparent
subsidy system is lacking. There is a strong sense of understanding of why basic services
are priced (but not how) as well as a strong sense of willingness to pay. Subsidies in general
are considered unsustainable; however it is inevitable in a highly skewed income country
like Namibia. In this regard, the responsibility of who should provide such subsidies to
those that are unable to afford basic services are unclear and should be defined based on
sector objectives and needs. Services are perceived to be well maintained and operated,
though access to information and transparency, especially regarding operational expenses
(mainly salaries of utility directors) as a function of profit and hence the price paid by
consumers is required.
 Identify the perceived level of transparency and stakeholder involvement required
for the price-setting process in Namibia
The need for a regulator is highlighted with the primary roles of tariff determination,
ensuring financial viability of service providers through regulatory tools, procedures and
guidelines. Information requirements include full costing of service related information,
such that consumers can (with relative ‘ease’) understand how the prices are determined.
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Consumer representation is preferred as opposed to individual involvement in the process.
In general consumers are reluctant about the details of the price-setting process as long as
there is satisfaction from the services delivered.
 Identify the appropriate regulatory framework needed to improve current price-
setting process in Namibia, especially towards the urban poor, to inform relevant
policy accordingly
An intermediate regulatory framework, with a hybrid system of making use of expert
panels within government, which will eventually phase out towards an independent agency
(proposed within 6 years) is identified for the Namibian process. The focus of such an
agency is proposed to be of a ‘structural regulation’ nature, which will initially focus on
roles and responsibilities, establishing procedures, guidelines and enforcement mechanisms.
This falls within the ‘building foundations’ category of the effective regulatory approach.
The capacity of the regulator also plays a crucial role in addressing information
asymmetries within principal-agent relationships in order to determine “informational
requirements; obtaining and managing information; data quality assessment; reporting
information and ensuring public access to information”.
The general conclusion from the research is that a regulatory framework would not only
facilitate the process of transparency through access to information and stakeholder
involvement in the price-setting process but it would also enforce incentive mechanisms for
service providers to deliver sustainable (through adequate tariff determination strategies to
recover costs) water and sanitation services to all consumers. Hence a regulator is not only
essential, it is critical for the price-setting process in Namibia to understand the high costs
of service provision in water scarcity conditions and how to manage it according to the
acceptable standards of all involved stakeholders.
7.3 Implications for theory and contribution to knowledge
The research rationalised regulation theory through the use of the principal-agent challenge
in the water sector. In this sense the major contribution to academic knowledge and
understanding of this research is that it suggests that the intersection between the principal-
agent theory and stakeholder theory is regulation theory. Regulation theory deals with the
technical financial details, which are necessary to understand the nature of setting prices on
water and sanitation services, while also considering non-price issues such as stakeholder
interests (including political interests and their unwillingness to charge for water services).
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The emphasis is that regulatory frameworks (including related institutions) form the
solution (or part of) to addressing information asymmetry relationships between
stakeholders with conflicting interests.
Thus to further academic understanding, the research makes a new synthesis of existing
theories applied to new area (Namibia) that have not yet been researched. Hence the
research indicates that it is even more challenging to achieve such regulatory frameworks in
the complex price-setting conditions faced by decision makers in Namibia, given the
extreme inequality and water scarcity nature. In this regard, the major conclusion is that in
Namibia three major principal-agent relationships exists; between government and service
providers, service providers and consumers and vice versa and therefore there is a need for
a regulator to address these issues. The need for a regulator is even more pertinent given the
‘double information asymmetry’ existing amongst two separate levels of service providers.
A further conclusion from the research is that government does not have the necessary
psychology or capacity to handle such demands and hence an independent regulatory
agency is necessary to act as an ‘insulating layer’ to be accountable for setting efficient
prices and promoting service quality and reliability as a priority and promoting the
necessary investment for sustainable service delivery to all.
7.4 Implications for policy and practice
The research has established that a regulatory framework is very important for sustainable
water and sanitation services, especially with regard to the price-setting process. The role of
the stakeholders within the regulatory framework needs to be clarified, to avoid
misperceptions. The perceptions of the consumers are mostly determined by the quality of
service provided, as well as the level of transparency, which is driven by information
available and customer service of providers.
Reflecting on price-setting processes taking place in England and Zambia provides good
insight into how regulators operate and guides the price-setting process towards efficient
service delivery. The conditions of each country are different and thus regulatory operations
are driven by country specifications. It has been further established in this research that all
stakeholders, irrespective of their different interests, have aims for a sustainable water
sector, and hence there is an important role for a regulator (especially in Namibia) to ensure
that that goal is met, while balancing the conflicting interests of stakeholders. Information
and stakeholder involvement is considered as the key of regulation, which enables not only
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consumers, but also service providers, to consider the regulator as credible, competent and
reliable. Hence technical expertise is an essential ingredient for interpreting, analysing and
implementing legal and regulatory frameworks.
7.4.1 Implications for policy makers (government)
Separation of functions, service provision, regulation and monitoring, is one of the
important lessons learnt from England and Zambian experiences. Hence this study
advocates clear roles and responsibilities specified in detail within the legal framework. The
delay in revision (since 2006) of the Water Act and hence the consequent non-
implementation of the regulatory board is a clear indication of the lack of commitment
(priorities) or political support for the water sector. However, also noteworthy is the fact
that the tariffs are being thoroughly investigated which has resulted in no tariff increments
for the past 3 years, based on the request of basic information and transparency from the
bulk water providers. This research hopes to facilitate (initiate) the process of establishment
of a regulatory agency with government taking the leading role. The research further agrees
with literature that regulatory processes cannot be divorced from government completely;
however with the appropriate information and level of transparency, the process can result
in an efficient and effective system. It will also encourage service providers to strive for
service improvement and expansion to all consumers.
A challenge within the Namibia water sector is that the service providers are governed by
separate ministries. Coordination across ministries and legal frameworks are required to
ensure that prices are set as one process and not at two different levels as it is currently
taking place. Coordination is also considered to be a critical role for the regulator, to ensure
adequate stakeholder involvement in the process.
The legal and regulatory framework should ensure that regulators take into account the
pillars of sustainability (economic, social and environmental), as well as a specific focus
towards service improvement for the urban poor, with the related support for necessary
investment. Hence the research emphasises structural regulation as a stepping stone for the
Namibian process.
The research strongly recognises that other countries experiences can be used as a guide,
with specific Namibian conditions shaping the implementation of the sector objectives.
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7.4.2 Implications for service providers
The service providers need an intervention to gain trust and confidence from their
consumers. The current perceptions of consumers and other stakeholders are such that
service providers are profiteering from them. The role of a regulator is such that it
facilitates the process of trust-building with service providers and stakeholders through
information sharing and stakeholder involvement efforts.
Regulatory tools, especially financial, needs to be purpose oriented and simple. Based on
results from England and Zambia, service providers’ perceptions were influenced by the
efficiency and practicality of the regulatory tools. Measurable performance indicators are
necessary to service providers to measure their performance. Hence the research advocates
for clear targets and indicators upon which consumers can hold the company accountable.
The role of the regulator in this regard is to monitor achievement of targets and to ensure
that the price for services is adequately reflected. Further, the research indicates that service
providers respond to appropriate incentives to encourage sector performance, hence another
task for the regulator to ensure. As much as financial viability (cost recovery) of service
providers is crucial for the water sector, so is the presence of a regulator to ensure that
services and prices are sustainable for all.
7.4.3 Implications for consumer representatives (including consumers)
The research shows that for the fee that consumers pay (as part of their water bill) to have a
regulator in place, the benefits are much more. Consumers are concerned with quality of
services for an affordable price. Furthermore a clear indication of what is being paid for is a
minimum requirement from consumers, which are more than willing to pay for quality
services. Consumer representation (in support of the regulatory process) is important to
ensure that consumer’s rights and needs are catered for. However, similarly, information is
required to ensure that service providers are aware of demands.
7.5 Limitations to research
Ironically, the major difficulty in the research was the lack of written
information/procedures (including performance indicators, monitoring and enforcement
guidelines) regarding the tariff-setting process in Namibia. Overall the process was found to
be highly sensitive (and political) and significant elements of financial information,
regarding the breakdown of costs and the detailed methods by which tariffs are calculated,
could not be accessed during the research. This aspect in itself is a result of the research in
Chapter 7: Conclusions and implications
241
helping to identify the types of information requirements needed to make the process more
transparent. The research also attempted to gather the perceptions of middle and high-
income consumers’ representative bodies but these could not be located, though it was
indicated that such a body exists. In this regard, consumers from those categories, indicate
that they contact the service providers directly and as such the conclusion is that consumer
representation is more needed for low-income user groups. It was not always possible to
ensure consistency in interviewing consumers and government officials throughout the
research, due to time limitations and accessibility of those target groups. Hence the research
draws the conclusion that low-income users are more interested and accessible for research
on setting prices of water than middle and high-income users. This perhaps indicates that it
is those (low-income users) that have problems with the services that were more
responsive, whereas the rest were more ignorant and complacent with the process details.
Finally, the financial data limitations to the research presented opportunities for further
probing and therefore further confirmed the research proposition. Thus it can be concluded
that the best possible methods were explored during the research, which yielded and
contributed to interesting discoveries.
7.6 Implications for further research
The research findings are considered to be a very good starting point for addressing the
establishment of a regulator for the water sector. Further research opportunities thus are to
undertake an in-depth cost benefit analysis to understand the implications (in terms of
costs) of the suggested regulatory framework options and financial requirements to sustain
such an institution. Further related research can focus on designing (country and need
specific) regulatory procedures and tools (especially financial models-focussing on
accounting separation for bulk and municipal services), guidelines, enforcement and
incentive mechanisms required for the proposed regulator.
It would also be of great interest to explore and compare water sector regulatory
frameworks across SADC region, and to identify the role of government within such
frameworks. This exercise would be beneficial to clarify the misconception that ‘regulators
take over government’s role’. The various types of regulators (single or multiple sectors)
and their benefits should also be investigated, to add to regulatory studies in developing
countries. Of particular, interest would have been the case of Tanzanian regulator, which
regulates energy and urban water and sewerage services.
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This research can be used to define full cost recovery for the water and sanitation sector in
the context of Namibia and what it will take to reach this optimum point. Such research
would be interesting to understand if a regulator has an influence in reaching full cost
recovery. Related research to assess the capacity and capability (what would it take) of
local authorities in all towns of Namibia to reach full cost recovery levels can be conducted.
Special emphasis should be placed on pricing and access to sanitation services, which is a
vastly neglected within the sector. The research also forms the basis of understanding
affordability issues, given the skewed income distribution conditions and thus further
research and be conducted on identifying targeted subsidies (or cross-subsidies) for the
urban domestic sector and the sustainability thereof.
7.7 Closing statement
The research aimed to adapt a framework for determining a price-setting process and
investigate the potential role of a regulator to inform the process and policy accordingly in a
water scarce, highly skewed income distribution challenged country. In this regard, the
author feels that this aim and related objectives has been adequately fulfilled, irrespective of
the identified limitations. Important cross-case analysis and insights gained from England
and Zambia strengthened the research for the Namibian price-setting process tremendously
and as such it is believed that this research will inspire further research to implement
effective strategies for “putting a price on water for all”.
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Appendix A: General overview of water and sanitation services in
Windhoek
Description Statistics/
Data
Source Information
date
1, 409, 920 Namibia Population and Housing Census 1991Population of Namibia
1,800,000 Projections: National Planning Commission 2001
147 000 Namibia Population and Housing Census 1991Population of
Windhoek
251 545 Windhoek Residents’ Survey: Probable
Variant Projection
2001
Formal/informal
population split in
2001
186 045 Formal
65 500 Informal
Projection (Windhoek Urbanisation Report by
City of Windhoek)
2001
% having all
(individual) services:
73,96%
Estimations by Department Planning,
Urbanisation & Environment : Division
Sustainable Development)
% without access either
to individual/communal
water supply: 0,3%
Estimations made by the above Division,
based on Informal Settlement Health Report
(Department Infrastructure, Water and
Technical Services: Division Health &
Scientific Services)
% of Windhoek
population with access
to water, sanitation and
electricity
% having access to
communal water taps:
25,74%
% without access to
individual or communal
sanitation: ± 16%
Estimations by Department Planning,
Urbanisation & Environment : Division
Sustainable Development)
Estimations by Department Planning,
Urbanisation & Environment : Division
Sustainable Development based on Informal
Settlement Health Report (Department
Infrastructure, Water and Technical Services:
Division Health & Scientific Services)
July 2001
N$ 1 526.67 for Low
Income Groups
Primary Household
Subsistence Level for
Windhoek (per month)
N$ 1 815.48 for Low-
Middle Income
Households
Household Subsistence Level Study for
Windhoek and Swakopmund by J F Potgieter
March 2001
Source: City of Windhoek: Demographic and Other Urban Data, November 2001
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Appendix B: Status of all Informal settlements in Windhoek.
Zone/Area Name Area (ha) Households Population
(@4
persons/hh)
Water
services
Sanitation
services
Okahandja Park A 20.442 368 1471 - -
Okahandja Park B 7.377 270 1080 - -
Okahandja Park C 9.788 131 523 - -
Ongulumbashe No 2 12.069 281 1122 - -
Ongulumbashe No 1 6.844 176 705 - -
Havana Section 1 (Township) 8.253 205 820 - -
Havana Section 2 (Ext1) 28.807 879 3514 - -
One Nation No 2* 17.528 313 1253 - -
Okantunda 8.274 204 816 - -
Samuel Maharero 10.142 242 969 - -
Okandundu 4.807 185 739 - -
Onyika No 2 4.966 255 1019 - -
Twahangana
(Former Greenwell Matongo A and
B)
8. 698 376 1502 4 WP 5 TB
Greenwell Matongo C 8.730 291 1163 5 WP 4 TB
Greenwell Matongo D 4.697 273 1093 4 WP 3 TB
Ombili No 1 1.707 41 163 - -
One Nation No 1 10.741 172 688 3 WP -
Omuthiya 3.895 191 762 2 WP -
Onghuwo Ye Pongo No 2* 5.481 271 1083 2 WP -
Omuramba 4.156 181 725 0 WP -
Freedomland A 2.146 154 616 - -
Freedomland B 1.863 184 736 0 WP -
Jonas Haiduwa 5.477 272 1088 4 WP -
Ondelitotela* 4.191 266 1063 - -
Source: T. Van der Westhuisen, May 2001. Useful data on settlement development projects of the City of
Windhoek as of 1992. (note some of the data is not updated and is from the 1997 informal census conducted
by the City of Windhoek) . (-) means that no information is available about this area; WP – Water Points; TB-
Toilet Blocks.
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Appendix C: Information needs table
Subject Characteristic Requirement Comments
Policies/Legislation - policies in place
-roles and responsibilities
Activity and Responsibility
matrix
- who is responsible
for it- who is doing it
(involved) and who is
only interested
Socio-economic Population figures Number of resident persons
and households
- this is to ease
sampling process
- Existing water coverage
by levels of service
(measured as percentage
of population).
- population figures
Maps illustrating- coverage
area, population in areas and
type of water services across
Windhoek (and if possible
price ranges across map)
- total amount of users of
service
- hours of water provision
- target dwellings
- delivery type
- payment (connection costs)
-the extent to which
the poor is served and
gives an indication of
justification and
necessity of subsidies.
(Franceys 2006-lecture
notes)
-Differentiate between
water and sanitation
per service levels and
population
Customer differentiation - means of identifying different
income level consumers
- current availability of socio-
economic data to carry out a
tariff study
- Map including
residential locations
and water sourcing
points
socio-economic profile
of the population
presently served and
unserved?
Household
income/expenditure
- (ideally)spatial representation
on income across the supply
area
- (adequate) income
distribution of the current or
intended supply area
- potential area of supply is
changing or has changed, why?
- income or
expenditure data are
seldom available,
except on national or
regional basis and are
often out of date and
unreliable.
- change question is
aimed at eliciting
whether income are
growing or expected to
grow faster or slower
than national average.
Change in income and
demand pattern as
coverage increases
- who has no public supply at
present? (describe)
- is the market to be
diluted as service area
expands?
- incentives to supply
becomes important in
this regard
Willingness to pay for
piped service or an
improved service
Willingness to pay survey
(previously done studies?)
- Willingness and Ability to
Pay graphs
- Attitude and ability and take
action graphs
Evaluate the tendency
to connect on part of
those groups currently
without piped supply.
Future options of service Water and sanitation -details of options, costs - options to be used
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Subject Characteristic Requirement Comments
improvements service options to all
areas
implications for consumers during willingness to
pay surveys
Financial Tariff systems -Tariff systems implemented
over years
- Price/tariff trend graphs (over
years)
- Demand and Supply
patterns??
Costs - specify total revenue
requirements
- Operating and maintenance
expenditures and cost of
capital
Investments -Investment figures
- types of investments
- Capital investment graphs
(over years)
- is the focus of
investment also
directed to poor?
- full cost recovery?
Subsidies - Who is it targeted? Who
benefits?
- How is it calculated?
Water Use implications for water
allocation
Are there any possibilities of
inter-sectoral/multi-
use/alternative uses of water
and? Are there any resulting
implications for charging?
Consumption rates consumption profile of the
served population by socio-
economic strata and by levels
of service
- Water consumption vs cost
graphs
Monitoring of prices Institutional
arrangements
- management and admin
- organisational autonomy
-enfoncement abilities
- commercial orientation
-consumer orientation
(transparency/information
sharing)
- give an idea of need
for independent
regulator
Source: adapted from (Sohail, 2004)
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Appendix D: Interview Guides
Note: Similar interview guides were used for all
Country interviews. The guides are specific to
target groups.
Service Providers/Goverment
General
 What is the company mission/vision? Is
it targeted to the poor as well?
 Which price-setting policies guide your
institution? Is there a need for these to be
reviewed?
Coverage
 What is the present coverage in the area,
by levels of service?
 What is the socio-economic profile of the
population presently served?
 What is the consumption profile of the
served population by socio-economic
strata and by levels of service?
Price-setting process
 Are you currently operating on a cost
recovery basis?
 What is the justification of the present
tariff structure? (economic/political) who
designed it? When? On which basis? Is
the tariff study available?
 How are constraints of water availability
reflected in the price setting process?
 How are the costs of sanitation services
reflected in the price setting process? Is it
a separate process to water services?
How different is it?
 Which consumer groups are principal
contributors to revenue?
 What proportion of costs (with or without
capital charges) are recovered? Do most
users pay close to average costs and high
users meet capacity expansion costs? Are
the marginal expansion costs high
compared with average costs?
 How are connection charges related to
costs? Are they relative to income? Is
there evidence that they discourage legal
connection?
 How many of the consumers pay
minimum charges and why?
 How functional are the meters (what is
replacement rate?)
 What is the operators perception about
the current tariff structure and its
efficiency for extending the provision of
services (improving the level of service)
to the poor?
 What is the demand for service from the
population presently not
served/improperly served?
 What objectives are set in the contract, in
terms of extension/improvement of the
service (to the poor?)
 What would be, under the present tariff
structure, the consequences (in terms of
financial sustainability) of extending the
service coverage to that population?
 How effective are the current tariff
structures for cost recovery from urban
poor? How do measure it?
 Can the urban poor afford the current
prices charged for water and sanitation
services? What can be done?
 What is the socio-economic profile of the
population presently not served/improper
served?
 What is the current availability of socio-
economic data to carry out a tariff study?
 What subsidies are embedded in the
present tariff structure (how are they
distributed between socio-economic
strata, and by levels of service? Do you
think there is a justifiable need for extra-
sectoral subsidies?
 Are there other general issues regarding
the tariff structure in terms of: economic
efficiency (such as deterrent industrial
rates); equity (such as: next door
neighbour is charged at a different rate);
financial sustainability (such as revenue
declines faster than consumption due to
block rates)
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o Is it possible to specify total
revenue requirements
o Operating and maintenance
expenditures and cost of capital
o How do you ensure
sustainability of institution
through pricing system
o What are the future costs
required to ensure
sustainability?
o Should there be a need for user
charges- what would be the
basis of it?
o To what extent can existing
patterns of charging be adapted
to ensure financial cost recovery
Monitoring of price-setting process
 How are the prices monitored and by
whom? Is it effective?
 Are there issues regarding the timely
application of the price adjustment
mechanism, or other threats on the
general tariff level for regulatory
(political) reasons?
 What is the position of the
client/regulator regarding a reform of the
tariff structure (who is in charge? Where
is it written? Is it a national tariff
structure? Is there an explicit procedure
for undertaking a reform? By law?
 Do you think there is a need for
independent regulator? Why? What
would its role be? How will it benefit the
urban poor?
Relations with other water and sanitation
institutions
 Which other institutions are involved in
your price-setting process and for what
purpose?
 How do your institution operations affect
the other water providers, if any?
 What do you think there is a role for PPP
in the water and sanitation sector? And
how can it work?
Water availability (conservation measures)
 What is the interest of the institution: cost
recovery or water conservation?
 What kind of water conservation
techniques are you using? Is it working?
What cost implications does it have for
customers?
 What do you think will lead to better
water use?
 What is the water status of Windhoek and
how will Windhoek be supplied with
water in the future? (given the present
urbanisation rate?)
Service provision and Customer relations
 How would you describe the quality of
the services provided to the urban poor
by your institution? (table for water and
sanitation)
 Can services be provided through
alternative means? How and which
means?
 What is the population’s perception about
water tariffs? What is the awareness of
the subject? Is the utility/public authority
communicating on the subject?
 What is the level of participation of
customers in selection of type of services
provided?
 What is the level of participation of
customers in price determination?
 Is there willingness and ability to pay for
these services?
Other
 Is there anything else you want to say on
this topic, that I haven’t asked? Do you
know anyone else I can talk to about this
topic?
 Is there anything else that you want to
ask me?
Guides for domestic users
Household information  How many people in the household
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 How long have you been here
 Gender and age composition of
household
 Gender and age of persons collecting
water
 Education level of the household head
 How many people are working in the
house
 Occupation of all adults in household
 Total household income per
month/expenditure per month
Existing water services information
 What kinds of services are provided to
you? (water/sanitation –make tick boxes)
 Ownership of water using fixtures; bath,
shower, WC, sink, dish water, washing
machine, garden water items
 Volume of abstracted water used in litres
per head per day
 Composition of use (%): cooking and
drinking, bathing, showers and personal
washing, washing of clothes, house,
vehicles, sanitation, garden other
 Water storage: type storage by volume
 Total monthly expenditure on water
services
 How would you describe the quality of
the services (good, average, bad)
 How would you describe your water
situation in your household (good,
average, poor)
 What do you think about water
availability in Windhoek
 Have you receive any information on
how you should use water? Was the
information useful?
Existing sanitation services information
 Type of service: water closet with piped
connection to sewer; own latrine,
communal latrine, septic tank, open areas
 Type of treatment at point of service
 Means of removal of urine and faeces:
flushing to sewer or septic tank,
collection from latrine, direct to lake or
river, other
 Charges for services; collection;
treatment and disposal
 Total monthly expenditure on waste
water services
 Service times
 Service reliability
Ability to pay for water and sanitation services
 Refer to Income level of household
(ranges)
 What other expenses do you face and
how do you prioritise payment?
 How much of your income are you
spending on water? (maybe not necessary
to ask?- can be calculated from income
level and price they pay for water??)
Service Providers/ Management preferences
 Who provides you with water and
sanitation services?
 How is the relationship between you and
the service providers?
 What happens if you do not pay for your
services?
 What is your opinion on the water and
waste water tariffs and billing
arrangements established by source
owners/managers
 Do you have other alternatives to get
these services from? Is it better?
 Have you been involved in determination
of prices for these services?
 Have you received any information about
payment of water and pricing of
services? Was information useful?
Guide for Regulators
Roles and responsibilities  What is your role as economic regulator?
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 How independent are you in executing
your duties?
 What regulatory targets must you meet?
 Is there a transparent, adequate and
agreed upon system for measuring
achievements of these targets? Elaborate
on regulatory tools enforced.
 How do you monitor the standards of
performance of the services?
 What is the service quality levels
required for efficiency? Which key
performance indicators are used to
measure these standards?
 How do you monitor the utilities
response to customer/consumer
complaints
 What are the major challenges faced
during the price setting process? How is
this dealt with?
 What are the reporting requirements that
a utility must adhere to?
Guides for other stakeholders
General
 Describe the major activities of your
organisation.
 Which groups to represent? How and
why? (get population figures, geographic
locations)
 How would you describe the water
situation in Windhoek? Explain
 What in your opinion is a good way to
manage water demand in Windhoek?
 Representation information regarding
water and sanitation services
 What are the major problems faced by
the group represented?
 What are the consequences of these
problems for group represented?
 What is being done to solve these
problems (by whom and how?)
 How effective are the actions taken to
solve these problems? Why?
Perception on price setting process
 Do you think public in general should
pay for water and sanitation services?
 What is your general perception about
the price for water and sanitation services
in Windhoek?
 Do you think is the amount the
represented group pay for water and
sanitation services?
 What do you think can be done to
provide affordable water and sanitation
services to all (especially urban poor)
 Who do you think sets prices of water
and sanitation services in
Namibia/Windhoek? Should there be a
change? How? Why?
 Do you know how prices are set in
Windhoek? Is there a need for change?
 What do you think should be considered
when prices are set in Windhoek?
 Do you think the group represented
should be involved in determination of
prices for these services?
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Appendix E: Transcribed interview data
Note: Not all transcribed data are presented- this is presented to give a sense of the responses. The
interviewees are not revealed due to confidentiality clause agreed upon during fieldwork; however codes were
used to classify interviewees in different categories. Tape recorder was mostly used.. Key: C= City of
Windhoek official; G=Government Officials; N=NamWater, O=Other (NGOs/Consultants); D=Domestic
users; DR=Domestic Community Representatives.
NAMIBIA
 Which price-setting policies guide your
institution?
N1: There is a strategic water sector plan
available. Since Oct 2006, Namwater convinced
the shareholders that tariffs be increased, but it
was not granted. Apparently they were granted an
increase of 6.9% (inflation) since January 08, but
this information never reached them. They
received a subsidy of 26 M for the time period
where there was no increment to make up for it.
So for the next price increment- this will be
considered and maybe there will be some back-
payment. NamWater has been involved in a study
with independent consultants, with regard to
subsidy scheme (since Nov 2007). A tariff
committee was establish to oversee this process.
The document was tabled for cabinet approval and
is still not in public domain. The report: principles
and methodology to calculate costs and tariffs for
water supply by NamWater (18 Sept 08). The
report includes:
 how to develop an accurate system,
 FCR per scheme (excluding depreciaton)
 Re-evaluation of assets (replacement of
assets- 2010)
 Credit control policy
 Differentiate between retail end use
subsidies and municipality.
The cross-subsidies depend on the re-evaluation of
assets exercise. Other issues covered in the report:
 O&M costs (eg. Payroll, electricity)
 Depreciation (excl dams)
 Inability of clients to pay (urban and
rural)
 Impact of no tariff increase (Kavango-
have been over charging so tariffs will
not be increased there)
 Tariff increased in areas like Kunene,
mines
 Align retail tariffs with commenercial
retail tariffs.
The plan was to submit the report as well as re-
worked tariffs (according to methodlogy) to
cabinet for increment for the next financial year.
The document was sent off 22 Oct 2008. Some of
the recommendations in the report is to ask for
12% increase per scheme, 6% increase in rural
areas- on average 8% increase to recover the costs
of current year. It is anticipated to start
implementing credit control policy in March 2009.
“there should be independent regulator” was in the
cabinet decisions when Namwater was established
in 1995 already- there is nothing new about what
you are suggesting. The need for independent
regulator is primarily to protect consumer
interests. There are no subsidies from government
at the moment. But do not support government
subsidies- not viable for water schemes.
N4: Tariff is the unit costs at sales point.
NamWater tariff is selling m3. Currently
NamWater is making use of cost allocation model
which includes overheads (assigned to schemes);
looking at costs specific to schemes. There are
various schemes- where at some places costs are
over recovered and others under recovered- that is
why they did the cross-subsidisation of schemes.
However there are other socio-economic factors
that has to be taken into account. 5 year financial
business plan is drawn up- viable for
sustainability.
The WASSP- talks about financial costs- as well.
The definition of full costs recovery needs to be
clarified. It states in the NamWater Act, that
NamWater is allowed to make profits….(page 20)
financial provisions, in which reserve funds and
capitalisation of profits… financing of future
expenditure…. It is a company and should act like
it.
C1: Do not know details about price-setting
process-referred to Q2 and Q3 for further details.
However interviewee mentioned the planning
process for informal areas: They follow the
development and upgrading strategy- which have
specific objectives for informal areas. This
strategy is mostly based on land delivery- but is
also based on recovering development costs-
because the CoW, does not receive subsidies from
government. The process involves: a)feasibility
studies and EIAs with community involvement-
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furthermore needs assessment is conducted to
determine what the community needs are, what
they want and based on their income- whether
they can afford it. [this has discrepancies, because
people are not honest with their income- and thus
the City never knows that the real income levels
are. Income levels are compared with services
available and based on an compromised
agreement a Social Compact Agreement (example
from Okahandja park A, B and C received) is
signed with community leaders. In certain
instances WATP surveys are done by
consultants??. The strategy includes 6
development levels- that caters for different
needs- current the strategy is being reviewed.
However challenges being faced with the strategy
includes customers being dissatisfied- feeling
discriminated against because they feel their
neighbours are receiving a better service. They
prefer uniform charges??
G1: There are principles highlighted in the
WASSP water tariff policy- which also includes
full costs definition. At the moment the allocation
of costs, calculation of tariffs (fundamental
principles of tariff determination are missing) is
unclear. NamWater is currently in the process of
developing a model- but not sure what its about.
The biggest challenge with NamWater is that the
overhead costs allocation needs to be sorted out.
In the past they increased tariffs- until 2007. For
example before then, 11.5% increase was done
across schemes- which is not right. There needs to
be a scheme specific calculation. These are easy
processes- but do not understand why it is being
complicated. It should be as easy as [total costs/m3
sold]. Last year (2007) the tariff was approved
based on inflation (6.9%) and no-one seems to
know why and how it is calculated. The biggest
problem is that NamWater does not consider costs
(eg. Difference between groundwater and surface
water costs of treatment- etc etc. There are no
formulae for these things- which is shocking for
such a big company. Until these things are sorted
out- the tariff will remain the same as 2007…..
O9: Water is a human right and it is important for
people to know their rights. The right to water is
related to the right to dignity and the right to life.
In 1956, water services were for free and now
people are expected to pay for it. The international
law talks of human rights, the rights of children
and water is included in this. Convention Right to
child and women. Article 144 of International law
- applicable to SADC. Namibia has a highly
skewed income and there are poor- which contrary
to public believe do not waste water- since they
use so little of it anyway. It is the rich people that
waste water- so they should be punished for it. It
is important to note that the argument is not
against payment for water- but we should note
how we should pay for it. The government has
their priorities wrong- looking at recent expenses
that were incurred- eg. State house that was built-
while the hospitals to treat the sick are not up to
standard. Looking at other basic services- Safety
and security- do we have to pay for the police
before we can be helped by them? So why should
we do it for water- which is also a basic right. To
keep prisoners in jail- we don’t receive a bill
before they can be kept in jail? So we need to
think of how to charge for water- why cant we tap
into the tax funds as well for it- Maybe we should
explore how SA is doing it- a technical solution is
needed to tackle this issue.
Lack of access to water- government excludes
poor people- so we should think of the impact of
lack of access to water? It is unfair that people are
evicted from their houses for non-payment of
water bills. The money should be diverted to basic
needs. Cross-subsidies should be considered- for
those that cannot pay- we have get creative to find
solutions.
In 1998- Water Act in the UK banned pre-paid
meters. What about diseases that goes along with
lack of water. The health implications are massive.
Think of people suffering from Aids- these can die
if they do not have water.
When thinking of SA- you need to know that the
payment is coming from somewhere- and so ask
yourself- who is paying for taxes? The principle
should be that nothing should be for free- even if
you pay little. In fact water is much cheaper
compared to brandy or cigarettes and that don’t
stop the poor to use it- so why should the basic
rights issue only come in when it comes to water?
Why cant the water sector follow the basic income
grant scenario- this has a people centred approach-
it is important that we change our thinking in that
way. It is an issue of priorities!! At all levels-
including government.
What about the poor- normally arrangements can
be made- but if there is no income- what kind of
arrangements can be made? The quantity- number
of households- influences the payment- the rich
are normally fewer and thus pays less, while the
poor are more and pay more.
The bottom line is that someone has to pay for
it….. the question is who and how much? There
needs to be a sense of appreciation for the
valuable resource.
Namwater is a non-for profit company- so they
should not be making profit out of water services.
“The price of water is measurable by the cars of
CEOs. That means they are over charging water-
people are paying too much for water.”
Appendices
268
 What elements are being considered when
setting prices?
C1: Do not know about price setting process-
however know that people are charged for water
services. Prices are determined by technical
personnel. Prices are included in erf prices and
people pay monthly levy- determined by the land
manager.
C5: The costs delivered at the first block is at a
subsidised rate (Namwater price). There are two
tariffs- basic (covers capital costs and interests)
and volumetric (first block at Namwater’s
price+10% admin charge+ penalty costs (long run
marginal costs-15 years). The price setting process
is very political and thus even if the City proposes
a certain increase to meet their costs- the
politicians will set it where they want it (eg. City
propose 20%, but will only allow 10%). For the
non-domestic (subsidies are very little- not
formal). Politicians consider social reasons such
as job creation etc as well. The City is operating at
90% cost recovery (domestic water use- 70% and
the rest- wastage. A regulator will be beneficial to
the system. When setting prices- also think of
quality standards and drought conditions (physical
conditions) and the costs o getting water where it
is needed. The bills to consumers should be easy
as well [costs/volume of supply=unit costs].
O8: It might be a good idea to follow the
parliamentary debates on water and pricing issues-
visit parliament archives. Don’t know much about
the debate- There is no doubt that people should
pay for services to recover the costs. Refer to Act-
also check out: ‘a place we want to call our own’
paper- 2005. The water act review process- needs
a knowledge base body (expert panel) is a good
idea-but ultimately they will be picked by
government. See equivalent to what you are
suggesting in the Environmental Management
Act- give power to ‘hand-pick’ people with
expertise- environmental commissioner. …
 What is the demand for service from the
population presently not
served/improperly served?
C1: Urbanisation rate increased after
Independence and became unmanageable for the
City. Temporary reception areas were created,
while the City started with Greenfields (areas that
are being developed in advance and then residents
are resettled later after services are provided-
alternatively they are called in-situ upgraded
areas. Babilon area, there are communal water and
sanitation services within 200m from erven.??
Relocation mostly takes place due to unsuitable
geographical reasons- people tend to start shacks
in rivers etc- these are referred to as ‘natural
informal settlements’. The new inhabitants are
expected to apply for erven to Property
management- which will allocate an erf in a
developed area- Greenfield areas. In many
communities people organise themselves and form
saving groups. Informal
settlement committee are formed with assistance
from the City with financial and technical
assessments. WATSAN committee is established
to assist informal areas with planning, payment for
communal services (see ToR received). Funds are
being recovered differently- the self help saving
groups are very successful and there are about 40
established [need to indicate it on map]. In the
natural informal areas- there are no services,
however in some areas taps and toilets are done on
emergency cases- not part of formal plans-.
C5: Sanitation is neglected from the process-
should also consider the sustainability of VIPs.
Promotion of waterborne sewerage in informal
areas. The best option is to put infrastructure for
water borne systems in place- and if people get
money eventually- they can just connect- but do
not promote VIPs, because nobody will use it- do
not make people use things that you will not use-
even if they are poor. The so-called poor people-
all manage to have cell phones and are paying for
all other services….. re-evaluate who is poor and
who really needs support.
C10: The resettlement process has started from
1998- where an initial survey was done on people
who owned and are registered for land. In those
early years- land were give to those that were
staying there for long (priority was given to them).
There are two land occupier status- those that live
on CoW land (lease agreements) and those that
have bought the land as a group as part of the
Shack Dwellers Federation initiative. In this case
those from the federation is 80%, while 20% lives
on CoW land in Greenwell Matongo D (area we
went to). Normally the City has nothing to do with
the federation group. During the resettlement
process- the city makes sure that the rightful
owners settle on the land (due to many illegal
occupants), so there is always a comparison
between what was on the list in 1998 vs with who
lives there now- if the names are different the land
is taken back. All houses and erfs are numbers- so
the City can keep track of what is going on. The
City officials work very closely with the
community leaders on this issue- and they
normally assist with getting people together and
spreading the word about relocation updates and
when people will be given land etc etc. Mostly
community leaders are involved to avoid conflicts.
Prepaid meters (in Babilon) does not work so
well- because there is only one collection point for
many households and there are long queues
always. They need more water points and security
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(to control vandalism) in this area. The issue with
prepaid meters is also to consider the security that
goes along with it. To get the card for the meters
is (N$150- which could be considered as
connection fees. Another problem is that it breaks
too frequently which is why people do not prefer
it anymore- in the beginning it seemed like a good
idea- but not anymore. The long term
sustainability of this system is questionable. To
address the issue of security- it is suggested that
the prepaid meters be placed at the community
offices (only problem might be travel distances),
where there are security guards already. [the idea
of having kiosk was tested]: “This will take us
back to old age”. The problem will be to control
who owns the kiosks and preventing people to
start building their own kiosks. The issue of
sanitation-VIP toilets is also a huge mistake.
Many people did not know what the toilets were
and given the name (VIP- misunderstood it for
Very Important People). People prefer flush
toilets. The approach used to sensitise people
about the toilets is wrong- that is why people
agree to it and when it comes to the maintenance
aspect- then people refuse to do it. The Otji toilets
work on a small scale, but not in a communal
setting. People now have to start paying for VIPs
as well- it is part of their lease agreement. In some
areas they are also testing with communal showers
(Okulumbashe), but this has not been working
well- wastage of water and unhygienic. “the
bottom line is that- if you stay in a municipal area-
you have to pay for services- otherwise you are
free to move to a rural area”.
 Perception of services (Quality, prices,
preferences)
D11: No not happy with services. Prefer tap on
erf. The distance is not far to walk and in some
instances it is better than what they are used to-
because they come from Owambo land where they
had to walk long distances to collect water- so this
is better. There are very seldom interruptions with
water services- 24 hours, 7 days a week supply.
The important services are:-electricity, - toilet, -
water (there will always be water-even if they
have to walk distances to get it- so not too
important). N$ 30 per month per household- they
pay to committee ad receive receipts for it. There
is no toilet facilities here and the use the bushes-
[correction from one member] – there are 6 toilets,
but they are out of order- there are about 300
people per 2 toilets (estimate). Payment is not a
big problem- if you cant pay you can sell things
and pay later- so good understanding with
committee members. People are willing to pay for
water services. Fairly good value for money- the
toilet facilities are the biggest problems. Not really
interested- maybe if had their own taps- do not
really want to be involved in price setting or
decision making. Committee is useful and do give
them information and also take their issues on
board and so think the committee members should
be involved in the bigger decision making
process- as long as they get feedback.
DR5: Most residents pay on time- but there are
the odd few that do not pay and are being
problematic- but they do pay in the end. Some
people- (those that are noticeably suffering) pay
half the price- agreed by community members.
On average most residents are domestic workers,
own business (selling home made food) or
security guards- the average income: between
700-1500. Yes they are part of setting the monthly
fix payment- but that depends on the meter
reading and the outstanding bills. It is important
that the affordability is taken into consideration-
but they do not think the rates can be different for
different areas- depending on income- so its fine
as it is. The committee reps felt that it is difficult
to control continuity within committee- and
people also do not attend meetings when arranged-
so its difficult- since it’s a voluntary effort (apart
from treasurer)- not much is done about. The city
keeps them well informed.
DR 6: Mostly in debt- always behind with
payments- have too many other obligations- but
make arrangements with community
representatives. She is currently unemployed- but
used to pay on time when she was working. Most
people in the area are unemployed and trying to
make a living by selling things (beers) or have
casual jobs. But there is always someone that
works (At least 1 in the households). Guess the
average is less than N$1200. Use little water- and
are already saving water- the community members
are also aware of water saving.
D12: use public taps and feel its unfair that in the
same area those that can afford have taps in their
yards and houses. But even if they could afford-
they need to move before getting a tap fitted-
because currently they are on lease property. They
have problems with toilets- there are no toilets and
have to use the bush- its unsafe, and unhygienic-
especially for ladies. Electricity is most important
for them. N$ 78 including water and erf. Have no
problem of paying. Price is affordable. They have
been relocated to this area since 2004 and have
been paying that same amount since then. They
use approximately 2 x 25 litres of water per day-
mostly for basic use such as cooking and washing.
want their own taps- currently get collective bills-
which they sometimes do not see- so just keep
paying the fix rates.
 Subsidies: What subsidies are embedded in
the present tariff structure (how are they
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distributed between socio-economic strata,
and by levels of service)?
G1: There is currently a study going on- national
subsidy policy aiming at urban and rural- this is
done by Herald Koch and has a period of 4
months November 2008-March 2009. This would
look at definition of poor and these subsidies
should be targeted.
G2: There is no information about subsidies- and
government does not have any mechanisms in
place for this purpose. That is why the study is
being undertaken now- trying to develop subsidy
policy (urban and rural)- there is a call for a
consultant out to undertake the study- but have not
found anyone yet. If no consultants show interest-
then government has to do it.
C5: Issue of subsidies- needs to be clarified as to
who the players are and their roles and
responsibilities. Subsidies for poor is
responsibility of government- but in absence of
that the City is taking responsibility. The issue of
cross-subsidies from rich to poor also needs to be
looked at carefully- because its very seldom that
others will pay for other people. Prepaid meters is
an option- some prefer it, others don’t. Majority is
willing to pay for water services- that is not the
issue.
O3: A cross-subsidisation scheme similar to that
of Rehoboth case- should be considered. The
system does ensure that there are affordable end
user tariffs in place. However this system has also
been changes since 8 months ago- where those in
power has changed it back to the old system- (for
unknown reasons). An performance study has
been done on the Rehoboth case and they realised
that Namwater bills are not paid- there are a lot of
politics involved in the process.
There is no subsidy system for Windhoek-
volumetric charges are set at Namwater prices
(subsidised), but a basic charge is added so the
end user tariff includes basic charges+namwater
volumetric charge. This system is such that the
poor are paying more money than the rich??
The national resource accounting report includes
full cost recovery calculated vs tariffs charged-
2001 reports- also check these out.
Most recent study was done together with Lund
Consulting and partners to develop tariff
determinations procedures seconded by DWAF
staff (committee). The draft report includes
methodology to determine tariffs; general
requirements and recommendations on how to
take the process further. The report is not yet in
public domain- check it out.
Last year the tariff (2007) was based on inflation
adjustments only and since no consensus was
reached on the tariff increments- there was no
increment. The biggest problems were that there
are no calculations of costs per schemes done
since 1998 (find out why this is?). Also since
1998, they only incorporate inflation and then
raise tariffs based on fixed percentages. Currently
they operate on depreciation charge- that is not
known and the cross-subsidies across schemes are
also not justified. Currently the biggest questions
to address are:
- the cost of supply (since 1997- this
has never been calculated)
- Khomas region is also not
reaching full cost recovery
levels??.
 The need for Regulator and its role?
C5: The regulator should not be merged with
ECB- it becomes a power issue- therefore it
should be DWAF’s responsibility- since they are
the leading ministry. Neutral body would have
financial implications which will complicate the
process. The water act should be clear on this and
should highlight how the body should work. The
perception against ECB is negative and we don’t
want to include water in their ‘mess’. The
questions that needs to be address with regard to
ECB is: Does it add value? Currently, I cannot see
the bottom line costs, for what the money is being
used for. The system is not transparent enough.
There is a need for a model (with clear and simple
figures) with basket indications of inflation- with
related predictions. Need knowledgeable people to
run the process- that is lacking at the moment.
O3:The job of a regulator is straight forward- it is
to know the costs of supply water and sanitation
services and determine the price (or agree with
utility the price). Those that cant afford it- it is just
too bad. After the price is set- then focus on the
debt collection process, keeping in mind that
water services cannot be cut off.
O9: The ECB has worked out mechanisms
together with municipality to improve debt
collection. It should be understood that water is
different from electricity in the sense that it is
social responsibility and that is politically
motivated. This makes provision of water tricky
and sensitive. In this regard, it is important to have
clear methodology on how to determine tariffs
(bulk and retail). This would need a clear mandate
to request specific information from providers as
well as enforcement mechanisms- should the
information not be provided. This is all provided
(or should be) in the guiding legal framework-
Act. This also includes the mandate to ensure
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implementation of the Act. This is where the
problem is in the water sector- the fact that the Act
is very weak (“toothless”)- once this problem is
solved- you are at least half way there. The Act
needs to be clear.
O6: Administration for bulk water service
providers should be robust and should have the
relevant information at their finger tips- but due to
political interference, the information is
manipulated. It really depends on who the
regulator is.
C4: The price setting process for LAs are also
dictated by government- because if certain price
increase is requested, government has the power
to say “cut it in half” and its up to the LA to find
other sources of income to bridge the gap of not
covering full costs. It is not easy to divorce
political interferences with the process setting
process.
G1: It is difficult to regulate currently- because
the process is done at an ad-hoc basis, and the
ministry appoints anyone to sit on the committee.
There is no continuity and no clear guidelines as
to what the elements are that needs to be
addressed. Even the revised WASSP is not clear-
especially in issues such as subsidies. The issue of
cross-subsidies across schemes as practiced by
NamWater to date is not justified- but there is
nowhere said that they can’t do it either. The Act
is not suppose to be a detailed document- it is
guide as to what needs to be done- it is the
regulations that goes with the Act that needs to
specify everything. It is unfair to expect the Act to
be detailed. The legislation is very clear. The
implementation or defining of Act also depends
on capacity existing in the water sector as well as
the leadership (minister) involved. The job of a
regulator (or similar body) would thus be to assist
in clarification of documentation for example. The
difficult tasks is dealing with LAs capacities,
rather than bulk water supply (should be fairly
easy and straight forward).
O1: The performance of LAs across the country
needs to be assessed, because the situation is
getting worse. For example, Keetmanshoop
municipality can hardly account for one third of
their water. There should be sanctions and
mechanisms in place to deal with such situations.
The decentralisation policy enable many of these
services to be localise, but there is no capacity and
skills to handle these demands and in such cases,
even the existence of a regulator would not be able
to solve these problems. The problem lies with
capacity building and training. These
municipalities are already bankrupt- they cannot
recover the costs and therefore would not even be
able to support any regulatory services in this
regard.
O6: Consider government to be the regulator,
since the salaries are catered for already and it has
the authority already so it is easy to give the
mandate to a certain department within the
ministry to run as the regulator. To regulate
NamWater should not be a problem, but the LAs
will be a problem since they have a range of
products they trade with (remunerative and non-
remunerative services) and these are being trade-
off against each other (cross-subsidising across
services). The regulator would have to do much
more there- since LAs are not allowed to make
profits and it is important to keep them at bay. The
best option is to leave it in government and just
empower those involved in the process and give
them a clearer mandate. They should have the
appropriate budget to train and build the necessary
capacity. The process can be made clear and roles
and responsibilities spell out clearly. Logistically
government is in the best position to take the lead
in this process. They already have certain power to
implement policies, so it will avoid confusion
among consumers.
C5: There is no way that the price-setting process
can be without political interference, so it is up to
you to determine what is the minimum required
and how it can be ring fenced to be outside
politics.
O9: It is optimal to have a merger, because this is
a independent standing institution already and its
better not to re-invent the wheel. The Act is clear
and thus it will be easy to adapt the Water Act
accordingly, with the respective Ministers as
guardian of the process. Though the politics
around water is different and difficult to handle
(since what is a basic right), but once procedures
are in place, the process should be easier. It is
clear that there is a need for a regulator in the
water sector. Do not agree that Minister will
interfere- since the Act is clear on roles and
responsibilities, but it is important to include
government in the process. It is important to
determine how minister, NamWater and LAs will
work together to protect consumers. Another
important aspect is to include economy into the
equation- to understand how it works and thus
determine the tariffs accordingly. Strongly
disagree with subsidies- it is unsustainable but
given the Namibian situation it is needed- but this
has to be integrated into the whole sector and not
just for certain aspects. Consider the whole sector
(holistic picture). By law NamWater is a
company, but the act is contradictory in the sense
that is only allowed to recover costs, while it is
company- it does not work that way. If it is a
company then it should be allowed to make
profits. There are lots of issues that needs to be
addressed, but that is part of the process. The
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issue of dividends of NamWater also needs to be
looked at.
C7: Certain LAs are operating as businesses and
they concentrate on what goes in (costs) and what
comes out (price) and therefore there is nothing to
regulate. The boards are there to make sure
business goes well and so having a regulator is
just duplicating existing structures. There are
certain allowable costs- so there is nothing wrong
with filling up funds to cover all costs
O2: There is a regulator needed, because
somebody has to be accountable/responsible for
the process and a coherent effort has to be done
towards this. “if you cant measure it- how can you
manage it”. It is not necessary clear that a
regulator is needed, but something is needed.
Maybe just focus on what is there currently and
build the capacity instead of starting something
new.
Zambia
Note: L=LWSC; K=KWSC; O=NGOs;
R=NWASCO; ZMG=Government; W=WWG; D=
Domestic users
 Price-setting process
G2: When NWASCO was formed, it was first
reporting to Ministry of Energy and Water. This
created a conflicting situation- because many of
stakeholders felt that the ministry is mainly
responsible for water resources and it was too
broad to include distribution as well. In fact it was
apolitical move, so as to control all the funds that
are linked to water distribution, because at that
point there were many donors involved (eg DTF).
This issue was solved and now NWASCO is
directly reporting to Parliament through Ministry
of Local Government and Housing. The biggest
disadvantage of LAs were that they had a big
income base and effectiveness specific for water
sector was not good. The size of the LAs also
played a big role on the income base. Provisional
water authorities except those on copperbelt-
usually had human capacity problems. The
presence of the regulator increase donor support
confidence as well, and it makes it easier for them
to support companies or the water sector.
L1: NWASCO guidelines apply and guides their
cost structure. It is economically viable- because
Zambia has a history of free water for all- and so it
was necessary to start at low levels- but they still
found it difficult to change the mind-set of
consumers- therefore they implemented price
increases in stages. The cost structure includes
electricity as one of the major contributors to the
structure-based on source- and considering that
they have to pump at an elevation of 350 km- and
therefore have many booster pumps. Other
elements includes chemicals, operation and
maintenance costs (fuel), staff. They also consider
affordability of consumers when developing their
cost structure. The recovery rate is very variable
and approximately 60% is recovered from
domestic sector- which is broken down in various
sections. The peri-urban debt collection depends
on the type of water source. Those with taps fitted
inside the houses- have meteres and receive bills
to pay. Approximately 49% of Lusaka has
metered taps. The commercial sector (eg.
Breweries, steel plants) uses more that 100m3 and
are metered and pays well and no big problems
experienced (20% of debt irrecoverable) there-
however it’s the institutions such as government
institutions (hospitals, schools, Universities,
defence barracks, airforce etc) that they are
experiencing problems with. Approximately 30%
of debt from these are not recovered. The
payments are inconsistent and if they do not pay-
they disconnect the water as a measure of
enforcement and this normally helps with getting
the bills paid. However disconnections do not
work in the domestic are- because once water is
disconnected- people get water from their
neighbours etc, so its difficult to control. The
Local Authority management structure is not
operating well- and that presents a big challenge
of debt recovery? There are specific payment
schemes for those in arrears payment. There is
also a lot of political interference- especially when
water is disconnected. In general customers and
make arrangements should they feel they cannot
make the full payments. There are no ‘special’
tariffs for pensioners for example- that is the
responsibility of government social schemes. The
company as part of their social responsibility also
allows for certain amount of free water- if
consumers are have funerals- these should be
arranged with company.
K1:Make use of increasing block tariff and that
consists of 3 blocks (see newsletter). There are
three categories- metered, fix rates and industrial
rates. The metering is for individual connections,
joint connections and shared connections, There is
also a category for semi-communal (7-25
household sharing taps)and the Kiosks and these
are also metered. The Kiosks contribute to better
revenue collection and contributions and therefore
it works for the company. No WATP studies have
been done- again this will be done once the
services are improved, because believe that the
willingness to pay is linked to the quality of
services. Currently those with high incomes can
afford to get better service- but low income groups
depends on some sort of cross-subsidisation
scheme. NWASCO has been encouraging services
to the low income groups
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O1: From experience, the Water and Sanitation
Council negotiates with the CUs on the water
tariff for a given period in a given locality.
However, experience has shown that CUs have
had difficulties controlling the water tariffs
because service providers at community level
apply the same within a given range rather than a
fixed tariff applied across board. The other
contributing factor is that the service providers
such as Water Trusts have to take into account
their over heads related to administrative and
running costs which are important for sustaining
the water scheme. Thirdly, various approaches are
used in deriving the water tariff. In the case of
Water Trusts, the Residents Development
Committee now known as Ward Development
Committees base their tariffs on the needs and
community’s willingness and ability to pay. Once
they agree, the tariff are revised giving reasons for
the same. Within these communities, other
complications related to those who have
individual connections. These are charged a higher
tariff than those who use communal facilities. In
my view, CUs are under charging in the inner city
due to political interference while the community
based service provider like the Water Trusts are
charging in accordance to the level of service
being provided. Water is paid for as and when it is
collected but in town some homes are charged a
flat tariff because meter are non functional and in
other cases water service is erratic making tariff
increase by CUs very difficult.
 Service provision
G1: The policy direction should be that all people
should be provided with water services, therefore
the regulator should facilitate the empowerment
process to LAs and CUs for service provision. It
should have a role to liaise relevant resources and
it should create for a for sharing information and
interaction. Overall, CUs are suppose to sustain
themselves such that they are able to provide
water even to peri-urban areas. However, these are
the so often forgotten areas and so its
government’s role to look for funding to cover
these areas. The geographical differences in areas
should also be considered in the supply of water.
Government provide ‘soft loans’ or grants to
support the companies to extent to peri-urban
areas- based on geography, it depends on the costs
to deliver services, CUs can request government
to assist them in that way. It is easier for
government to apply for grants on behalf of the
companies- than companies to apply themselves.
… Donors are very much involved in the process.
Investment in urban sector is more costly
compared to rural- which is why the services are
more expensive as well, therefore it is very
important to be strategically placed for money to
be recovered from investment. Yes, the water
sector is very donor dependent- the infrastructure
is over 30 years, and therefore it is important to
get donor funds especially for infrastructural
development. Privatising water utilities can apply
work if own investment plans are in place-
otherwise the investment has to be sourced from
donors or government. Such funding is channelled
through decentralisation scheme through
government to reach companies that needs to
funds for investment. In the past, money was
operated very centralised, through project
proposals. Government’s role is to make sure that
donor funding is utilised, otherwise government
has to pay it back.
W1: The complaints vary from location- but in
general it includes: -Non availability of water;
Eradic water supply (limited hours); Connection
fees are too high; Time frame for taps to be
connected takes too long. After receiving the
complaints- they verify it according the
procedures in NWASCO guidelines (check out
guideline procedures). Report it to company (both
verbal/writing) to respond to complaint within a
given time (guidelines). Then follow-up
procedures takes place and still if nothing is done-
then the matter is taken to NWASCO (also cc to
company). Then do a follow-up on how
NWASCO deals with the issue- then it gets back
to consumer. Normally after it is reported to
NWASCO the issue is solved, WWG thinks that
the regulator is very effective and strong and does
not get influenced by company or government
(politics). Regulator operates on good transparent
system and really has the interest of consumers at
heart. The water kiosk system is good and is really
being support by the companies and regulator,
however WWG feels that is a system that can
work in rural areas- but not in urban. People need
to have their own connections- therefore some
system should be worked out to address the high
connection fees. The issue of high percentage of
unaccounted for water- is a concern for WWG-
because those costs are transferred to consumers-
which is unfair.
The mindsets of people must change- they need a
leader to take process further. “ start pay as long
as you pay- you can complain
 Affordability perceptions (service
provision, quality, price)
D9: shared tap- service is very irregular- the day
of interview- there was no water since previous
evening 6 until 11:00 next day.- no warning was
issued. Shortage of water is biggest problem. They
are tired of reporting it- because nothing is done
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about it. Don’t know how many people sharing-
more than 100. Make 28 thousand ZamK per day.
Furthers traveller walks about 20 minutes to
collect water.
D10: Kiosk- opening hours 06:00-11:30, then
14:00-18:00. Hours were decided upon by shop
attendant. The water is metered- he receives a
book from company, to record the meter readings.
If no water is available- due to electricity cuts, he
informs people. He reports it to the office directly.
There are water tankers as back-up running- but
very seldomly. Suggested that maybe company
should consider having tanks installed- like what
Water Trust is using. Do not know about
NWASCO or DTF.
D7: Stand post- Shortage of water- in which
times- people that have water sell it illegally (for
double the price). If no water- borehole/shallow
well. Don’t know about NWASCO or WWG.
Only know Lusaka water. The customers
(collecting water) did not have any problem- since
they are use to it. The commission for manning
the tap is 40% (is about 300 thousand per month)
of water sales. They get paid every day after
taking water to company office. They were
selected in a workshop and have been serving for
5 years. People have no problems with paying for
water. Opening hours:06:00-11:00 then 14:00-
18:00. : No toilet facilities- make use of pit
latrines- no complaints about it.
 Regulatory process (perceptions of
services, regulatory tools)
L3: NWASCO- in general the regulator is good-
but there is a tendency of over-regulation.
Especially in the beginning after the regulator was
formed- there were many stumbling blocks or
“hampering blocks” which affected the pace of the
providers. The roles and responsibilities of the
regulator were not clear in the beginning- but it is
improving now. There is no clear line between
regulating and interference with company
management operations. The regulator feels that
they have power to walk in and do what they
want- and that is undermining management of
company. Communication between regulator and
providers- were not good as well- because the
regulator does not know what is happening on the
ground- yet would like to “decide” what the
company should do. This causes a lot of
frustration. The regulator needs more technical
expertise “they need more hands-on people-
before they can get hands-on”.
The information required by the regulator is
cumbersome and we are not sure what they use
half of the information for. Some of the tools they
use are not applicable and needs to be adjusted to
company specifics. The regulatory system is
“imported” and is out of touch with what is
happening on the ground. The regulator needs to
be more flexible and communication needs to
improve. A lot of progress has been made since
the inception of the regulator- and there are many
improvements. The benchmarking assessment
presents a problem, where companies of different
scope and scales are compared and this is unfair to
companies. “compare like with like”.
K2: The regulator is doing a good job, with
minimal interference by government, especially
when it comes to tariff setting. The regulator is
making it easier for the company to set their own
tariffs. The regulator is considered as very
professional and hardly allows government
interference in their operations and decisions. The
major benefit of having a regulator is for the
consumers- because it ensure service
improvements for a fair price. The regulator is
also known to defend companies- especially if a
price hike is needed. At one time- the regulator
even forced the company to increase their prices
for their own sustainability and they defended the
company in public. The regulator however needs
to have a better understanding of the utilities
before enforcing punitive measures against it. For
this- more interaction with utilities is needed to
understand the challenges. Otherwise the tools of
the regulator are good and simple and are easy to
understand. The regulator has now introduced
‘regulation by incentive’. Many companies inflate
their figures and therefore it is necessary to have a
regulator to ensure that companies perform
according to their plans. However, the regulator
should take into account the differences amongst
companies and should be utility specific. There is
a point system that the regulator uses which works
well. The regulator has introduce a “regulation by
incentive scheme as appose to regulation by
enforcement”.
The penalties are very effective and is fair and
works well. Companies always adhere to decision
of Regulator- have not heard of any company that
has resisted the claims from the regulator. There is
also provision made- should companies want to
dispute the claims from the regulator- they can go
to court.
The company has a good working relationship
with the regulator and they often have very good
training opportunities for staff to attend. It
operates well, very transparent (4 out of 5) and
good well with government as well. They are also
good at sharing information and protects both the
interests of companies and consumers. The
regulator however needs to market themselves
very well-especially to the consumers and link the
consumer groups to companies and consumers.
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G2: The regulators are as follows: Environment
council, water board (government body
responsible for abstraction and water resources
licences), energy and communication and
transport authority, NWASCO. These bodies work
well together. There is a national programme,
which is aiming to meet MDGs (including costs
involved) which is looking at national water sector
and what it will cost to meet the goals. There are
strict guidelines which are followed and it
involves all stakeholders. It is very rare that there
are conflicts while the guidelines are followed
between company and regulator- and in such
cases, government acts a the “father of two
children fighting”, and guides them so that in the
end the situation is controlled. The role of
government in this situation is to just to guide
them and advice on how things should be done…
just like a father does. Government does not want
direct involvement and is only involved in
appointment of 2 of the NWASCO board
members- chair and vice-. They do not interfere in
the day-to-day operations of the regulator. Overall
the system is working well. “water is a state
business and therefore it is difficult to divorce the
tasks”.
W1: Though the regulator is doing a good job-
there are issues of concern with regard to
appointment of the board of the regulator. The fact
that government has to appoint some of the
members (political appointees) makes the system
vulnerable to political interference and this issue
needs to be dealt with.
O2: The guidelines for tariffs is currently being
reviewed. The financial sheets prescribed (excel
sheets) to utilities are not used properly by CUs.
This needs to be improved. Overall the regulator
is effective and is working well- there is a sound
procedure in place as well as good description of
tools available. It is important that when it comes
to tariffs- there should be a balance between
viability and affordability (poor focus). The
income levels of consumers has to be considered
at all times during the tariff setting process.
W1:The beginning was not easy- there was a
perception that they are policing and the
companies were hesitant to provide information
and working together with the group. The benefits
of having such a group only became apparent later
such that they could also use the group to get
information across to the people (acceptance of
their existence was important to carry out their
duties). The area has 33 wards, and the members
are all dispersed across these wards. Their roles
include the following:
 Sensitise the rights of people to the
utilities (vice versa)
 Act as a link between customers and
utilities and regulator.
 Deal with customer complaints and
ensure that is dealt with according to
NWASCO guidelines.
They have an office- and the joint regulators are
paying for administrative and logistical expenses
of the members. This is good because this will
enable consumers to know where to take their
complaints to- because previously they had to wait
until the members get to their area or go to the
members houses. The members have various plans
and schedules and have certain areas they monitor
after problems have been reported. Much of their
work is in the peri-urban areas, because most of
the other areas where people receive bills- they
deal directly with the company. WWG mostly
makes use of the media through regular radio
programmes (on general awareness issues and
what they do- advertisement) and if urgent issues
are to be dealt with they call press forums- but
they try and refrain from using newspapers- to
avoid conflict of interest issues with the
regulators.
R2: The regulator makes use of the information
system which is guiding the utilities on how to
determine their tariffs. This information system is
supplemented by inspectors going out to the
utilities to update the information. At once a year
inspectors visit all companies. There are also part-
time inspectors that are professionals (not working
for the companies- they are external from outside)
that are used to get the experience and to assist in
updating the relevance of the information.
Sanitation is one of the biggest challenges the
sector is faced with and there is a need for new
entrants. Facilities such as pit latrines are
encouraged through utilities to cover public toilets
as part of their expansion projects. There are some
options such as cost sharing that can be done. For
example Lusaka water tariff- 10% increase in
sanitation levies and these are subsidised. The
most important thing is that it should be
sustainable options that will fit in the broader
government options as well as the Vision 2030
process (specific for investment programmes).
The challenges faced by utilities are largely
investment funding related. Companies are
dependent on external grants and loans. These are
being mobilised by government through a system
of priorities. Cost of capital is high (with high
interests rates) and it is not cost effective for local
conditions. The national urban programme (find
out more about it) will try and address these
issues. Overall it is important to always engage
with customers- because the customers do not
know what is happening behind the scenes.
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They work very well with the water board (though
NWASCO is not involved in water permits etc)
but they mostly collaborate on water quality
issues. NWASCO is also responsible for
environmental protection together with the council
of Zambia- which looks at sewerage collection,
treatment and disposal. They ensure that is done at
acceptable quality (end product). GTZ- also a
good relationship- they act as technical advisory
committee and also sits on the water board as well
as board of NWASCO. There are other platforms
of sharing information- such as CEO forum,
where al CEOs are invited and discuss issues of
concern. This takes place quarterly. In this sense
most stakeholders are involved in the process
most of the time.
There is the African Forum for Utility Regulators
(AFUR), which also shares information across the
region- and it includes all utilities (energy, gas etc
etc). Nwasco is part of the sectoral committee.
There are also guidelines for African regulators.
(check out). There is a lot going on in the sector,
there are too many demands- especially on him
(regulator) sharing best practices, and
international travels- so the challenge is
prioritising and managing local regulatory
challenges. As more and more people gets expose
to the idea- the demand is increasing.
England
D= Domestic users; C=CCWater members;
O=Ofwat officials; A=Anglian Water Services
officials
 Price-setting process
C2: There are 3 companies within the region
which is managing the demand quite well- but
realising that this is the driest region in the
country- compulsory metering should be enforced
to conserve water. The companies are slowly
introducing meters which is good way to go. Own
opinion: the current way of management is poor-
eg. Managed by engineers vs managers- all
companies are into building infrastructure- had
level of foresight- Reduction in rainfall and
population increase and steep increase of water
usage- there is a high percentage of few people
living in households so increase in demand
therefore it is important to think about balance
between supply and demand. Anglian region is
fortunate that the infrastructure is in good
conditions. Since the recent drought- the customer
relations of companies has improved, especially in
terms of sharing information (through media)-
however there are still a number of things that are
critical for companies to improve.
 Regulatory process (perceptions of
regulator services, tools, consumer
representation)
A1: PR04 was better than current review process.
Things are now too complicated. The companies
need shorted questions and need to be more
simplified than that. Aquarius is not working and
there are many questions regarding its accuracy.
The regulator is micro-managing the companies
and this is frustrating. Too much detail required
for the June returns and there is an imbalance on
the regulator information. The regulator is of the
opinion that companies are hiding information-
but sometimes they ask for things that don’t exist.
PR09 is very opaque and Ofwat is not very
transparent. The regulator is very ‘cold’ towards
companies. It depends on the personality and
attitude of the staff of the regulator. They feel
companies are misleading them and that is not
true- its because they do not have the kind of
details that are required in some instances- and it
is not very clear why such details are necessary.
Companies do not know what Ofwat does with
most of the information they request. The previous
DG of Ofwat was beter, because companies have
more respect for him and he was doing things with
more authority. Currently it is “regulation by
doghouse”- it is very aggressive and political.
C2: Their role is to start discussion that would
benefit the consumers. They are particularly
strong in the following: build better relationships
with customers-providing what customers like,
need and feel is essential; promoting issues such
as metering-where appropriate; be involved in
planning (town planning). This is good to be more
proactive and anticipate planning of growth- and
this is something that the Anglian committee
pushed for and is now taking the lead in this for
other committees to follow. : The OPA is
outdated and needs to reviewed as well as GSS.
The evolution of the regulators tools are not good.
They need to change their strategic thinking and
introduce at least 20 year forward planning- they
need to get up to date with what is happening in
the industry.
C1:CCW aims at getting the views of consumers
across as well are interested in sustainability
issues. Would like to be part of the softer solution
to environmental and sustainability issues- also
want to ensure that customers pay a fair price for
their services. Process of getting money back to
consumers: Build a good relationship with the
companies, for example through our regional
Chairs to enable CCWater to have open
discussions with them.
- A few months before the companies’ financial
results are announced, the Chief Executive writes
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to companies asking them to return money (i.e.
profits) to customers.
- As part of the bi-monthly meeting between
regional chairs and companies, the message of
“returning money to customers” is re-emphasised
- The regional Policy Managers mention this again
to their companies
-When the financial results are announced (June)
we send local and national press releases either
praising the companies for returning money to
customers or criticising them for their very high
profits
A1: CCW plays an important role and are doing a
good job as watch dogs of the industry. Their
views are quite often taken on board and influence
decisions. They are also an important part of
annual billing literature
C1: OFWAT is efficient- yet complex. They got
the cost of capital calculations wrong, but overall
the process is getting better. The quality of
regulation could be improved. When they started
off it was really and thus they raised their profile
of customer relationships. But since then- they
have been slipping up and now they keep on
relying on their good reputation from the past.
They are being outstripped by the companies and
their tools are not progressive enough to catch up
to companies pace. After the Water Act 2004,
Ofwat started to change and they realised that they
need to get modernised in line with companies.
The problem with Aquarius is that they need to
get it right too- because currently its too complex-
especially for members of the committee to use. It
shows the level of complexity in the system- but it
needs to be a single model and they need to
highlight certain elements to make it transparent.
O2: June Returns-looking at the financial
performance of companies over the years. The
process includes: consultation strategy- including
meetings/internet chats) and individual responses.
(This includes responses from companies on the
strategy as well)- August Business plan- drafts;
Templates developed for all the information
required. The process is highly data hungry and
computerised. It is efficient (look at number of
staff?) and is very transparent- data requirements,
but the timing is limiting and therefore the
information sharing process is selective. There are
talks of reviewing the time period for reviews- and
making it 6 years to coincide with water
framework directive. [Personal opinion: this
would be better]. The process has “grown” over
the years- making it easier- compared to when
they started. The tools could be easier with
computer systems- but this is the best it could be
at the moment. The Reservoir will help to clarify a
lot of issues within Aquarius model. Project
Reservoir is good timing- and this allows them to
review the information requirements as well.
 Service provisions (quality, price,
affordability)
A1: Currently they have 62% meter coverage in
the area. They are operating in one of the driest
areas in the country and therefore always strive to
save water and balancing it with water efficiency.
The make use of radio advertsing, tv (bbc) and
have strong marketing strategy. For example they
promote a lot of retrofits, especially for toilet
facilities- and install them for free eg. Shower
timers. The metering system works well. Meters
are installed free of charge. There is a leakage
control team out constantly and the company
spends £15M annually on leakage targets. The
support for meters from customers are varied and
therefore there is a testing period- if people do not
like it- they can remain on the flat rates.
D7: Pay £30 per month- prefer flat rates, give me
control over bills. Anglian water services are
good- no problems, though bill is unclear. Do not
know Ofwat or CCWater.
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Appendix F: NWASCO Price-setting Schedule
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Appendix G: Detailed Schedule of Ofwat, PR09 Price-setting process
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Appendix H: Summary of NamWater Financial Statements (and related calculations) as collated from the Annual
Reports.
PPP (Int $)
Year Inflation rate Indexed Real PPP (Int $) England Zambia
1997 100.00 2.11
1998 6.2 106.19 1.98 2.809 0.652 836.77
1999 8.6 115.38 1.83 2.969 0.646 1064.96
2000 9.2 126.05 1.67 3.661 0.644 1292.79
2001 9.3 137.77 1.53 3.979 0.653 1522.9
2002 11.3 153.34 1.37 4.329 0.659 1786.62
2003 7.3 164.49 1.28 4.282 0.655 2090.05
2004 4.2 171.36 1.23 4.294 0.649 2414.81
2005 2.3 175.23 1.20 4.265 0.645 2660.91
2006 5.1 184.09 1.14 4.511 0.646 2839.26
2007 6.7 196.46 1.07 4.803 0.647 3082.42
2008 7.2 210.60 1.00 5.18 0.655 3292.12
Conversion Rates-Namibia
Sources:
2008, World Development Indicators
Bank of Namibia
Bank of Namibia
PPP Figures- IMF @ 24 April 2009
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2008 Price 2008 2008 2008 2008
Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP
1.83 5.18 1.67 5.18 1.53 5.18 1.37 5.18
Items 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002
N$'000 N$'000 N$'000
Treated Water Volume Sold (m3) 71,014
Re-worked Toal operating income 0 0 0 0 0 0 247,990 340,606 65,754
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue 160,116,125 292,273,416 56,423 168,434 281,428 54,330 210,421 321,669 62,098 231,769 318,327 61,453
Reworked Revenue 160,116,125 292,273,416 56,423,439 168,434 281,428 54,330 210,421 321,669 62,098 231,769 318,327 61,453
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cost of Sales 140,308,696 256,117,252 49,443,485 150,661 251,732 48,597 173,853 265,768 51,306 214,427 294,508 56,855
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gross Profit 19,807,429 36,156,164 6,979,955 17,773 29,696 5,733 36,568 55,901 10,792 17,342 23,819 4,598
Reworked Gross Profit 19,807,429 36,156,164 -49,387,061 17,773 29,696 5,733 36,568 55,901 10,792 17,342 23,819 4,598
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other operating income 22,941,079 41,876,279 8,084,224 21,771 36,376 7,022 21,161 32,349 6,245 16,221 22,279 4,301
Reworked operating income 22,941,079 41,876,279 8,084,224 21,771 36,376 7,022 21,161 32,349 6,245 16,221 22,279 4,301
Administrative expenses 41,150,697 75,115,825 14,501,124 36,453 60,907 11,758 36,638 56,008 10,812 46,585 63,983 12,352
Other operating expenses 5,977,276 10,910,824 2,106,337 2,921 4,881 942 0 0 0 0 0
Expenses 0 0 0 0 0 0 261,012 358,491 69,207
Expenses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reworked expenses 0 0 0 0 0 0 261,012 358,491 69,207
Advertising and community outreach 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,912 2,626 507
Auditors remuneration 0 0 0 0 0 0 195 268 52
Bad debts provision 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,669 9,160 1,768
Impairment charge for bad and doubtful debts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank charges 0 0 0 0 0 0 145 199 38
Changes in inventory, operating gains and asset clearings 0 0 0 0 0 0 -14 -19 -4
Clearings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consultancy and contractor fees 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,142 9,809 1,894
Courier services 0 0 0 0 0 0 139 191 37
Depreciation 0 0 0 0 0 0 65,672 90,198 17,413
Depreciation and amortisation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Directors fees 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 89 17
Employment costs 78,214 142,771 27,562 89,471 149,492 28,860 91,552 139,955 27,018 105,049 144,281 27,854
Entertainment 0 0 0 0 0 0 226 310 60
Fleet services 0 0 0 0 0 0 17,602 24,176 4,667
Impairment of fixed assets* 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,469 39,101 7,549
Insurances 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,442 3,354 647
Maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 14,616 20,075 3,875
Materials and supplies 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,325 16,928 3,268
Membership and subscriptions 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 412 80
Other sundry expenses 0 0 0 0 0 0 107 147 28
Printing and stationery 0 0 0 0 0 0 928 1,275 246
Property charges 0 0 0 0 0 0 944 1,297 250
Security services 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,371 1,883 364
Training courses 0 0 0 0 0 0 559 768 148
Travel, subsistence and accomodation 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,215 3,042 587
Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,939 43,867 8,469
Recoupment of internal charges and project costs capitalised 0 0 0 0 0 0 -40,005 -54,946 -10,607
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit/(Loss) from Operations -4,379 -7,994 -1,543 170 284 54,835 21,091 32,242 6,224 -13,022 -17,885 -3,453
Reworked Profit/ (loss) from operations 89,876,481 164,059,092 31,671,639 78,918 131,860 25,456 94,367 144,258 27,849 80,148 110,081 21,251
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest received 6,860,952 12,523,872 2,417,736 5,105 8,530 1,647 4,567 6,982 1,348 4,567 6,273 1,211
Reworked Interest received 6,860,952 12,523,872 2,417,736 5,105 8,530 1,647 4,567 6,982 1,348 4,567 6,273 1,211
Interest received 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,642 2,255 435
Interest received-trade debtors 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,925 4,017 776
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finance Costs 10,416,581 19,014,261 3,670,707 4,105 6,859 1,324 8,300 12,688 2,449 22,234 30,538 5,895
Reworked Finance Costs 10,416,581 19,014,261 3,670,707 4,105 6,859 8,300 12,688 2,449 -22,234 -30,538 -5,895
Interest paid 0 0 0 0 0 0 -14,322 -19,671 -3,797
Profit/(loss) on foreign exchage transactions 0 0 0 0 0 0 -7,912 -10,867 -2,098
Gains on foreign exchange transactions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit/(Loss) before Tax -7,935,094 -14,484,594 -2,796,254 1,170 1,955 377 17,443 26,665 5,148 -30,689 -42,150 -8,137
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reworked Profit/(loss) before tax 17,273,154 31,530,138 6,086,899 9,380 15,673 57,806 33,958 51,911 10,021 13,779 18,925 3,653
Taxation 0 0 0 3,647 6,094 1,176 -7,009 -10,715 -2,068 6,240 8,570 1,655
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Proft/(Loss) for the Year -7,935,094 -14,484,594 -2,796,254 4,817 8,048 1,554 10,434 15,950 3,079 -24,449 -33,580 -6,483
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reworked Net Proft/(loss) for the year -7,935,094 -14,484,594 -2,796,254 4,817 8,048 1,554 10,434 15,950 3,079 -24,449 -33,580 -6,483
Convertion rates
Income Statement (Re-worked) from period 1999-2002
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2008 2008 2008 2008
Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP
1.28 5.18 1.23 5.18 1.20 5.18 1.14 5.18
Items 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006
N$'000 N$'000 N$'000 N$'000
Treated Water Volume Sold (m3) 64,575
Re-worked Toal operating income 246,962 316,191 61,041 272,270 334,623 64,599 321,478 386,375 74,590 362,991 415,263 80,167
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue 236,885 303,289 58,550 263,466 323,803 62,510 314,547 378,045 72,982 349,979 400,377 77,293
Reworked Revenue 236,885 303,289 58,550 263,466 323,803 62,510 314,547 378,045 72,982 349,979 400,377 77,293
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cost of Sales 203,190 260,149 50,222 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gross Profit 33,695 43,141 8,328 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reworked Gross Profit 33,695 43,141 8,328 263,466 323,803 62,510 314,547 378,045 72,982 349,979 400,377 77,293
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other operating income 10,077 12,902 2,491 8,804 10,820 2,089 6,931 8,330 1,608 13,012 14,886 2,874
Reworked operating income 10,077 12,902 2,491 8,804 10,820 2,089 6,931 8,330 1,608 13,012 14,886 2,874
Administrative expenses 51,181 65,528 12,650 37,385 45,947 8,870 40,998 49,274 9,512 60,923 69,696 13,455
Other operating expenses 0 0 0 283,119 347,957 67,173 243,011 292,068 56,384 252,458 288,813 55,755
Expenses 254,371 325,677 62,872 320,504 393,903 76,043 284,009 341,342 65,896 313,381 358,509 69,210
Expenses 0 0 0 334,493 411,096 79,362 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reworked expenses 254,371 325,677 62,872 320,504 393,903 76,043 284,009 341,342 65,896 313,381 358,509 69,210
Advertising and community outreach 1,049 1,343 259 660 811 157 571 686 132 855 978 189
Auditors remuneration 594 761 147 339 417 80 249 299 58 325 372 72
Bad debts provision 13,464 17,238 3,328 0 0 0 24,713 29,702 5,734 30,092 34,425 6,646
Impairment charge for bad and doubtful debts 0 0 0 29,986 36,853 7,115 0 0 0 194 222 43
Bank charges 181 232 45 287 353 68 180 216 42 0 0 0
Changes in inventory, operating gains and asset clearings 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -71 -81 -16
Clearings 0 0 0 23 28 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consultancy and contractor fees 4,493 5,752 1,111 2,601 3,197 617 2,838 3,411 658 2,107 2,410 465
Courier services 177 227 44 160 197 38 153 184 35 203 232 45
Depreciation 67,782 86,783 16,753 72,854 89,538 17,285 79,282 95,287 18,395 0 0 0
Depreciation and amortisation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78,843 90,197 17,412
Directors fees 234 300 58 80 98 19 57 69 13 48 55 11
Employment costs 100,530 128,711 24,848 96,876 119,062 22,985 92,322 110,959 21,421 105,475 120,664 23,294
Entertainment 247 316 61 115 141 27 49 59 11 77 88 17
Fleet services 18,006 23,054 4,450 14,391 17,687 3,414 11,632 13,980 2,699 11,719 13,407 2,588
Impairment of fixed assets* 9,829 12,584 2,429 56,194 69,063 13,333 336 404 78 6 7 1
Insurances 4,122 5,277 1,019 4,311 5,298 1,023 2,800 3,365 650 2,704 3,093 597
Maintenance 16,649 21,316 4,115 12,162 14,947 2,886 9,218 11,079 2,139 9,942 11,374 2,196
Materials and supplies 12,888 16,501 3,185 10,990 13,507 2,607 11,452 13,764 2,657 12,508 14,309 2,762
Membership and subscriptions 349 447 86 221 272 52 237 285 55 1,716 1,963 379
Other sundry expenses 421 539 104 179 220 42 179 215 42 118 135 26
Printing and stationery 380 487 94 434 533 103 588 707 136 310 355 68
Property charges 801 1,026 198 780 959 185 846 1,017 196 894 1,023 197
Security services 1,362 1,744 337 1,740 2,138 413 1,610 1,935 374 1,538 1,759 340
Training courses 723 926 179 198 243 47 363 436 84 568 650 125
Travel, subsistence and accomodation 1,770 2,266 437 1,255 1,542 298 1,102 1,324 256 1,267 1,449 280
Utilities 39,132 50,102 9,672 42,904 52,730 10,179 48,374 58,139 11,224 55,434 63,417 12,243
Recoupment of internal charges and project costs capitalised -40,812 -52,253 -10,087 -29,236 -35,931 -6,937 -5,141 -6,179 -1,193 -3,491 -3,994 -771
0 0 0 -297,108 -365,149 -70,492 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit/(Loss) from Operations -7,409 -9,486 -1,831 -48,234 -59,280 -11,444 37,469 45,033 8,694 49,610 56,754 10,956
Reworked Profit/ (loss) from operations 94,953 121,571 23,469 592,774 404,724 78,132 605,487 349,672 67,504 676,372 773,771 149,377
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest received 9,279 11,880 2,293 6,240 7,669 1,481 7,496 9,009 1,739 14,878 17,020 3,286
Reworked Interest received 9,279 11,880 2,293 6,240 7,669 1,481 7,496 9,009 1,739 14,878 17,020 3,286
Interest received 4,204 5,382 1,039 5,044 6,199 1,197 5,638 6,776 1,308 12,229 13,990 2,701
Interest received-trade debtors 5,075 6,498 1,254 1,196 1,470 284 1,858 2,233 431 2,649 3,030 585
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finance Costs 24,604 31,501 6,081 27,150 33,368 6,442 17,076 20,523 3,962 21,697 24,821 4,792
Reworked Finance Costs -24,604 -31,501 -6,081 -27,150 -33,368 -6,442 20,134 24,198 4,672 -21,697 -24,821 -4,792
Interest paid -26,110 -33,429 -6,454 -27,973 -34,379 -6,637 18,605 22,361 4,317 -23,087 -26,412 -5,099
Profit/(loss) on foreign exchage transactions 1,506 1,928 372 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gains on foreign exchange transactions 0 0 0 823 1,011 195 1,529 1,838 355 1,390 1,590 307
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Profit/(Loss) before Tax -22,734 -29,107 -5,619 -69,144 -84,979 -16,405 27,889 33,519 6,471 42,791 48,953 9,450
0 0 -83,133 -102,171 -19,724 0 0 0 0
Reworked Profit/(loss) before tax 26,474 33,895 6,543 -14,844 -18,243 -3,522 62,041 74,565 14,395 86,185 98,596 19,034
Taxation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -593 -678 -131
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Proft/(Loss) for the Year -22,734 -29,107 -5,619 -69,144 -84,979 -16,405 27,889 33,519 6,471 42,198 48,275 9,319
0 0 -83,133 -102,171 -19,724 0 0 0 0
Reworked Net Proft/(loss) for the year -22,734 -29,107 -5,619 -69,144 -84,979 -16,405 27,889 33,519 6,471 42,198 48,275 9,319
Convertion rates
Income Statement (Re-worked) from period 2003-2006
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Notes to Income Statement- colour coded to match colors in Income Statement
2005 Annual Report-different figure compared to 2004 Annual report
Detailed income statement only available since 2002
Find out more about these
Detailed income statement items-Hidden
*- note in 2004 mentioned (as analyses in the Directors' Report- find out about this!!
Find out more about these-hidden
Have detailed items hidden
Administrative and other expenses are summed up under detailed income statement under
expenes
Need clarification!!
Recorded and reworked not matching!
major hidden items for further calculations
Figure different from 2004 Annual Report
Not included in income statement- added from notes of Annual Report
Figures not adding up with detailed income statement info
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Balance Sheet for period 1998-2002:
2008 Prices
Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP
1.98 5.18 1.83 4.27 1.67 5.18 1.53 5.18 1.37 5.18
Items 1998 1998 1998 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002
N$'000 N$'000 N$'000
ASSETS
-2,851 -12,178
Non-current Assets 954,731,563 1,893,487,378 365,538,104 960,208,713 1,752,749,643 410,961,229 0 0 -15,280
Property, plant and equipment 954,731,563 1,893,487,378 365,538,104 955,056,069 1,743,344,089 408,755,941 978,390 1634740.5 315,586.96 1,053,854.00 1,611,018.03 311,007.34 1,145,243.00 1,572,953.67 303,659.01
Intangible Assets 0 0 0 5,152,644 9,405,554 2,205,288 4,656 7779.4658 1501.827375 636 972 188 883 1,213 234
Deferred tax assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,098 48618.32 9385.775979 0 0 0 2,878 3,953 763
Total non-current assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,012,144 1691138.2 326,475 1,054,490 1,611,990 311,195 1,149,004 1,578,119 304,656
Reworked total non-current assets 954,731,563 1,893,487,378 365,538,104 960,208,713 1,752,749,643 410,961,229 1,012,144 1691138.2 326474.5633 1,054,490 1,611,990 311,195 1,149,004 1,578,119 304,656
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current Assets 64,389,772 127,702,095 24,652,914 75,935,290 138,611,065 32,499,664 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inventories 243,441 482,808 93,206 209,369 382,179 89,608 250 417.71187 80.63935647 209 319 62 213 293 56
Accounts receiveable 46,203,298 91,633,465 17,689,858 41,562,412 75,867,363 17,788,362 25,923 43313.379 8361.656151 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trade and other receiveables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44,949 68,713 13,265 50,512 69,377 13,393
Funds at call 15,473,662 30,688,400 5,924,401 28,087,790 51,271,003 12,021,337 26,779 44743.624 8637.765308 58,367 89,225 17,225 28,575 39,247 7,577
Bank balances and cash 2,469,371 4,897,421 945,448 6,075,719 11,090,520 2,600,356 7,768 12979.143 2505.626084 4,955 7,575 1,462 20,172 27,706 5,349
Total current assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 60,720 101453.86 19,585.69 108,480 165,832 32,014 99,472 136,622 26,375
Reworked total current assets 64,389,772 127,702,095 24,652,914 75,935,290 138,611,065 32,499,664 60,720 101453.86 19585.6869 108,480 165,832 32,014 99,472 136,622 26,375
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets 1,019,121,335 2,021,189,472 390,191,018 1,036,144,003 1,891,360,708 443,460,893 1,072,864 1792592.1 346060.2502 1,162,970 1,777,823 343,209 1,248,476 1,714,741 331,031
Reworked total assets 1,019,121,335 2,021,189,472 390,191,018 1,996,352,716 3,644,110,351 854,422,122 1,072,864 1792592.1 346060.2502 1,162,970 1,777,823 343,209 1,248,476 1,714,741 331,031
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capital and reserves 959,054,444 1,902,060,804 367,193,205 951,119,350 1,736,158,065 407,071,059 0 0 0 0 0 0
Share capital 959,054,444 1,902,060,804 367,193,205 959,054,444 1,750,642,659 410,467,212 959,054 1602432.9 309349.9895 959,054 1,466,098 283,031 959,054 1,317,229 254,291
Development reserve 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,000 15,287 2,951 10,000 13,735 2,651
Accumulated loss 0 0 0 -7,935,094 -14,484,594 -3,396,153 -3,118 -5209.7024 -1005.734054 -6,627 -10,131 -1,956 -31,076 -42,682 -8,240
Ordinary shareholders interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 955,936 1597223.2 308344.2555 962,427 1,471,254 284,026 937,978 1,288,282 248,703
Reworked capital and reserves/ordinary shareholders interest 959,054,444 1,902,060,804 367,193,205 951,119,350 1,736,158,065 407,071,059 955,936 1597223.2 308344.2555 962,427 1,471,254 284,026 937,978 1,288,282 248,703
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-current liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deferred tax liability 0 0 0 0 0 25,451 42524.739 8,209.41 3,362 5,139 992 0 0 0
Deferred revenue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34,400 52,587 10,152 101,731 139,724 26,974
Long term liabilities 36,588,220 72,564,201 14,008,533 61,524,584 112,305,993 26,332,003 56,737 94798.873 18,301 110,435 168,821 32,591 139,850 192,079 37,081
Post retirement medical provision 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total non-current liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 82,188 137323.61 26,510 148,197 226,548 43,735 241,581 331,804 64,055
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reworked total non-current liabilities 36,588,220 72,564,201 14,008,533 61,524,584 112,305,993 26,332,003 82,188 137323.61 26510.34972 148,197 226,548 43,735 241,581 331,804 64,055
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current liabilities 23,478,671 46,564,468 8,989,280 23,500,069 42,896,650 10,057,831 0 0 0 0 0 0
Account payable 21,381,855 42,405,922 8,186,472 20,338,256 37,125,128 8,704,602 30,935 51687.666 9978.31397 0 0 0 0
Trade and other payables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46,364 70,876 13,683 65,227 89,587 17,295
Current portion of long term liabilities 958,325 1,900,614 366,914 2,507,450 4,577,059 1,073,167 2,850 4761.9153 919.2886638 3,242 4,956 957 3,690 5,068 978
Bank overdraft 1,138,491 2,257,931 435,894 654,363 1,194,464 280,062 955 1595.6593 308.0423417 2,740 4,189 809 0 0 0
Total current liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 34,740 58045.241 11205.64498 52,346 80,021 15,448 68,917 94,655 18,273
Reworked current liabilities 23,478,671 46,564,468 8,989,280 23,500,069 42,896,650 10,057,831 34,740 58045.241 11205.64498 52,346 80,021 15,448 68,917 94,655 18,273
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 60,066,891 119,128,669 22,997,812 85,024,653 155,202,643 36,389,834 116,928 195368.85 37715.99469 200,543 306,568 59,183 310,498 426,459 82,328
Total equity and liabilities 1,019,121,335 2,021,189,472 390,191,018 1,036,144,003 1,891,360,708 443,460,893 1,072,864 1792592.1 346060.2502 1,162,970 1,777,823 343,209 1,248,476 1,714,741 331,031
Reworked total equity and liabilities 1,019,121,335 2,021,189,472 390,191,018 1,036,144,003 1,891,360,708 443,460,893 1,072,864 1792592.1 346060.2502 1,162,970 1,777,823 343,209 1,248,476 1,714,741 331,031
Convertion rates
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Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP Nominal Real PPP
1.28 5.18 1.23 5.18 1.20 5.18 1.14 5.18
Items 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006
N$'000 N$'000 N$'000 N$'000
ASSETS
-8,620 -34,925 739 6,246
Non-current Assets -15,345 -26,188 -17,327 -24,950
Property, plant and equipment 1,165,513.00 1,492,233.84 288,076.03 1,104,979.00 1,358,032.86 262,168.51 1,056,339.00 1,269,582.30 245,093.11 996,319.00 1,139,791.59 220,036.99
Intangible Assets 2,121 2,716 524 1,149 1,412 273 155 186 36 791 904.9061093 174.692299
Deferred tax assets 2,878 3,685 711 2,878 3,537 683 2,878 3,459 668 2,878 3292.439675 635.606115
Total non-current assets 1,170,512 1,498,634 289,312 1,109,006 1,362,982 263,124 1,059,372 1,273,228 245,797 999,988 1143988.939 220,847
Reworked total non-current assets 1,170,512 1,498,634 289,312 1,109,006 1,362,982 263,124 1,059,372 1,273,228 245,797 999,988 1143988.939 220847.285
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inventories 344 440 85 263 323 62 214 257 50 259 296.2966907 57.2001333
Accounts receiveable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trade and other receiveables 53,126 68,018 13,131 44,764 55,016 10,621 49,551 59,554 11,497 47,858 54749.67962 10569.4362
Funds at call 50,337 64,448 12,442 39,705 48,798 9,420 85,359 102,590 19,805 206,649 236407.0071 45638.4184
Bank balances and cash 30,110 38,551 7,442 17,952 22,063 4,259 47,743 57,381 11,077 78,603 89922.04161 17359.4675
Total current assets 133,917 171,457 33,100 102,684 126,200 24,363 182,867 219,782 42,429 333,369 381375.025 73,624.52
Reworked total current assets 133,917 171,457 33,100 102,684 126,200 24,363 182,867 219,782 42,429 333,369 381375.025 73624.5222
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets 1,304,429 1,670,091 322,411 1,211,690 1,489,182 287,487 1,242,239 1,493,010 288,226 1,333,357 1525363.964 294471.808
Reworked total assets 1,304,429 1,670,091 322,411 1,211,690 1,489,182 287,487 1,242,239 1,493,010 288,226 1,333,357 1525363.964 294471.808
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capital and reserves 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Share capital 959,054 1,227,900 237,046 959,054 1,178,689 227,546 959,054 1,152,658 222,521 959,054 1097160.333 211807.014
Development reserve 10,000 12,803 2,472 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accumulated loss -53,810 -68,894 -13,300 -112,954 -138,822 -26,800 -99,054 -119,050 -22,983 -56,856 -65043.41562 -12556.6439
Ordinary shareholders interest 915,244 1,171,809 226,218 846,100 1,039,867 200,747 860,000 1,033,608 199,538 902,198 1032116.918 199250.37
Reworked capital and reserves/ordinary shareholders interest 915,244 1,171,809 226,218 846,100 1,039,867 200,747 860,000 1,033,608 199,538 902,198 1032116.918 199250.37
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-current liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deferred tax liability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deferred revenue 114,690 146,840 28,348 111,336 136,833 26,416 119,312 143,398 27,683 166,677 190678.9325 36810.6047
Long term liabilities 199,196 255,035 49,235 206,391 253,657 48,969 197,120 236,913 45,736 177,970 203598.1546 39304.663
Post retirement medical provision 0 0 0 13,989 17,193 3,319 16,250 19,530 3,770 16,250 18590.04333 3588.81145
Total non-current liabilities 313,886 401,876 77,582 317,727 390,490 75,384 332,682 399,841 77,189 360,897 412867.1304 79,704
0 0 331,716 407,683 78,703 0 0 0 0
Reworked total non-current liabilities 313,886 401,876 77,582 331,716 407,683 78,703 332,682 399,841 77,189 360,897 412867.1304 79704.0792
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Account payable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trade and other payables 62,580 80,123 15,468 31,794 39,075 7,543 26,496 31,845 6,148 39,949 45701.76253 8822.73408
Current portion of long term liabilities 12,719 16,284 3,144 16,069 19,749 3,813 23,061 27,716 5,351 30,313 34678.15283 6694.6241
Bank overdraft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total current liabilities 75,299 96,407 18,611 47,863 58,824 11,356 49,557 59,561 11,498 70,262 80379.91537 15517.3582
Reworked current liabilities 75,299 96,407 18,611 47,863 58,824 11,356 49,557 59,561 11,498 70,262 80379.91537 15517.3582
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 389,185 498,283 96,194 365,590 449,315 86,740 382,239 459,402 88,688 431,159 493247.0458 95221.4374
Total equity and liabilities 1,304,429 1,670,091 322,411 1,211,690 1,489,182 287,487 1,242,239 1,493,010 288,226 1,333,357 1525363.964 294471.808
Reworked total equity and liabilities 1,304,429 1,670,091 322,411 1,211,690 1,489,182 287,487 1,242,239 1,493,010 288,226 1,333,357 1525363.964 294471.808
Convertion rates
Balance Sheet for period 2003-2006:
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Notes to Balance sheet
Notes
2005 Annual Report-added figure that was not in 2004 Annual Report
Bank overdraft stopped from 2002??
Share capital always the same since 1998?
Difference between capital and reserves and ordinary shareholders
interest??
Find out more about it
Reworked calculations
Additional calculations
Recorded and reworked not matching!
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Financial Ratios calculated based on financial statement figures above.
Equations
Target
range: 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Profitability ratios [%]
Return on Fixed Assets (ROFA):
Profit before interest and tax (PBIT)/(average) Net
Fixed Assets x 100 0.000 0.017 2.000 -1.133 -0.633 -4.349 3.537 4.961
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE):
Profit before interest and tax x 100/Capital Employed
(total assets less current liabilities) 6 to 8 0.000 0.016 1.899 -1.104 -0.603 -4.144 3.142 3.928
Net Profit Margin:
Profit before interest and tax x 100/Sales or
Turnover -0.003 0.101 10.023 -5.619 -3.128 -18.307 11.912 14.175
Net Asset Margin: Sales or Turnover/Capital Employed 0.158 0.162 0.189 0.189 0.193 0.226 0.264 0.277
Gross Profit Margin: Gross profit x 100/ Sales or Turnover 12.371 10.552 17.378 7.482 14.224
Efficiency ratios
Debtor days or Debtors' ratio: Debtors x 365/ Credit Sales (or Turnover) 90 95 56 78 80 82 62 57 50
Creditor days or Creditors' ratio: Trade creditors x 365 / Cost of Sales 60 53 75 97 111 112
Fixed Assets turnover: Sales or Turnover/Fixed Assets 0.167 0.166 0.200 0.202 0.202 0.238 0.297 0.350
Operating ratio:
(Operating expenses-Depreciation)/Operating
income 0.6 0.79 0.76 0.91 0.64 0.86
Liquidity Ratios
Current ratio: Current Assets/Current Liabilities 1 to 2 1.968 3.231 1.748 2.072 1.443 1.778 2.145 3.690 4.745
Quick ratio: Current Assets less Stock/Current Liabilities 2.732 3.222 1.741 2.068 1.440 1.774 2.140 3.686 4.741
Financial Gearing ratios
Gearing: Long-term debt x 100/Capital Employed 0.037 0.061 0.055 0.099 0.119 0.162 0.177 0.165 0.141
Debt equity ratio: Long-term debt x 100/ Share capital and reserves >100 0.038 0.065 0.059 0.115 0.149 0.218 0.244 0.229 0.197
Interest cover and interst gearing: Profit before interest and tax/interest charges 0.91 0.28 1.72 2.01 -2.15
Investors ratios
Return on Equity:
Earnings after tax and preference
dividends/Shareholders' funds -0.834 0.504 1.084 -2.607 -2.484 -8.172 3.243 4.677
NamWater Financial Ratios
Sources:
For Equations: Watson, D and Head, A, 2007. Corporate Finance. Principles and Practice. 4th Edition. Pearson Education Limited, England
For Target Ranges: Franceys, R, 2006. Lecture Notes. Cranfield University
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Appendix I: National Bulk Tariff increases (and Windhoek)-1998-2006
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
National tariffs (annual averages) (N$) 2.00 2.40 2.59 3.11 3.25 3.67 4.11 4.60 5.16 5.75
Real tariffs (incl inflation) 4.21 4.76 4.73 5.20 4.97 5.04 5.26 5.65 6.20 6.58
Real tariffs converted to US$ [2007:7.1] 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.80 0.88 0.93
Real tariffs converted to PPP [2008:5.18] 0.81 0.92 0.91 1.00 0.96 0.97 1.02 1.09 1.20 1.27
National tariff % increases 30 35 20 20 12 12 17 18 13 12 12 11.5
Windhoek (Von Bach Scheme Tariff increase %) ? 20 8 20 5 13 12 12 12 11.5
Recorded Bulk Water Tariffs and % increases
Sources:
DWA (2007). Terms of reference for tender to
review and evaluate current tariff system.
Government Gazette July 2001; Government Gazette
June 1998; Government Gazette June 1999; Government
Gazette June 2003; Government Gazette June 2006;
Government Gazette March 2000; Government Gazette
March 2005; Government Gazette October 2002
Self calculated- not provided in June 2006
Gazette
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Appendix J: Cost implications for sanitation systems for low-income
areas in Windhoek
Area Name #ofH
ouses
N
o.ofToilets
#T
oilet/H
ouse
ratio
C
om
m
ents
#T
oilets
needed
@
5
H
H
/Toilet
#T
oilets
needed
@
10
H
H
/Toilet
Shortfall
of
T
oilets
@
5
&
10
H
H
/Toilet
C
ostIm
plications
@
5
H
H
/
@
10
H
H
@
costof
N
$
8200.00
/U
nit
Epandulo 205 0 No toilets 40 20 40/20 328 000.00/
164 000.00
Freedom Land A 88 4 46 18 9 14/5 114 800.00/
41 000.00
Freedom Land B 90 4 57 Only 2 toilets
are working
18 9 14/5 114 800.00/
41 000.00
Greenwell Matongo
C
482 16 30 96 48 80/32 656 000.00/
262 400.00
Greenwell Matongo
D
380 16 24 4 toilets not
working
76 38 60/22 492 000.00/
180 400.00
Jonas Haiduwa 339 0 No toilets 66 33 66/33 541 200.00/
270 600.00
Kahumba ka Ndola
A
179 12 15 70 35 58/23 475 600.00/
188 600.00
Kahumba ka Ndola
B
120 12 10 48 24 36/12 295 200.00/
98 400.00
Kapuka Nauyala 50 2 25 10 5 8/3 65 600.00/
24 600.00
Okandundu 355 4 89 Not yet open 70 35 66/31 541 200.00/
254 200.00
Okatunda 384 0 No toilets 76 38 76/38 623 200.00/
311 600.00
Omuramba 160 0 No toilets 32 16 32/16 262
000.00/131
200.00
Omuthiya 250 6 42 50 25 44/19 360 800.00/
155 800.00
Ondelitotela A 328 0 No toilets 65 32 65/32 533 000.00/
262 400.00
Ondelitotela B 517 0 No toilets 100 50 100/50 820 000.00/
410 000.00
One Nation 1,2
and 3
1081 0 No toilets 216 108 216/108 1 771 200.00/
885 600.00
Onguo Ye Pongo 2 356 6 59 71 35 65/29 533 000.00/
237 800.00
Onyika 2 420 10 42 84 42 74/32 606 800.00/
262 400.00
Okahandja Park D 78 0 No toilets 15 7 15/7 123 000.00/
57 400.00
Oohambo dha
Nehale
480 0 No toilets 96 48 96/48 787 200.00/
393 600.00
Havana level 1 940 146 6 188 94 42/+52 344 400.00
Havana level 2 416 155 3 83 41 -/-
Samuel Maharero 425 4 106 85 42 81/38 664 200.00/
311 600.00
TOTAL
Source: Water and Sanitation Committee. 2007. Draft Preliminary Report on current situation on sanitation facilities in informal
settlements, with particular reference to dry sanitation units in Hanavana and Okahandja Park areas. City of Windhoek. Namibia
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Appendix K: Experiences from Electricity Control Board as described by
ECB interviewees (2007,2008)
Official records show that the Electricity Act of 2000 established the Electricity Control Board (ECB) as an independent electricity
industry regulator reporting to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, based on recommendations from a feasibility study that stated that
electricity tariffs were not cost reflective and hence steady increases in the tariff are needed until 2010 to get tariffs up to date (ECB,
2006b: 1-3). The ECB started implementing its tariff determination methodology in 2003 and is primarily responsible for ensuring that
fair tariffs are charged at all three operational levels (generations, transmission and distribution) to end users as well to ensure financial
and environmental sustainability. It generates its income primarily from the levies (0.006 c/KWH in 2007/08) from utilities that are paid
by their clients. The electricity distribution function of Local Authorities (receiving royalty surcharges as a result) and private distributors
within regions have been transformed into 5 Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs) which are licence holders and receives bulk supply
from NamPower (para-statal) following the single buyer market structure model (ECB, 2006a: 13). Tariff calculations are reviewed based
on “rate of return minus the weighted average cost of capital”, using an Asset Register (Namibia Electricity Network Assets (NENA))
database. The ECB facilitates the tariff determination process through supporting local authorities to ring fence their electricity
undertakings (ECB, 2006b: 5). Various quality of supply and service standards are established and are also used for benchmarking
purposes through the SADC Regional Electricity Regulator Association (RERA) (ECB, 2006a: 27). Except for the pre-paid electricity
(includes paying unit charge and levy) system that is targeted for the urban poor, there are no pro-poor tariffs established yet (this is being
investigated). The ECB makes use of multi- and single-part tariff system which includes basic fix charges, unit charges and levies while
the latter includes only unit charges and levies. In this regard, the general public perception towards ECB is negative due to association to
electricity price increases.
In the light of discussing the establishment of a potential water regulator, two interviewees explained the establishment process (late
1990s) of the ECB as an intensive process of stakeholder consultations and staff training (with support from external consultants), with
special focus on local authorities and decision makers (politicians). The entire process (tariff study) was donor driven (Norwegian) and
the initial financial support to establish the ECB was government funded. The interviewees emphasised that the Electricity Act (2000)
forms the backbone of the process with clear guidelines on operations (including enforcement mechanisms, quality and supply service
standards), hence there is very minimal political interference such that “when it comes to tariff determination, the regulator has the final
say”. The interviewees further mention that the process is very slow in the beginning, especially in terms of developing guidelines and
procedures, however once the stakeholders have a clear understanding on the basics (and principles) as to why and how things are done it
becomes easier and the benefits are clearly visible. One interviewee indicated that the strength of the reform process was the “politician
targeted approach”. There were various ministers’ workshops where the tariff methodology (included calculating price paths and
forecasts) were explained and refined. Furthermore, the training with external consultants had an element of ‘local shadow’, which
ensured that locals (Namibians from MME and other research institutions) were trained during the studies for continuity and
sustainability purposes. The tariff determination process of the ECB also includes strengthening the debt collection process of the
utilities, through outsourcing of ECB tariff technicians and analysts to facilitate the process. However, the interviewees shared sentiments
that it is “easier” to deal with electricity compared to water sector, since the latter is also a social responsibility which makes it highly
politically motivated and hence the process is very sensitive.
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Appendix L: Water Industry Commission of Scotland financial model
examples.
Source: http://www.watercommission.co.uk/view_Financial_Model.aspx
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